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The immense value of the arts has long been recognized by diverse cultures and 
such recognition has mostly guaranteed their inclusion in educational and school 
curricula the world over. The arts are considered valuable for numerous reasons, 
but their inclusion depends on particular interpretations of their merits that may 
sometimes have failed to realise their full or real potential. Although some ways of 
valuing the arts date back to antiquity, debates about the value of arts certainly 
deserve no less consideration in the modern context. Plato was sceptical about the 
moral value of the arts and regarded them as of dubious educational significance. 
He thought the arts were more a matter of rhetoric than reason. However, taking a 
more positive view of the moral power of the arts, Aristotle defended both the arts 
and rhetoric as potentially contributory to personal formation and the development of 
moral virtue. At all events, if the arts are to remain educationally defensible, it is 
arguable that educational theorists and policy makers need to demonstrate their 
capacity for: (i) objective aesthetic judgement; and (ii) the communication of 
knowledge and/or truth. Both of these are contentious, as artistic and aesthetic 
value judgements have often been said to be subjective or personal. In this context, 
the distinction between judging something as good (which requires reasons) or 
simply liking it (which does not) is crucial. Here, establishing the objective rational 
character of the arts seems to be a precondition of demonstrating their potential for 
knowledge or truth. Arguably, however, there are different respects in which arts 
may be said to contribute to the development of understanding and appreciation in 
human agents of themselves, of their relationships with others and of the world, e.g.: 
(i) aesthetic (sensory) appreciation; (ii) development of imagination; (iii) 
understanding of aspects of human psychology; (iv) education of the emotions; (v) 
and moral understanding. In this essay, various philosophical defences of the 
‘intrinsic’ (personally formative) educational value of the arts will be drawn from the 
literature of philosophy and education. Following discussions of ancient arguments 
for and against the arts, the thesis will discuss at some length defences of the 
educational value of the arts offered by the American great books tradition, British 
literary and cultural critics and more recent educational philosophers and theorists. 
In the final ‘conceptual’ chapter of the thesis, two contemporary works of cinema are 
discussed to reinforce the key arguments of the thesis. However, having explored 
the nature and potential of the arts and arts education from a philosophical 
perspective, this study then seeks to enquire into recent Scottish educational policy 
developments with reference to the role of arts in arts education and in education 
more generally through: (i) the exploration of policy documents and official 
guidelines; and (ii) the voices of interviewees and other research participants 
involved in Scottish policy making. The thesis will conclude from this enquiry that the 
educational value and significance of the arts is not adequately appreciated in 
contemporary Scottish (and perhaps other) educational policy and practice. The 
study concludes by advocating a return to Aristotle’s conception of the arts as 
contributory to phronesis (the practical wisdom of virtue), rather than techne (the 
technical knowledge of skill). Narrow specialisation in forms of training are liable to 
leave people uninitiated into the wisdom and moral power of the arts –benefits that 
should ideally be available to all. From the perspective of this thesis, only a broad 
educational approach that encompasses thorough arts education will result in well-
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The Curriculum for Excellence was in its formative stages when I was a studying for 
an MSc in Education at Moray House School of Education. My background is in 
studies in Philosophy and Education and at the time I was eager to learn more about 
the values of education systems and their impact upon policy making. The 
development of a new school curriculum in Scotland presented an ideal opportunity 
for me to question currently prevalent notions of education and to consider what I 
would regard as worth including if I had the power to organise a school curriculum.  
This raised two key questions that would require discussion and clarification for a 
successful present study: (i) what does it mean to call someone ‘educated’? And (ii) 
to what extent is schooling concerned with the promotion of educated people? Other 
questions also emerged from these, such as: what is the best way to cultivate and/or 
educate people? And what disciplines or fields of education might most effectively 
help such cultivation? As someone who has always regarded the arts highly, and who 
has written several previous essays on their value, it seemed natural to me to suppose 
that the various arts should occupy not just an important but a central place in any 
balanced educational curriculum. 
From my time as a student in Scotland I realised that it is a country that celebrates 
arts with regular and numerous festivals (such as the world famous Edinburgh 
festival), exhibitions and performances. However I was also aware from reports in 
the press that audiences for arts events are in some decline. I thought this might mean 
that while Scottish people are ready to express themselves through various artistic 
means or performances, they are not so well equipped to appreciate the arts as 
audiences. This also seemed to be supported by a concern voiced by one of my MSc 
professors that young people do not seem to read literature for personal enjoyment as 
much as formerly. He illustrated this by pointing out that on public transport many 
(especially young) people seem to be using mobile phones or occupied with i-pods 
instead of reading books as they might have done in the past. My attention was also 






generally used in the Scottish 5–14 programme and Curriculum for Excellence to 
refer more to modes of creative practice than to activities of appreciation. In this 
light, I began to ask whether an ‘expressive’ approach to arts education was really 
adequate and whether perhaps a different approach might encourage a broader 
educational approach to the arts. Furthermore, this prompted me to question the very 
nature of the arts and to re-consider their full potential and educational value. 
It was during this time that I also came across Hopkins (2001, p.179) who argues that  
Much of the debate about education in the last twenty years has been about whether 
schools are getting better or getting worse. This, however, is an irrelevant question. 
The real issue is whether current provision is good enough for the challenges now 
facing us as a society. 
This gave me much food for thought in so far as it seems at odds with to my own 
beliefs. I have always believed that the ‘education’ of young and old should be about 
timeless values. Many issues that have preoccupied people all over the world since 
ancient times remain significant to the present day. For example, moral dilemmas of 
love, hate, freedom, power and personal illumination and redemption are enduring 
themes in artworks from the beginning of recorded time. However, in contemplating 
these ideas, I appreciated a profound truth that (the late Professor) McLaughlin 
points out (2000, p.450): 
Philosophy on the one hand and educational policy making on the other do not share 
the same aims, values, interests and priorities. One overly simple way of stating the 
differences here is to claim that educational policy, unlike philosophy, is not aimed at 
the elucidation of (say) truth or goodness but at the resolution of practical issues and 
problems. 
This insight motivated the present attempt to undertake a critique of a particular 
(Scottish) educational policy regarding the nature, role and potential of arts from the 
philosophical perspective of regard for truth and virtue. At the same time, I hoped I 
might find a way of translating the philosophical aspirations for arts education of 
educational philosophy into the practical realities of educational policy-making and 






short, the main motive was that this study would result in suggesting the best way in 
which people might be truly educated in the arts. 
1.1 Methodological connections 
The present thesis sets out to explore questions of the educational nature and 
significance of the arts from a mainly philosophical perspective. Philosophical 
analysis was the preferred approach in so far as the main issues and problems 
addressed by this thesis were perceived to be conceptual and normative. As David 
Carr (undated, see appendices) in his unpublished paper ‘Reason and Argument’ 
explains, human enquiry involves various sorts of arguments including: (i) logical or 
deductive arguments which include those of a philosophical or conceptual nature; 
empirical arguments or arguments from ‘induction’; and (iii) normative arguments 
which attempt to construct a moral or evaluative case. Recognising that contested 
concepts and judgement of value are deeply implicated in both the philosophy and 
theory of education and in educational policy-making, this study was concerned to 
engage in a thorough investigation of the conceptual and normative questions from 
an (analytical) philosophical rather than an empirical point of view. Above all, 
however, the thesis was concerned to avoid the danger that Carr (ibid) highlights of 
mistakenly confusing issues and arguments of a conceptual character with empirical, 
social scientific or psychological claims and arguments.  Thus, much of the focus of 
this thesis is upon the clarification or analysis of such key philosophically 
problematic terms as ‘education’, ‘knowledge’ ‘value’, the ‘aesthetic’ and ‘art’, and 
upon the complex relations between these concepts. On the other hand, the 
philosophical discussion has not sought to exclude useful investigation and 
discussion of the practical implications and possibilities of educational philosophy 
and theory. On the contrary, a substantial part of the present thesis (as is clear 
elsewhere) has been concerned to explore, by more empirical means, the state of 
contemporary Scottish thinking about the nature and educational place of the arts in 
Scotland. Nevertheless, the key methodological approach in this study is 






The spirit of this study is largely in accordance with the idea that educational 
philosophy is not a kind of ‘pure’ philosophy, but a branch of educational theory. In 
this light, it seemed to the present researcher that this philosophical study would 
probably need at different points to engage in the three principal roles of analytical 
philosophy of education as identified by Carr (2000, p.182):  
(i) The philosophical examination of normative or ethical justifications for particular 
educational policies and practice. 
(ii)  The conceptual analysis of philosophically central concepts of educational            
significance and relevance. 
(iii)  The critical analysis of received educational theory and policy documentation. 
Taking into consideration these different but connected educational philosophical 
tasks, conceptual analysis of key terms is also here linked to the exploration of 
different evaluative perspectives as identified in the various past and present theories 
of the educational significance of arts and the aesthetic and in interviews, 
questionnaires and policy documentation considered in the more practical (empirical) 
parts of this research.  
But the philosophical enquiry of this study seeks above all to offer clearer insight 
into a variety of central concepts of arts education in order to throw light on the 
various philosophical and political arguments that have been given in the past and 
present for the value of arts in education and schooling. To this end, in particular, the 
thesis concludes by analyzing and criticizing the present situation of Scottish arts 
education (as revealed by the views of policy makers) and by suggesting the way to a 
broader knowledge-based educational perspective on arts education in Scottish and 
other education systems. Precisely, this broader view would take arts education to be 
concerned more with the promotion of intrinsically valuable states of personally 
formative knowledge and understanding on the part of pupils rather than mere 
instrumental or utilitarian training (Carr, 2000). 
  
Different areas of enquiry, such as psychology, sociology and philosophy, sometimes 
use different terms for the same or similar things. For example, someone might claim 
that the second part of this thesis concerned with exploring Scottish policy 






described as ‘scientific substantive’ research according to the definition of 
Hammersley (2000). Indeed, the approach adopted at this point in the thesis may 
have some similarities to social scientific research. However, the present author 
would prefer to think of the whole research project of this thesis as philosophical in 
so far as the practical or empirical part of the thesis has explicitly sought to move 
beyond the mere description of views to the philosophical and ethical evaluation of 
them. All the same, the thesis has ever sought to respect the view of Carr (2000, 
p.189) that intelligent educational enquiry should be:  
…committed to the idea of a proper division of intellectual labour in the interests of 
some kind of strategic and systematic advance in our understanding of important 
theoretical and practical issues. 
1.2 The chapters 
Following the introductory chapter, the second chapter is a discussion of Plato’s 
scepticism about the value of the arts. In summary, for Plato, the arts are a form of 
rhetoric and rhetoric deals in persuasion, deceit and falsehood rather than knowledge 
and truth (although there is a degree of ambivalence about this in some of Plato’s 
dialogues). Overall, however, Plato regarded the arts as morally dubious and 
therefore of little educational significance. 
Chapter three explores Aristotle’s defence of both the arts and rhetoric: in the Poetics 
and elsewhere, Aristotle appears to have argued for the potential contribution of 
poetry and music to personal formation and the development of virtue. Aristotle 
seems to have rejected Plato’s view on the moral degeneracy of the arts and to have 
defended them as of both moral and educational value. 
Chapters four and five explore the prospects of arts as vehicles of objective 
knowledge. In chapter four, the idea that arts have objective value of potential for 
genuine knowledge and truth is explored and defended. Briefly, if the arts are to 
count as any sort knowledge, there must the possibility of (i) rationally objective 
aesthetic judgment; and (ii) some concept of narrative or other truth. Thus, since it is 
often said that artistic and aesthetic value judgments are subjective or personal, much 






artistic appreciation. This discussion turns on an all-important distinction in the 
context of aesthetic value between judging something to be good (which requires 
reasons) and simply liking it (which does not). Subjectivism, scientism and other 
misconceptions of arts are discussed, culminating in a defence of the epistemic 
qualities and power of the arts. 
Chapter five starts with a discussion of the nature of knowledge, with particular 
reference to Plato’s dialogue Theaetetus. Then arts are considered as potential 
vehicles of knowledge with regard to different respects in which they may contribute 
to the development of understanding and appreciation in human agents of 
themselves, their relationships with others and their world, in such respects as: (i) 
aesthetic (sensory) satisfaction (in the light of different concepts of the aesthetic); (ii) 
development of imagination; (iii) understanding of aspects of human experience and 
psychology; (iv) education of the emotions; and (v) moral understanding. Issues of 
relevance that are also discussed are: (i) the difference between knowledge and 
understanding gained from arts/poetry and (scientific empirical or other) sources of 
knowledge and understanding; and (ii) the relationship between art and morality. 
The focus of chapter six is mainly on literature rather than art in general. This 
chapter looks at how philosophers, poets and literary theorists from antiquity to the 
present day have dealt with the question of the epistemological status and 
educational value of literature. Examples are drawn from such modern trends as the 
American Great books tradition, British cultural and literary criticism and the British 
liberal educational tradition to show how the ‘intrinsic’ personal and educational 
value of arts and literature has been defended by a variety of influential philosophers, 
theorists and poets including Matthew Arnold and T. S Eliot. 
Chapter seven explores both wider and narrower interpretations of ‘education’, 
covering a wide range of intrinsic and/or extrinsic developmental concerns and 
purposes. The chapter explores (amongst other things) the issue of how the post-war 
Scottish curriculum was formed in the light of different educationally traditionalist, 






idea of ‘generic arts’ in recent educational philosophy. At this point, ’intrinsic’ 
justification of the arts in the school curriculum is further reinforced.  
Chapter eight concentrates on the narratives of two movies; Il Postino and Take the 
Lead. Using illustrations from these movies, the chapter attempts to underline several 
key points of this thesis. The main point is to demonstrate how the different arts dealt 
with in these movies serve to make the fundamental point of the thesis that arts 
provide their own distinctive (emotional or experiential) access to aspects of human 
life that are not available through other forms of human enquiry. 
Chapters nine and ten move away from the philosophical to the more practical 
concerns of this thesis with educational policy and practice. Following a discussion 
of methodological issues in chapter nine, chapter ten first presents a review of recent 
Scottish educational policy documentation together with some comment on its 
implications for the place of arts in the school curriculum. This leads onto a 
presentation, analysis and evaluation of issues raised in extensive research interviews 
and questionnaires with Scottish educational policy makers. 
The final chapter makes general recommendations for the future of Scottish (or any 
other) education policy. After admitting the limitations of the current study, it also 







































Chapter 2  
 
2. Plato on the value of the arts 
Plato would exclude the arts from an ideal education system since he does not think 
that the arts yield genuine knowledge. Art as representation (in broad terms) is mere 
imitation of the imitation of the Platonic Ideas/Forms. The sensible beauty that art 
may depict reflects mere empirical appearances without real beauty: that is to say the 
beauty of reason. Reason is that part of the soul which should control the other two 
parts: the spirit and that which involves passion, emotion and appetites. Nevertheless, 
irrational art has the power to move human beings. This happens because of the 
attractive but deceitful means that artists use and also due to its influence on the 
irrational part of psyche. This process leads the agent away from knowledge, truth 
and goodness, often resulting in immoral attitudes and behaviours. The solution 
appears to lie for Plato in rejection of the arts and the authority of artists; but for 
several reasons Plato does not fully embrace this conclusion, arguing for the 
controlled use of arts in education for politically prescribed moral purposes.  
 
2.1 Arguments for and against the inclusion of the arts in education 
As in the case of other school studies, rational arguments are needed for the inclusion 
of arts in the school curriculum. Certainly, before it is asked which of the arts should 
feature in the school curriculum, it needs to be asked whether the arts as such have 
any educational value at all. Moreover, a place to start discussing this question might 
well be with the arguments of Socrates in Plato’s dialogues. These dialogues seem to 







2.1.1 Plato’s exclusion of the arts: avoiding imitation without knowledge 
In Plato’s Republic
1
 (Book 10 in Cooper, 1997, pp.11–28; Hamilton & Cairns, 1961, 
pp.819-844; Pappas, 1995, pp.173–187), Socrates questions the educational value of 
arts in any preparation for citizenship in the ideal (Platonic) state. He attacks 
painting, music and poetry (both the epic poetry of Homer and his own tragedian 
contemporaries). He characterises art in terms of a concern with representation, 
which is certainly one of the traditional functions of art as described by Noel Carroll 
(1999) in his book ‘The philosophy of Art’; there, Carroll (p.22) states that Platonic 
(and Aristotelian) representation theories had ‘a pretty good fit with the data’, 
because the concept of representation fitted well with the general approaches to art of 
those times. However, Plato’s idea of representation seems to be conceived in rather 
wider terms and to include elements of what might nowadays be called non-
representational art in so far as it involves not only the representation of appearances 
of material objects, but also the organisation of sounds and colours which are not of 
clear mimetic or narrative form (Moravscik, 1982, p.34).  
In Plato’s Republic, art is regarded mainly as the depiction of sensible parts of nature 
and their qualities. Plato’s theory of the nature of art reflects the notion that a 
plurality of things with the same name constitutes a specific type: that is to say an 
intelligible form or idea (Republic 596a). The person who makes an object that 
embodies this idea is able to create a material representation but not the actual idea. 
In fact, Socrates argues that a painter is able only to paint an imitation of some 
appearance of a given idea: that is to say a second-hand representation. Whereas 
ideas themselves have a divine or ‘intelligible’ source, and nature or human agency 
brings into being material objects that reflect these ideas, the artist creates an artwork 
which represents ideas at an even further remove by imitating such material objects 
(Rep.596a–596d-597b). Therefore, the work of the artist is twice removed from the 
reality of things as they are, since he or she represents the material world only as it 
appears to be and not as it is (ibid 598a). This is due to the fact that the material 
                                                 
1
 References to Plato’s work will refer directly to the original sources; because all the other books 
cite Plato’s work in a similar way e.g. Rep.596a (Rep. For Republic), unless there is a quotation where 






world and its qualities – including human physical existence and agency – as they are 
represented through the arts are sensible (of the senses), and their existence is only 
secondary to, or derivative from, the Forms/Ideas (Moravscik, 1982, p.34) that they 
express. From this viewpoint, it is the Forms that are the primary reality, since only 
these are not changeable or perishable (Stevenson, 1974, p.24), Thus, in so far as 
education is the process by which human agents become knowledgeable, and 
knowledge is a matter of the grasp of genuine truths about reality, then it is only 
acquaintance with the Forms that can yield educationally worthwhile knowledge. In 
so far as the material appearances of forms are imperfect, changeable and perishable, 
any and all human perception of them can count as only belief or opinion, rather than 
knowledge. (Rep. 476–480 in Stevenson, 1974, p.24). Mere artistic copies of such 
material objects may be even less than this. Moreover, among the Forms, the Form of 
Good is particularly exalted ‘and plays an almost God-like role, being the source of 
all reality, truth and goodness’ (ibid, p.25).  
The (true) knowledge of the forms may also be attained only by the strict practice of 
the rigorous form of rational or intellectual enquiry which Plato refers to as 
‘dialectic’, because there can be no genuine access to such abstract ideas through 
human sense experience of the natural material world (Carr, 1999, p.40). For Plato, 
agents might claim expertise in the manufacture, use and representation of material 
objects (Rep. 601d), but strictly it is only he or she who gives orders to the 
manufacturer who is entitled to say whether the object is manufactured correctly and 
therefore fit for use. Only he or she who created it in the light of an ‘intelligible’ idea 
or plan can know its true nature and purpose. Whereas the manufacturer relied on 
true belief (justified confidence), only the designer of the object and its user have real 
knowledge of it. (Rep. 601e). Since the artist is not even following the instructions of 
a knowledgeable person, he or she cannot even be said to have justified confidence 
(Rep.602a). In this light, poets are not knowledgeably inventive at all as they are just 
foolish mirrors of mere appearance who reflect what is around them; the role that 
Plato gives to the artist is what might nowadays be called photographic realism (Rep. 
420c 472d 484c 500–1; also in Annas, 1982, p.21). In a metaphorical sense, the artist 






produces a ‘twice removed’ shadow of the original (Rep.597e3–4 in Moravcsik, 
1982, p.38). Hence, artists do not understand what their work represents for two 
reasons: i) they do not have genuine practical knowledge of the represented objects 
of their artwork, since they are not the creators of those represented objects (or those 
who ordered the craftsman to create them); and ii) they do not have an insight into 
the true meaning of what they try to represent (that is to say the Forms/Ideas). 
Ultimately, artists attempt to capture what they perceive as reality, only to produce 
an imitation of an imitation, further distancing themselves from the 'truth'. 
For Plato, any possibility that artists might directly represent reality is ‘out of the 
question’: there is a qualitative difference between any representation or 
interpretation of the Forms by the craftsman and any representation of the objects by 
the artist, in so far as the first may have knowledge or good evidence but the latter 
has neither of these (Nehamas, 1982, p.73). To ‘imitate’ the Forms is a request that is 
logically impossible for the artist to satisfy, for in virtue of satisfying it, the artist 
would cease to be an artist’ (ibid, pp.73–74) Even if art reflected virtuous figures and 
situations ‘it would do no more than to create a way in which someone who seemed 
virtuous, but who might in no way be virtuous, would act’ (ibid, p.68). In Phaedo 
(68d–69b), Plato claims that even when an artist, such as a tragic poet, tries to 
present a virtuous figure, this is not genuine presentation, because such represented 
virtue remains merely apparent virtue. In this case, the actor merely performs a 
virtuous role and creates a false image of virtue of mere virtuous appearance rather 
than virtuous reality.  
In fact, Plato uses the word eros to describe the aspiration to the ‘intelligible world’ 
of rational knowledge and understanding. Such intelligible knowledge and 
understanding is, according to Plato, the only state of a ‘well-lived life’ for two 
reasons: firstly, it has intrinsic value and is sufficient unto itself without provoking 
any further needs; secondly, such a state results in self-knowledge and intellectual 
freedom, rendering the affairs of the ‘sensible world’ trivial and unimportant 
(Moravcsik, 1982, p.29). Consequently, the objectives of a life focused on theoretical 






dialectic enquiry may be seen as means to the attainment of such objectives (ibid, 
p.30).  
2.1.2 Doubting the beauty of objects  
Despite this, some might argue that however far an artwork may be from truth and 
knowledge, at least it is beautiful and its value is to be found in its beauty. Although 
Plato takes the idea of beauty very seriously, such beauty is not just a matter of 
subjective sensory pleasure. It is a form that is related to such other forms such as 
truth and goodness: that so, it can only be grasped by the proper exercise of reason 
and understanding and not by the senses. In consequence, art for art’s sake or for 
sensory pleasure for Plato does not provide a justification of the value of the arts 
(Barrow, 1975, p.25). Thus, such ‘superficial’ pleasure – whether an intentional or 
unintentional means or end – could not be the standard by which artworks are judged 
as good or bad. Similarly, artworks do not even have the extrinsic value of the ‘good 
bed’ made by the craftsman that is more pleasurable to sleep in than the bad bed 
(Plato, Republic in Cothey, 1990, pp.30–31).  
Furthermore, in connection with the beauty mentioned above, Murdoch (1977, p.17) 
argues that Plato’s antipathy toward art leads him to separate art from real beauty, 
because ‘he regards beauty as too serious a matter to be commandeered by art’. 
True beauty is the beauty of reason (Plato, Symposium, 211e–212a). Phenomenal 
beauty is superficial and at best an appearance of something good. Cothey (1990, 
p.172) explains:  
On Plato’s theory, beauty is the appearance of what is good; and a good table, for 
example, is one that serves well its purposes. Plato allowed that when a carpenter who 
knows what it is for something to be a good table applies his knowledge practically he 
makes a beautiful table. However, the problem with art is that it claims a closer 
relationship with beauty: works of art profess no purpose, save incidentally, but to be 
apprehended as beautiful. Plato believed this is absurd. If works of art had a valid 
function they would be capable of beauty on the same principle that beds or tables are, 
namely in so far as they well exemplify what it is to be good of their kind. But nothing, 
he believed, can have any kind of relation to beauty that art professes. 
 







The things that well exemplify the Form of the beauty, as opposed to well exemplifying 
the other Forms, are not the particular beautiful things we experience through our 
senses but the Forms of these things. As judged by the standards of beauty itself, the 
whole world of sense experience stands condemned as capable at most of an inferior or 
illusory beauty. 
Therefore, once again, art is not capable of producing anything valuable either in 
‘theory’ or practice and anyone who wishes to know what real beauty is would not be 
an artist in Plato’s ideal state (ibid). The appearance of beauty in an artifact is still 
second or third removed from the real beauty of Forms and the appreciation of this 
artistic beauty has nothing to do with real beauty (Moravcsik, 1982, p.31). The way 
that ordinary sense perception grasps beauty – according to Plato (ibid p.43) is 
beauty as ‘fineness in appearance’; but this is superficial as ‘beauty should lead us to 
the contemplation of things that are not only fine in appearance’ in the material 
world, but fine in the intelligible world. Even in the case of ‘good’ art, wherein art 
can represent the appearance of an object very well, it is still only depiction of the 
sensory world that is possible. There are some very rare exceptions when, under the 
control of reason, art might stimulate some rational reflection and therefore very 
indirectly have some potential for knowledge of the truth. But the true nature of the 
reality that an object reflects (the Forms/Ideas) still lies beyond any artistic 
representation (Moravcsik, 1982, p.30). 
2.1.3 Immoral impacts by charming means 
On such a view, art is not a vehicle of knowledge and truth. However, Plato argues 
that the evils of art are not yet exhausted, since the arts may have still worse effects 
on people who are influenced by them. Artworks clearly move people, but such 
affection is also potentially dangerous. Firstly, artworks employ various artifices 
such as similes and metaphors. Such effects may be charming but when the artworks 
are stripped of these, nothing is left but a potentially deluding presentation of 
appearance rather than reality (Rep.601b). Socrates gives the example of a charming 
but not really good-looking man. If his charm is taken from him, then he is stripped 






(1987, p.71) defines art as a primitive means of expression which uses its artistic 
adornments against ‘subordinate’ reason by expressing and stimulating passions.  
The seductive adornments of the artist can therefore be creative, but also dangerous, 
as they can easily influence the audience in directions that are far from truth and 
reality. This is especially true of poets who use the same medium of language as 
truth-seeking philosophers (Annas, 1982, p.21). It is in this respect that the question 
of a rivalry between poetry and philosophy emerges (Plato, Laws, 817). However, 
the poet is not a genuine rival of the philosopher since he or she can only manipulate 
the irrational part of mind; whereas genuine truth and virtue can only be grounded in 
reason (Plato, Republic, book 3). To be sure, some poets may be regarded as serious 
rivals to philosophers in so far as they are inspired by gods or divine powers. Such an 
inspiration may be considered a unique gift of which Plato would perhaps be more 
tolerant (Woodruff, 1982, p.144), since divine inspiration is beyond the sphere of 
reason. But Plato (ibid) is largely consistent in maintaining that if the poet tells the 
truth then he or she would not be a poet but a philosopher. Moreover, on the 
occasions that poets do refer to something true, they may not be aware of this if they 
do not have knowledge of the Ideas/Forms. Furthermore, (ibid, p.146) ‘poetry has no 
distinct explanatory function; consequently, poets have no skills’. What they do is 
guided by inspiration rather than truth and so they do not have real knowledge of the 
way their artefacts are produced: ‘The self-containment of poetry means that poets 
have neither knowledge that their products are true, nor knowledge how to produce 
them’ (ibid).  
Nevertheless, Plato himself seems to adopt many poetic and literary devices. 
Moravcsik (1982, p.30) states that ‘The contrast between aspiration and inspiration, 
as well as the lack of the concept of taste, help us also to understand why Plato can 
denounce poetry and literature and then employ so many poetic and literary devices 
in his own writings’. However, Plato recognises that he uses artistic means in order 
to express himself, but insists that he does so only as mathematicians use diagrams, 






2.1.4 Relation to irrational part of soul 
Another Platonic objection to the arts has to do with human nature and the soul. The 
issues or objects described in artworks engender impressions in people’s minds that 
may be contrary to reason because they are inconsistent or contradictory (Rep. 602d). 
Someone may accept such poetic contradictions, but it is clearly not rational to say 
that something is both x and not x. Plato’s Socrates claimed that the human soul has 
three parts. The part which uses rational procedures in order to gain knowledge is the 
superior part of the soul (ibid, 603a). Another part that consists of non-rational 
feelings and appetites is regarded as an inferior part or level of the soul. It is regarded 
as inferior, precisely because it is indifferent to the truth, and also because it is easily 
affected or seduced by artworks also unconcerned with truth. Thus, when someone 
grieves for something or somebody, even though his/her reason recognises that grief 
is not good, useful or proper for him/her, he or she is controlled by the affective or 
appetitive part of the soul (ibid, 603b). Generally, Plato presents reason as stable and 
passion as petulant and changeable according to circumstances (ibid, 604c). The 
representational artist aims to satisfy the latter part of the soul, because it is easier 
and more popular to affect people in this way rather than bring them to reason or 
truth (ibid, 605a).  
In this respect, art undermines the rational part of the soul by reinforcing the 
irrational and emotional (Rep., 606a). Art for Plato is therefore a species of anti-
rational rhetoric, which empowers emotion by reinforcing the passionate sides of 
people’s lives and exaggerating their influence. Extrapolating the implications of this 
view, Plato (ibid, 605b–d) believes that a society governed by its emotions, passions, 
appetites or desires rather than reason and rational argument will finally, through bad 
government, fall into chaos and disorder. In the case of humour, for example, the loss 
of reason that attends comic pleasure may lead to a lack of seriousness that trivialises 
life (606c). The Platonic account extends this point to other desires and feelings such 
as sexual appetite, anger and so on, which overpower reason by stirring up 
occasionally pleasant but nevertheless irrational feelings (ibid, 606d). The creation of 
communities which are governed by attraction to pleasure and aversion to pain 






implications of artistic pleasure, then they may also be blind to the social injustices 
of unmerited prestige, wealth, and power etc, becoming slaves to such false masters 
(ibid, 608b).  
On such a moralistic view, art is seriously dangerous in so far as even the best 
characters may prove corruptible. For example, even such upright characters may 
experience intense negative feelings in the presence of a play that represents immoral 
situations. Long term exposure may result in entrenching these negative feelings in 
their own lives, even in the absence of immoral circumstances. But, generally, long-
term exposure to art may also provoke desensitization towards immoral situations 
(Republic 605–606 in Cothey, 1990, pp.30–31). Here, there are two problems: the 
first concerns the probable negative content of the artefact; and the second is related 
to the effect of artworks on the irrational (and rational) part(s) of the human soul. It is 
a consequence of the first point that in Plato’s ideal Republic no artwork of painting, 
sculpture or architecture that depicted such negative features as bad character, ill 
discipline, meanness or ugliness would be allowed (Rep. 401). Only characters who 
behave in a genuinely good, reasonable and moral way should be artistically 
represented (in so far as artists are to be allowed in the ideal state). And only such 
noble representations should be allowed to feature in the education of the citizens of 
the ideal state. 
The second problematic feature of art that emerges here is the dangerous effect on 
the soul exerted by artworks that appeal to emotion or feeling rather than reason 
(Plato, Republic in Annas, 1982, p.7). Indulgence in emotions is typical of art and 
consequently reinforces the irrational part of the soul, which prevails over reason. 
But reason is the aspect of soul that should take priority as ‘the capacity enabling the 
agent to achieve moral distance and not be dominated by his emotions at any one 
time’, in opposition to the human tendency to be directed by emotion, feelings, 
appetites and desires (ibid, p.8). Such reason, operating as a corrective capacity, 
‘would appear as the source of deliberated and authoritative moral views that sort 
out, and may conflict with, our pre-reflective intuitions, which tend to be based on 
the mere appeal of particular people and actions’ (ibid). In this respect, any 






only as a totality of tendencies to the immoral that are contrary to truth (Rep. 603a7 
605a8–b2 in ibid, p.9). Such a tendency to the irrational is reinforced by the pleasure 
that follows from encouragement of lower human desires. Such pleasures undermine 
serious life and good character (ibid, p.10). 
Finally, then, it seems that art is not only opposed to reason due to its connection 
with the irrational parts of the soul, but it reinforces the strength or power of appetite 
thus overwhelming the resistance of reason (Rep. 606 d1–7). Hence, even though the 
reasonable part of soul may know the correct route, it is overwhelmed by the force of 
‘the horse’ of passion and appetite. Practical human examples of such a situation 
might be the lover who recognizes that being involved in an affair is immoral and not 
good for him/her; but nevertheless is disabled by appetite from refraining (Rep. 
607e); or the person who realizes that smoking or a fatty diet are harmful, but she or 
he finds it difficult to stop smoking or to start slimming (Carr, 1991, p.34). Plato also 
introduces the example of the father whose son dies and, although he knows his grief 
is not positive or constructive, nevertheless cannot control his sorrow and grief. 
Nehamas (1982, p.68) interprets this opposition of weak and strong motives as the 
‘tendency to take as models for imitation what are merely products of imitation’. 
That is to say, if art is an agent of imitation at a second remove from Forms/Ideas (as 
already argued), the audience will not focus on how to use reason in order to find the 
path to knowledge. It is a human weakness to focus on imitations, to indulge in the 
associated emotions and to reproduce such imitations in their own lives.  
Hence, for Plato, the capacity to distinguish between knowledge of reality and the 
false ‘reality’ of representation is a desirable attitude and a valid educational goal. It 
enables agents to appreciate the traps and pitfalls of arts and to overcome them (Rep., 
605-6). However, there is further potential for deceit here, not least for those who 
think that they know art well, and this involves possible flattery of the agent. Plato 
(Hamilton, 2003, p.44) argues that ‘our knowledge of art can easily flatter us into 
thinking it makes us morally better people. Yet insight into the suffering we cause can 
even make us readier to cause it: having a finer sense of what we are doing can 
easily trick us into thinking we are doing something different’. This returns us to the 






ugliness need to be avoided because they can exercise even unconscious influence on 
those who encounter them. It is all too easy for those who come in contact with such 
cases to think that they are just excusable human defects that are not so bad after all. 
To conclude, before turning to some of Plato’s more positive views of arts, his main 
criticism of the arts rests on the argument that inspired (or, according to several 
translations, ‘mad’) work of arts may have little relation to rationality or 
logos(reason), and only reason can ground moral teaching. Moral understanding 
requires the clear thought of dialectic and rational enquiry that is needed for clear 
vision of truth and goodness (Nussbaum, 1982, p.84). Even when emotions and 
passions are controlled by reason, and arts have a didactic character, they still 
instruct through experience rather than theoretical understanding. That is why there 
can be a no real philosophy in art (Moravcsik, 1982, p.40).  
2.2  Platonic contradictions, compromises and suggestions  
In view of all this, it might be expected that Plato’s ideal education system would be 
based only or exclusively on reason. In terms of Plato’s distinction between logic and 
thymic, or the rational and irrational parts of the soul, the latter could never provide 
any basis for knowledge, because – as previously shown – the irrational part of soul 
consists of ‘primitive’ appetites, passions, emotions and desires that may mislead the 
agent into error (Nussbaum, 1982, p.86 & p.121; Republic 403a, 580e &586ab, 
Phaedrus 47eff & 68a). Nussbaum (ibid) is one of several writers who claim, as a 
keystone of the platonic theory, that the ‘blind animals’ of affective human 
experience are the chief impediment to human education due to their insubordinate 
and irrational nature. However, Plato himself seems to depart from this view in some 
of the things that he says. The following sections present some of these apparent or 
real contradictions with a view to some possible re-assessment of the Platonic model 
of education with regard to the arts.  
There are several problematic passages in Plato’s works where he seems to 
contradict his strict position and appear more tolerant towards the arts. A key point is 
that even though Plato offers a morally negative view of the irrational parts of soul 






desires, especially erotic ones, are mainly depicted as inferior ‘animal’ pleasures – 
and therefore as mainly morally harmful (mostly in Republic and Phaedrus 258e) – 
he nevertheless takes a much more positive view of the erotic (particularly in the 
Symposium) as a sensual or temporal expression of a more transcendent or ‘divine’ 
form or state of love (Nussbaum, 1982, p.105).  
Moreover, while Platonic theory strongly suggests that emotions and appetites should 
be suppressed or reined in by reason, the non-rational side of human nature is still 
regarded as a part of the soul that needs to be nourished and cultivated in the interests 
of healthy human flourishing. Thus, when properly controlled by reason, it ‘can play 
a good and a necessary role in motivating the person, even in teaching the person 
about the beautiful’ (ibid). This seems questionable because from one perspective the 
irrational elements can hardly provide any knowledge if they ‘cannot function 
cognitively’; however, platonic eros seems to involve some feelings that may have a 
(‘cognitive’) function beyond mere satisfaction of the bodily desire, and which also 
play a crucial role in motivating human moral and other agency (ibid, p.106).  
Nussbaum argues that Plato occasionally claimed that ‘the irrational elements have 
an important cognitive role to play in our aspiration toward understanding’, as they 
are a motivational source of energy to the chariot (1982, p.99). The charioteer who 
allegorically is the logisticon part of the soul has a role that concerns the control of 
the horses it steers: that is to say, reason gives clear direction to the thymicon and 
epithimiticon horses. Hume regarded reason as entirely separate from desire and 
passion and as merely an instrumental means by which desire could achieve its ends: 
for Hume, reason was merely the ‘slave of the passions’. But this does not seem to 
have been the case for Plato who appears to have regarded the desires of the spirit as 
deeply informed and guided by reason (ibid, p.99).  
This point about the non-rational art of the soul, which when properly controlled by 
reason can motivate the person and teach about the beautiful (ibid), raises further 
questions concerning the concept of ‘beautiful’. As already shown, beauty is for 
Plato a two-sided term which may refer to features of the external material world or 






aesthetic beauty of sensible appearance may arouse primitive appetites or feelings 
offering sensory pleasure which in turn give rise to confusion of the ‘pleasant’ with 
the ‘beautiful’. However, bearing in mind that appearances are imitations of Ideas, 
beautiful appearances may also stimulate reason to look for the Ideas behind the 
appearances. And, of course, contemplation of Ideas is what Plato regards as real 
beauty (ibid, p.100). This reflects the workings of eros, which has a double function 
with respect to two different parts of the soul: firstly, it is able to receive the stimuli 
of the beautiful and good through irrationally inspired emotion and appetites; but, 
secondly, the same eros may inform reason indicating to the latter the presence a 
higher transcendent (spiritual) beauty (ibid with references to Republic 250e).  
In earlier parts of this discussion, a certain rivalry between poetry and philosophy 
emerged. At this point, however, we may question whether such rivalry is apparent 
or real. If it is claimed that the artist does not create at all, but that he or she just 
copies mere appearances, then he or she cannot be a serious rival to the philosopher 
as artists have no real business with truth and knowledge (Annas, 1982, p.22 with 
reference to books 2, 3 and 10 of Republic). However, if a poet is inspired by 
irrational (even divine) forces and creative but deceitful forms of persuasion, then he 
or she may reinforce the irrational part of soul and woo it away from the Forms of 
Good and Truth (ibid).  
 
If the poet is truly creative, then he is a rival. Plato is split between accepting the fact of 
the poet’s creativity at all [...] so eliminating him as a rival, reducing him to the time 
waster who mirrors the world. 
On this view, an artist is a rival to the control of the human soul, as he or she may be 
able to distract it from philosophical knowledge of the truth. However, it remains 
questionable whether the artist is a rival with regard to perception of truth which 
seems more the business of the philosopher. Still, while Plato’s theory seems to be 
generally unsympathetic to this view, there are places where he seems to think 
otherwise. 
On one hand, Plato seems to regard art as corrupt and unproductive of anything of 






artist to recognition of a spiritually transcendent beauty (Phaedrus 245a2–b1; also in 
Cothey, 1990 , p.36). The key question therefore is whether such inspiration could be 
regarded as a special kind of insight which, while not strictly truthful in itself – might 
nevertheless support more ‘philosophical’ truth (ibid, p.36); whether, in short (and a 
little paradoxically), artistic falsehoods could be ‘noble lies’. In this light, art may be 
‘useful’, but its value does not come from within art itself, but from the wise 
employment of its products. Cothey (1990, p.30) states that ‘Plato’s view is that art 
has a potential for good only as a useful lie’. Hence, in Phaedrus (245) and Ion (533) 
Plato entertains the value of art, even though he undermines it in the Republic. On 
the former view, the arts may be the product of divine inspiration which is genuinely 
sensitive to and appreciative of real beauty. However, as Moravcsik (1982, p.36) 
states ‘at this point we run up against one of the cornerstones of Plato’s 
epistemology and ethics, for there is no room in Plato’s scheme for sensitivities that 
are not based on understanding’.  
On the face of it, we may seem to have contradictory strands in Plato here. From 
another perspective, however, some of the contradictory points might also be 
reconciled. For example, Plato may regard art and aesthetic experience as far too 
trivial to contribute seriously to the flourishing life, though it does have some 
motivational value under the influence of reason. Even in his Republic, Plato does 
not banish it totally from his ideal state. Morally uplifting art – representing human 
beings in a good light – may have beneficial moral and educative effects on young 
minds, and later – when these young minds become mature wise citizens – they may 
come to reject the lies and myths of art and aesthetic experience, having appreciated 
the rational knowledge and truth that underlies them (Moravcsik, 1982, p.3; 
Collingwood, 1925, pp.154–172). 
On this view, Plato would seem to recognise that arts have some value (see Frank in 
Lodge, 1947, pp.287–308) in the education system he recommends in his major 
dialogues: in fact, this seems to be recognised in the two major stages of education 
that he suggests: (i) a non-logical stage which concerns vocational training for all; 
and (ii) a logical/intellectual education for the political rulers. During the first stage 






moral and religious purposes (e.g. for the cultivation of lively and not indolent 
spirit). Furthermore, bearing in mind that young souls are impressionable and can be 
shaped by such influences (Janaway, 2005, pp.3&4), Plato (Rep.401b–401d trans by 
Hamilton & Cairns, 1961, p.646) suggests that arts and crafts managed in an 
educational way may aim at: 
...following the trail of true beauty and grace, that our young men, dwelling as it were 
in a salubrious region, may receive benefit from all things about them, whence the 
influence that emanates from works of beauty may waft itself to eye or ear like a breeze 
that brings from wholesome places health, and so from earliest childhood insensibly 
guide them to likeness, to friendship, to harmony with beautiful reason.  
In this respect, arts even with all their flaws may assist true education, though there is 
no doubt that a mature or wise life should not over-emphasise – or, worse still, be 
devoted to them (Annas, 1982, p.22). Nowadays, a common question that children 
are asked is what they would like to do ‘when they grow up’. Clearly, if children of 
the Platonic Ideal State were asked what they would like to do when they grow older, 
the answer ‘artist’ would not be welcome. The perfect solution for Plato would 
involve total exclusion of the arts from an ideal community; but Plato also recognises 
that such exclusion would be extremely difficult, if not impossible, and contrary to 
human nature. The difficulty is that art appears to be a vital part of any recognisable 
human culture and is deeply implicated in the formation of sensibilities, motives and 
attitudes that are importantly constitutive of human soul (Rep. 601b1–4, 605a2–6. 
605c10–d5).  
2.3 Summary and conclusion 
Plato is arguably the first major philosopher who attributes the very special role to 
education of reconstructing society for the better (Stevenson, 1974, p.29). Such 
education involves several stages with regard to which Plato mainly distinguishes 
two phases: non-intellectual and intellectual. The first of these includes the arts; but 
it is the second one, for the intellectual elite, that puts particular emphasis on 
philosophy and mathematics, because through these the mind can be led to real 






value of this value is, because this would be like asking what the extrinsic value of 
happiness is (Bloom, 1987, p.41). However, Plato supports his theory of education 
through a ‘dialectical’ analysis of the structure of the human soul and argues that 
only lives ruled by the rational part of the soul are conducive to true human 
fulfilment and freedom (Nehamas, 1982, pp.73–74). Such fulfilment and responsible 
freedom is also not merely an individual matter, but has significant implications for 
the flourishing of the rest of the society and good citizenship (Laws 644).  
At all events, such an education is not one that satisfies individual personal appetites 
and passions, but one which reinforces ‘the reasonable self-control and discipline of 
the moral virtues in the light of some principled conception of how it is right and 
proper for an individual to live or of what lies in his true interests’ (Carr, 1991, p.31) 
Such education should not therefore be aimed at satisfaction of lower parts of soul, 
but at cultivation of rational enquiry for the pursuit of real knowledge (ibid). In fact, 
for Plato, the difference between reason and passion sometimes seems to be 
equivalent to the difference between virtue and vice (ibid). Reason and passion are 
opposed to each other in so far as (Carr, 1991, pp.31–32): 
 reason’ comprehends what modern psychologists call the ‘cognitive’ side of human 
mental life– understanding, rational thought, deliberation, calculation, reflection, 
judgement and so forth; ‘passion, on the other hand, covers the ‘affective’ or feeling 
aspects of human experience –passions, emotions, moods, inclinations, instincts, 
appetites, and so on … [which] are regarded mainly as a source of temptation to 
wickedness and error and the principal function of human reason appears to be to help 
us avoid the various states of moral defect into which the passions would otherwise 
lead us. 
But here, some qualification may be necessary. Even though reason encompasses 
what modern psychologists call cognition, for Plato (as later for Aristotle), there is 
not necessarily any sharp distinction between reason and affect, since he does seem 
to think that (at least some) passions and appetites may be cognitive. Although he 
does not regard passions as naturally rational/reasonable, there may be for him a 
cognitive dimension to their nature that renders them potentially educable. Thus, the 
passions and emotions of spirit may be considered cognitive in so far as they imply 






However, given the artist’s main focus on affect and emotion, Plato could not really 
regard an artist as a teacher of virtue, in so far as his or her only aim is to provide 
pleasure by ‘flattering’ the irrational parts of the soul. For Plato, the artist employs 
deceitful tricks, focusing on sensible rather than intellectual reality, and producing 
artefacts that i) are far from real knowledge (Lodge, 1953, p.37), and ii) mislead the 
mind progressively further and further away from truth and knowledge (as argued 
before).  
In the Republic (411e–412a; 591d1), Plato uses a term from the sphere of the arts to 
define the ideal citizen: it is the adjective mousikotatos (most musical); that is to say, 
one who lives a harmonious life with the help of his/her harmonious soul. This 
harmonious soul uses reason in order to control the spirit and the passions-appetites. 
However, what is ‘musical’ in this as well as in other contexts is not the artist who 
produces music, but the ‘noble man’ who patronizes artists and knows what to take 































Chapter 3  
 
3.  Aristotle’s defence of the arts 
Although much influenced by his mentor Plato, Aristotle followed his own 
philosophical path. Plato was more negative towards the arts, but his contribution 
was very important in pointing to the possible negative moral effects of the arts. 
Aristotle agrees that the arts have moral significance and he argues that their 
significance may also be educationally positive. For him, the arts may precisely 
contribute to the moral development and education of citizens. The ultimate goal for 
the latter should be virtue; virtue as good character. In Aristotle’s view, emotions, 
passions and appetites are not inimical to moral development, but potential sources 
of knowledge. These parts of the soul may enter into positive co-operation with 
reason and moral principles. But moral principles and universal truths may well be 
discernible in the arts. Generally, however, arts may educate audiences through both 
the training of their emotions and the promotion of moral knowledge and insight.  
3.1 The human soul: Virtue and Happiness 
Aristotle’s theory of the human soul and its flourishing differs from the Platonic 
rationalism and dualism described in the previous chapter. In the first place, mind-
body dualism is not for Aristotle a helpful characterization of human nature. 
Aristotle’s view of the relationship between mind and body is a functionalist one. For 
him, the human soul is to the body as sight is to the eye (On the soul 412b18–1; e.g. 
in Cottingham, 1996, p.134)
2
. Body and soul do not belong to separate worlds where 
the first is the source of vice and irrational behaviour and the latter is the only vehicle 
of spiritual, mental or intellectual development (as Plato believed). Aristotle does not 
think that any natural human inclinations, tendencies, dispositions and powers are 
bad; it depends on how people express and exercise them. He argues that the body 
and sensory faculties of a human being are not obstacles either to knowledge or 
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attainment of worthwhile human goals. Aristotle develops a naturalistic approach to 
the study of man in which observation and experience are important to moral 
learning in so far as they may provide useful knowledge of how things are that also 
enables human agents to conceive of things as how they should be (see Carr, 1991, 
p.46).  
Virtues feature prominently in the Aristotelian account of human soul (Ethics; De 
anima; Carr, 1991, pp.42–60). He conceives of both intellectual and moral virtues. 
Intellectual virtues such as wisdom, judgement, knowledge and intuition are 
necessary for the discovery of various truths through scientific and other theoretical 
enquiry. Intellectual virtues are important for their own sake, but their exercise is 
also important for the development of moral virtues. Moral virtues such as courage, 
self-control and tolerance aim at the cultivation of natural human feelings, passions 
and instincts according to the principle of the mean. Such moral virtues involve a 
disposition, a motive or desire to act in accordance with the practical wisdom that 
Aristotle calls ‘phronesis’ (ibid, p.57). However, a life of virtue should not only be 
understood as a life in conformity to reason and rational principles defined as 
separate from feelings, passions, instincts and appetites. Such sensory and affective 
qualities are natural and more or less morally neutral. It is only when the human 
agent does not regulate or cultivate them in accordance with the good judgements of 
phronesis, that they may become misdirected or irrational; their cultivation in the 
light of practical wisdom may render them morally exemplary (ibid). Consequently, 
such qualities are conducive to virtuous training and education. Thus, virtue as 
opposed to vice is not a matter of acting contrary to feelings and inclinations. To be 
virtuous does not mean that one has to overcome all natural appetites, feelings and 
passions in the interests of pure reason. Thus, although to be courageous one must 
feel some fear, such fear is not bad in and of itself (Ethics 1115a–b; Carr, 1991, 
p.53). Even though feelings, passions and appetites may be bad, they are not 
intrinsically bad, but rather natural to the human condition. Moreover, neither are 
moral virtues unnatural and foreign to human nature, since as social animals, ‘human 
beings are fitted by nature to receive them’ – although they are not exactly natural 






1991, p.50). In fact, as Aristotle argued in Eudemian Ethics ((1219b1220a; in 
Korbilas, 2006, p.155): 
 The reasoning faculty is a principle controlling not reasoning but appetite and 
passions; therefore he [a human being] must necessarily possess those parts. And just 
as a good constitution consists of the separate excellences of the parts of the body, so 
also the goodness of the spirit, as being an End, is composed of the separate 
virtues...whereas the moral virtues belong to the part that is irrational but by nature 
capable of following the rational.  
And, as body and soul do not belong to separate worlds (Carr, 1991, p.48), the 
physical/corporal development contributes to moral education in this way as well 
(Politics 1334b; in Korbilas, 2006, p.52): 
 
 So the irrational part of the soul is prior to the rational. And this also is obvious, 
because passion and will, and also appetite, (subdivisions of desire) exist in children 
even as soon as they are born, but in the nature of reasoning and intelligence to arise 
in them as they grow older. Therefore in the first place it is necessary for the training of 
the body to precede that of the mind, and secondly for the training of the appetite to 
precede that of the intelligence; but the training of the appetite must be for the sake of 
the intellect, and that of the body for the sake of the soul. 
In this respect, Aristotle’s account is evolutionary (Carr, 1991, pp.46 & 49). The 
training and refinement of the soul is a large task for the human agent who needs to 
explore, evaluate and reflect on experience. Plato would agree that the acquisition of 
moral wisdom is a long process that takes many years. However, the Platonic way 
primarily involves intellectual or theoretical enquiry in pursuit of clear understanding 
and knowledge of good (ibid). Aristotle regards much theoretical and intellectual 
enquiry as important because it may reveal truth about life and the world, but he does 
not conceive the wisdom of phronesis as concerned primarily with discovery of truth, 
but rather as the means to achieve virtue understood as good character; the point of 
moral enquiry is to make people good (Ethics, 1106a; in Korbilas, 2006, p.67):  
Excellence of virtue in a man will be the disposition which renders him a good man and 
also which will cause him to perform his function well.  
Such moral enquiry demands reasoning, principled judgement and evaluation, but 






changeless principles. Moreover, such virtuous enquiry reflects a ‘threshold concept’ 
that implies an ongoing and never fully concluded project (Swanton, 2003, p.3).  
Human nature is also caught in a two-way relationship between the individual and 
society (Carr, 1991, p.45). The individual develops moral knowledge by observing, 
evaluating and reflecting on how virtues operate in human relationships, and this 
process aims towards the achievement of harmonious social relations. Thus, moral 
reasoning involves reflections upon moral knowledge as expressed in the practical 
context of human relationships, and moral wisdom assists the choice of those paths 
in life that promise a successful individual and social life (ibid, pp.45–50). Moral 
development and knowledge therefore emerge from practical contexts and social life 
and benefit these situations in turn. Goodness, justice and other moral qualities are 
intrinsic to this interpersonal world, not as objects of a scientific or theoretical 
enquiry, but as part of the ‘rough and tumble’ of human practical reality. This makes 
moral life a matter of ongoing development (ibid).  
The exercise of virtue in such a life journey should result in eudemonia, sometimes 
translated as ‘happiness’ (Aristotle, Politics 1323b). Happiness is that state of a good 
life in which a human being – on both the personal and social level – is well-
endowed with virtues and good fortune (ibid, also Ethics i 1099a 32, x1179 a4ff). 
Thus, Aristotelian happiness is not an inner state of good mood and pleasant feelings, 
but a state of human well-being or flourishing. Moreover, the happiness of wellbeing 
cannot be entirely dependent on external goods, for this would be like assigning ‘the 
cause of a brilliantly fine performance on the harp to the instrument rather than to 
the skill of the player’ (Politics 1331b–1332b; in Korbilas, 2006, p.49). Hence, 
Aristotle’s concept of eudemonia as the ultimate good and the moral goal of society 
and its citizens reflects a teleological account of human affairs, in which the purpose 
of virtuous actions is directly related to certain beneficial outcomes (Carr, 1991, 
p.45). For Aristotle, all human endeavours aim at happiness, not only for practical 
reasons, such as successful social life and the virtuous society, but for its own sake. 
However, virtuous citizens promote harmonious and co-operative relations in a civil 






virtue of the state is of course caused by the citizens who share in its government 
being virtuous’ (Politics 1331b–1332b; in Korbilas, 2006, p.48).  
To summarise in Aristotle’s words, briefly (Magna Moralia 1184 a–b; in Korbilas, 
2006, pp.271–272): 
If we attain Happiness, we are wholly content. Happiness, then, is that ‘best of human 
goods’ which is the object of our inquiry. It is a complete end; and the complete end is 
‘The Good’, and the end or goal of all good things [...]Happiness and being happy 
consist therefore in living well; and living well in living accordance with the virtues. 
This then is ‘the End’, and Happiness, and ‘the Best’.     
And (Politics 1323 b; in Korbilas, 2006, p.41):  
‘To each man there falls just so large a measure of happiness as he achieves of virtue 
and wisdom and of virtuous and wise action. 
3.2 Tragedy in Aristotle 
3.2.1 Mimesis 
For Aristotle, as for Plato, mimesis is also a fundamental feature of tragedy and/or 
arts, but in a somewhat different sense. Imitation is for Aristotle (Poetics, chapters 
1–4; in Ackrill, 1987, pp.540–556; also in Ackrill, 1997, pp.29–44; also Butcher, 
1902) the common principle of the arts: what differentiates arts are the media (singly 
or combined: rhythm, language, harmony), the objects (higher or lower types of 
human characters and actions) and the manner/mode of imitation (dramatic narrative, 
pure narrative, pure drama). Starting with the latter, drama has to do with the 
involvement of the artist who: i) either narrates or becomes someone else; ii) speaks 
in his/her own person without change; or iii) does things with others involved in the 
mimesis (ibid). Furthermore, the media and objects of imitation determine the 
distinctive nature and role of the arts by contrast with, for example natural sciences 
and history. The person who successfully uses artistic media will be an artist (poiete: 
maker) as opposed to the scientific writer (physiologos: scientist of nature) who 
interprets the natural world through only his reason. Moreover, an essential 






judgement in poetry which influences the representation and appreciation of objects 
of imitation – these objects being human beings and their actions, qualities and 
virtues or vices (ibid). The degree of moral judgement involved in mimesis in 
connection with such objects depends on the varieties of virtue in the narrative. 
Different kinds of narrative are concerned with human action, but the key difference 
is that whereas history describes ‘particular’ and ‘contingent’ facts and events, poetry 
reveals the ‘probable and necessary’ consequences of this or that circumstance. The 
latter makes general statements which help the audience to understand general truths 
about their nature and the moral order (Poetics 1451b; in Ackrill, 1997, p.30; Pappas, 
2001, p.20). This sort of imitation and its claim to truth and understanding brings the 
poet close to philosophy and offers a positive response to Plato’s more negative and 
contrary view. That is to say, Plato argued that the imitation with which the artist is 
concerned is an obstacle to the truth and he distinguished the artist from the 
philosopher who pursues real knowledge. Aristotle (Metaphysics 982b; in Korbilas, 
2006, p.241), however, makes a connection between philosophy and the arts not only 
in his Poetics, but in Metaphysics as well where he claims that the person who enjoys 
wondering in myths/plots (where myths are composed of wonders) is a kind of 
philosopher, because (ibid): 
It is through wonder that men now begin and originally began to philosophize; 
wondering in the first place at obvious perplexities, and then by gradual progression 
raising questions about the greater matters too. 
3.2.2 Objects of mimesis: myth, character and intellect 
Myth/plot (μύθος; plot or ordering of particular actions) is the most important of the 
three internal elements of tragedy (Poetics; Butcher, 1902). The other two internal 
ones are character (ήθος or ethos) and intellect (διάννοια; thought). These refer to the 
mimesis of moral characters and action and the mimesis of their intellect (e.g. with 
maxims). Therefore the quality of the authors of action has moral and intellectual 
significance or value (ibid). Character and intellect are the cause of every action in 
tragedy, as they are of any action in life. There are also three external elements of the 






diction (λέξις); but the main elements which contribute to the education of the 
audience are the internal ones (ibid).  
Myth/plot, with its unity of organically connected momentous actions and its 
dramatic unity, reveals the universal truth which – while far from historical truth – is 
nevertheless an agent of moral truth (ibid with reference to Aristotle’s Poetics; book 
9). Such myth not only conveys knowledge, but also simplifies it for the audience. 
Even though the plot represents the general properties of things, however, the 
tragedy still imitates events rather than the passions of the characters: ‘tragedy 
represents events and not passions, somewhat as painting is more a matter of line 
than of colour. Plot, not character, is the soul of tragedy’ (Poetics 1450b2–3 in 
Pappas, 2001, p.20). This means that one event causes another, and – in accordance 
with general principles – a plot is created. This plot with explanations, character 
development and ‘general empirically grounded statements of human behaviour’ is 
able to communicate knowledge (ibid, p.20). The characters themselves may 
represent the particular, rather than the universal. But even if characters are particular 
and not universal, they may still conform to general causal patterns and principles 
and reflect an order of action that yields general or ‘universal’ moral values and 
knowledge (ibid, p.22). 
On this Aristotelian view, imitation is not a process of automatic mimicry as Plato 
argued, but a procedure of selectively represented action with teleological moral 
import (Republic 596d in Pappas, 2001, p.21). Aristotle conceives the role of a poet 
as not merely a verse maker or a deceiving imitator (or imitator of the imitation 
according to Plato), but as a reflective person who has to select significant and well-
connected actions to communicate universal knowledge to the audience (ibid). 
Therefore, myth-making is an active process that requires the development of both 
artist and audience in intellectual and moral respects (ibid). The aesthetic value of the 
tragedy will be explored in more detail later, but it is worth mentioning that this 
active conception of myth may call into question the value of ‘art for the sake of art’. 
Indeed, poets need to be careful, because although their role as reflective artists is 
more responsible than that of makers of verses or deceivers, their concern is still with 






themes (Poetics 1451b15 in Pappas, 2001, p.21). Their themes should originate from 
tradition and a common cultural store of significant stories. Moreover, in so far as 
over-ingenious plot-making may distance the plot from the truth, it may make it 
difficult for the audience to believe, therefore undermining the moral role of the 
themes (ibid). 
To say that the primary ingredient of tragedy is momentous tragic action, does not 
mean that characters are of no interest. The characters should be noble people whose 
dignity and moral status enhance the importance of their actions and their 
misfortunes (Poetics 1448a2, 1454a17; in Pappas, 2001, pp.22–23). Their 
misfortunes are not meaningless and just a matter of bad luck, but the proper 
consequence and meaningful punishment of their faults in life (ibid). It is not entirely 
clear that the Greeks always thought tragic misfortune ‘deserved’ as in the case of 
Oedipus. Mostly, however, the empathy generated in the soul of the spectator makes 
him or her realise that the tragic character’s mistakes and their consequences are 
something that could realistically happen to anyone if they do not strive to be 
morally virtuous (ibid). Thus, while in real life people do not always face the 
consequences of their actions, in tragedy they invariably do. But the moral 
significance here concerns not only the communication of moral knowledge; moral 
significance is also about moral emotions. In particular, since noble characters get 
punished for their immoral misdeeds, the audience feels: i) pity for the unfortunate 
fate of the ‘noble’ characters; ii) fear of receiving the same punishment if they 
themselves misbehave; and iii) the pleasure of catharsis/expurgation (Poetics 1449b; 
in Pappas, 2001, p.16).  
3.2.3 Catharsis and other pleasures 
Catharsis is an essential element of tragedy (Poetics 1449b24–28; in Pappas, 2001, 
p.16): 
Tragedy is the mimesis of a serious and complete action of some magnitude; in 
language embellished in various ways in its different parts; in dramatic, not narrative 






Some (e.g. Else, 1957; Nehamas, 1992) believe that Aristotelian catharsis is mainly 
a narrative process; perhaps something like the logical outcome of well-linked 
incidents which aim at a significant plot structure (Pappas, 2001, p.19). However, it 
is widely argued that Aristotle’s catharsis is not only a ‘purging’ of the misfortunes 
and incidents of the plot, but a psychological process with moral potential. It refers to 
the expurgation of those emotions which are aroused by the tragedy. In fact, it is 
clear from Aristotle’s Politics that catharsis in the human soul is ‘a relief, something 
that makes the soul settle down’ (Politics 1342a7–15; in Pappas, 2001, p.18). In his 
Rhetoric, Aristotle enhances this view, regarding the settling down of the soul as the 
pleasant return to the ‘normal’ state of the intellect in the light of true intellectual and 
moral knowledge as the result of learning (1370a; in Korbilas, 2006, p.286).  
Thus, catharsis may be an effective psychotherapeutic means of ‘providing 
homeopathetic doses of feelings we want to get rid of’ (Cooper, 1997, p.30). 
Nevertheless, this process should result not only in a good mood, but also in moral 
effects. Art is about learning and knowledge. Pity and fear are the emotions which 
seem to be most educable and are those which arouse the relief of catharsis and 
moral awareness (ibid). Pity refers to what the audience may feel for characters 
whose lives are devastated by misfortunes. On the one hand, characters evoke pity 
because they are good people: on the other hand, they are as human as the audience. 
But such pity does not prevent the audience from feeling fear. The characters’ 
misfortunes are not undeserved; they are often the punishment for voluntary 
misdeeds. Since such punishment is not undeserved, it means that the immoral 
actions even of good people may issue in punitive consequences. Hence the audience 
may fear that something similar will happen to them under similar circumstances 
(Poetics 1449b; in Pappas, 2001, p.16). This fear helps the audience to see how 
moral principles work. Therefore, the experience of character, virtue and vice in the 
arts educates an audience. Emotions are not invariably bad and their expurgation 
does not mean that they should cease to exist; it is just that their moral character or 
status needs to be clarified. But such clarification of emotions in the arts equips the 






development contributes to moral enlightenment (Pappas, 2001, p.18; also relevant 
Golden 1976; Nussbaum 1986). 
Another aspect of catharsis and of the training of the emotions through tragedy is 
that it refines and cultivates the perceptions of the audience, enabling them to 
understand the quality of their emotions and the quality of the tragedy itself. This is a 
kind of pleasure that has to do with the cognitive shaping of experienced feeling 
(Carr and Davis, 2007). 
In addition to references to tragedy, Aristotle argues that music may help to educate 
human emotions, because it can potentially enhance character in people. It is not only 
beneficial to contemplate noble characters and virtuous actions as in tragedy, but also 
to be moved by music that expresses such qualities of character as courage and 
temperance. Aristotle argues (Politics 1340a; in Korbilas, 2006, p.55):  
...(and this is clear from the facts of what occurs–when we listen to such 
representations we change in our soul);...and it is the case that whereas the other 
objects of sensation contain no representation of character......pieces of music on the 
contrary do actually contain in themselves imitations of character.  
It is clear that for Aristotle (as for Plato) different musical modes or rhythms could 
have different emotional and hence different moral characters (though these two 
great Greek philosophers did disagree about the moral character of the different 
modes and rhythms). Thus, regular or stable rhythms might express temperance and 
martial rhythms express courage. In this regard, rhythm could be regarded as having 
a similar educative role to a human action when represented in tragedy (ibid). 
Music is also an art that is appealing as well as of educational value to young people. 
Even though moral development should be the main aim and benefit of the arts, 
music is also a potential source of other kinds of pleasure with regard to its means as 
well as its ends. Music is attractive to young people who are inclined towards 
pleasurable sensory experiences, but lack patience for anything not pleasant. Music 
offers the natural pleasant delights of melody and rhythm. Such attraction to music 
may reflect the harmony that the soul naturally craves. In this way, art may promote 






and rhythm. Music and tragedy, therefore, have not only an instrumental function as 
means to moral character, but also a role in promoting the sensational pleasure of the 
audience. This shows their great potential for moral education: ‘And we seem to have 
a certain affinity with tunes and rhythms; owing to which many wise men
3
 say either 
that the soul is a harmony or that it has harmony’ (Aristotle, Politics, 1340b; in 
Korbilas, 2006, p.52). 
Harmony and rhythm are two psychological sources of attraction to poetry. Another 
is the instinct for imitation. Mimesis is natural and pleasant to all people from a very 
young age, because imitation is a source of knowledge. Imitation is a way of learning 
and it is in human nature to love learning and to try to develop cognitively (Poetics 
1448b; Butcher, 1902, p.15). Of course only the well-imitated is pleasant and of 
educational value; hence not all artistic creations do convey moral knowledge of 
educational value (Rhetoric 1371b; Korbilas, 2006, p.286). Here, good and bad 
imitation may be grounds for a distinction between bad and good art or between art 
and non-art. But, insofar as art i) represents moral knowledge and ii) is artistically 
good, it should be pleasant to the audience. In this regard, Aristotle (Rhetoric 1371b; 
Korbilas, 2006, p.286; for such a distinction see also Best, 1985 & McFee, 2005) 
reinforces the educational case for music and tragedy to other arts with a distinction 
between aesthetic and artistic value that supports the view that artworks with 
unattractive objects/content may nevertheless be artistically ‘pleasant’ and valuable: 
And since learning and admiring are pleasant, all things connected with them must also 
be pleasant; for instance, a work of imitation, such as painting, sculpture, poetry and 
all that is well imitated, even if the object of imitation is not pleasant; for it is not this 
that causes pleasure or the reverse, but the inference that the imitation and the object 
are identical, so that the result is that we learn something.     
In general, there are several pleasures in the arts, such as the delight of emotional 
excitement or the sense of harmony; but for Aristotle all the educational value of the 
arts resides in the knowledge it provides. Thus although Aristotle recognises that arts 
provide diverse pleasures, such as sensory pleasure and entertainment, the pleasure 
of educating the character and catharsis, is the chief end of contemplation of the arts. 
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That is why he suggests that the virtuous agent should not be looking for any kind of 
pleasure the arts can offer, but for that of educational value, which is derived from 
catharsis through pity and fear (Poetics 1453b).  
3.3 The aesthetic value of the arts 
However, the fact that Aristotle emphasises the value of cognitive and moral 
development through the knowledge that art may communicate, may give the 
impression that art’s aesthetic properties are of little or no value. The artistic value of 
an artwork may seem for him not to be related to its aesthetic properties (Pappas, 
2001, p.23). Nevertheless, a weaker position might attribute some aesthetic value, in 
so far as: i) the importance of the way that imitation (the basic element of art) is 
presented and developed does seem to matter; and ii) the way in which a piece of 
work shapes the quality of the experienced feeling may have moral significance 
(ibid). That is to say that the artistic effects contribute to the ethical effects. However, 
Aristotle stresses that such a contribution is subordinate, because it is the plot/myth 
and the internal structure of the piece that should produce the tragic emotions of pity 
and fear (Poetics 1449b; Butcher, 1902, chapter 14). The external artistic aids such 
as scenery and spectacle should not in themselves be intended as the artistic point by 
affording mere sensory pleasure (ibid). Furthermore, the mimetic skill of the artist is 
not enough to represent universal knowledge (Poetics 1451b15). Thus, the artist’s 
activity is not reduced to automatic mimicry (Poetics 1451b27–29; in Pappas, 2001, 
p.21). True artistic activity should aim for an aesthetically harmonious sequence of 
actions; but since i) the artist’s sources are traditional stories; and ii) he or she should 
not change much of their details, any valuable aesthetic effects that lie in his or her 
artwork are not the sole responsibility of the successful artist (ibid, p.24).  
Beauty is a problematic term in aesthetics. Even though Aristotle does not much 
refer to the word ‘beauty’, he thinks of it (Poetics 1451b27–29; Metaphysics 
1078a31–b5; Politics1284b8–10) in terms of right size and proportion – so that, for 
example, tragedies should be neither too long for the memory, nor too short for the 
sake of seriousness. This definition seems far from Plato’s account of beauty as an 






size and proportion are real/natural qualities of things and he takes beauty to be a 
feature of the natural world (Categories 5b15–29; Parts of Animals 645a23–25; in 
Pappas, 2001, p.25). But this does not really support a case for aesthetic beauty 
having a distinctive role in arts – bearing in mind that he recognises beauty beyond 
the arena of arts. In particular, he states (Metaphysics 1078b, in Korbilas, 2006, 
p.268) that: 
The main species of beauty are orderly arrangement, proportion and definiteness; and 
these are especially manifested by the mathematical sciences.    
Beauty as an aesthetic quality may not be a crucial concept in the Aristotelian theory 
of art as the aesthetic is not prominent in his account of art. Nevertheless, aesthetic 
value in arts is not excluded entirely. It could be said that to an extent aesthetics may 
be reconciled with Aristotelian Ethics in so far as successful artistic representation of 
moral knowledge and insight does play a role (albeit minor) in moral development 
and education in the course of training of the human emotions and the soul. 
3.4 Concluding remarks on character and (arts) education 
According to Aristotle, mind-body dualism (of the kind defended by Plato) fails to 
provide an adequate account of human nature. For example, the physical and sensory 
faculties of a human being are not obstacles either to knowledge or the attainment of 
right and proper human goals. Aristotle develops a naturalistic approach according to 
which observation and experience are important to learning – especially to the 
development of virtue and virtuous character (Carr, 1991, p.46). A substantial part of 
the Aristotelian theory is concerned with intellectual and moral ‘virtues’ as traits of 
the human soul. Intellectual virtues are important for their own sake, but the exercise 
of intellectual virtues – particularly of phronesis or moral wisdom – is also important 
for the development of moral virtues. Human agents have a natural aptitude for 
moral virtue, but such virtue requires lifelong training. The complete acquisition and 
employment of virtue is a life journey that should result in happiness for both 
citizen(s) and the society. Arts can significantly contribute to moral education by 






active process of representation, art may arouse pity and fear which then results in 
catharsis, understood as a kind of emotional release and moral reconciliation. This 
relief contributes to knowledge in general and moral education in particular. In this 
light, art for its own sake would not seem to have any value for Aristotle. Still, pity 
and fear are not the only emotions that art engenders or excites, and to this extent 
some aesthetic value may be had from the arts. However, Aristotle seems to regard 
moral education as an important outcome of the arts. The human soul needs 
education, and arts may have an important contribution to make; but it would be 
wrong to have education in the arts without character. As Mahatma Ghandi stated 
(1925), one of the seven sins of life is: Education without character (the other six 
are: Politics without principle; commerce without morality; wealth without work; 






Chapter 4  
 
4. Objectivity as a precondition of knowledge 
Better than any explanation is the experience of feelings                                                      
that poetry can reveal to a nature open enough to understand it  
Neruda (Radford, 1994) 
If the arts are to count as knowledge, they must surely be the possibility of: i) 
objective aesthetic judgement of the arts; and ii) the possibility of truth in the arts. 
But artistic and aesthetic value judgements have often been said (from Hume 
onwards) to be subjective or personal. The distinction between judging something 
good (which requires reasons) and liking something (which does not) is crucial here 
(the following discussion of 4.1 and 4.1.1 will be based on general understanding of 
Ward (in Cooper, 2005, pp.243–249), Whewell (in Cooper, 2005, pp.250–154) and 
Crawford (in Gaut & Lopes, 2001, pp.51–64) – unless referenced otherwise. David 
Best’s (1980) work is also relevant here and will be explored later. This chapter is 
about objectivity in the arts as a precondition of knowledge.  
4.1 Aesthetic judgements; objectivism, subjectivism and relativism 
Aesthetic judgements have traditionally been held to concern appreciation of beauty 
or the beautiful – or qualities of natural or man-made objects (such as their satisfying 
form, elegance, loveliness, grace, delightful ornament and so on) in terms of which 
such objects may be pronounced beautiful. Judgements that a certain dance or 
painting is beautiful (graceful or elegant) are commonly held to be a kind of aesthetic 
judgements: the painting or dance is beautiful by virtue of qualities it shares with 
those natural objects (such as landscapes) we also find beautiful.  
The main issue about aesthetic or artistic judgement is whether the properties by 
which we consider a landscape or painting to be beautiful are objective (that is, in 






things, or just aspects of the way we perceive them or of ‘affective’ responses to 
them. In short, is beauty (or artistic significance) an actual inhering quality in or of 
the things perceived or merely of the experiences or perceptions of those who 
perceive them? To adapt a common phrase: is beauty (merely) in the eye of the 
beholder?  
The suspicion that beauty may only be in the mind of beholders is reinforced by the 
general idea that aesthetic and artistic judgements are – unlike the empirical 
judgements of scientific enquiry, but like (in some views) moral judgements – a 
species of value judgement. On this view, to judge that the Venus Di Milo is 
beautiful (or of some artistic merit) is perhaps to say no more than that the sculpture 
pleases me or that ‘I like this piece of sculpture’. Another way of raising this issue is 
to ask whether – and/or by virtue of what – aesthetic judgements or the value of 
artworks is of general (universal), local or (merely) personal satisfaction or interest. 
From this viewpoint (as in the case of moral judgements), there seem three broad 
possibilities (Ward, 2005, pp.243–245):  
(i) Aesthetic judgements may be subjective: they are functions of largely personal 
affective (rather than cognitive) responses to (what are experienced as attractive) 
features of natural or man-made environment, 
(ii) Aesthetic judgements may be relative: while aesthetic or artistic judgements may 
be based on human feeling or ‘pro-attitude’, such judgements are also often the 
‘educational’ product of local social or cultural conditioning. On this view, a 
Shakespeare play may well be found aesthetically and artistically or pleasing because 
people have been taught in a particular context to perceive it that way. 
(iii) Aesthetic or artistic judgements may be of general or universal human 
significance: on this view, even if they have an affective dimension or component, 
such judgements may also be true or false in virtue of objective features of objects or 
of circumstances which such judgements are ‘about’. Thus, the truth of ‘Macbeth is a 
masterly treatment of the destructive effects of ambition’ would be supported by 
considerations about the work itself rather than in agent’s subjective (emotional or 






It is not clear whether these accounts of aesthetic or artistic response are mutually 
exclusive. The third position might not necessarily exclude the possibility of 
regarding expressions of personal preference or local perspective as (albeit limited) 
aesthetic or artistic judgements. On another hand, thorough endorsement of the first 
position – that aesthetic judgements are (only) expressions of subjective (affective) 
taste or preference – would seem exclusive of the other positions. It is also important 
here to see that subjectivism and relativism – though often popularly confused – are 
not identical positions. For example, whereas a relativist might ground his aesthetic 
preferences in local socially agreed rules or standards or of ‘good taste’, a 
subjectivist could offer nothing in way of inter-subjective rules, standards or reasons. 
In short, whereas objectivists need not (and usually do not) deny a role for personal 
or subjective affect or preference in aesthetic or artistic value and judgement, the 
subjectivist usually does deny that such judgement can ever rest on (objective) 
reason.  
But the question of the objectivity or otherwise of aesthetic judgement and/or 
artworks is of enormous educational significance (Carr, 1999, pp.240–256). The key 
issue is that of whether aesthetic experiences or artworks can have any value beyond 
personal satisfaction or pleasure: whether, for example, aesthetic or artistic 
experiences can be sources of knowledge or education about the world, rather than 
just opportunities for private pleasure or entertainment (ibid). From this perspective, 
if aesthetic or artistic subjectivism is to be believed – if, that is, it is true that 
aesthetic judgements are no more than expressions of affectively grounded liking or 
preference – then it is difficult or impossible to see how there might be anything 
resembling real education or teaching in the arts. If what I like aesthetically or 
artistically is simply justified on the grounds that I like it and can give nothing in the 
way of objectively valid reasons for liking this or that, then no-one is in any position 
to try to educate someone else to their own (by definition, subjective) point of view. 
On this view, there can be no more to aesthetic or artistic appreciation than liking 
what I like, because there cannot be any such thing as knowing whether what I like is 






The objectivist view is arguably the ‘default’ position: on face of it, it seems 
plausible to suppose that a painting or the landscape is beautiful – and to be regarded 
so – by virtue of properties or qualities that the painting or landscape really possesses 
and that therefore exists as substantially independent of any perceiving mind that 
beholds such properties. It seems plausible to hold, for example, that natural and 
‘unspoiled’ wilderness is more beautiful than a wasted stretch of scarred and polluted 
urban or industrial desolation. The very words we use to describe these different 
scenes – ‘natural’, ‘unspoiled’, ‘scarred’, ‘waste’, ‘desolate’, ‘polluted’ – would 
seem to indicate grounds for such objective appraisal. On this view, the job of 
aesthetic and arts educators would seem to be a straightforward matter of assisting 
pupils to recognise and appreciate artistic properties and qualities that assist 
judgements of beauty or ugliness (ibid).  
This being said, human imagination has often clearly shaped aesthetic and artistic 
sensibility and perception. Artists of past and present have been able to create 
aesthetic and artistic pleasure from combinations of sound, and from themes and 
images that would previously have been thought ugly, discordant or tasteless. For 
one thing, although actual subjects of painting might well have unattractive qualities 
– a wizened old woman or man who would not normally be described as beautiful – 
artists may well succeed, through sympathetic depiction of the character of age, in 
making beautiful portraits of such subjects. But, more generally, without reference to 
the excesses of contemporary art, one only thinks of the violent reactions in their 
own time to impressionist paintings or to Stravinsky’s ‘Rite of Spring’ to see how 
public taste in art can change overnight from strong hostility to warm acceptance and 
enthusiasm. All this reinforces the idea – not usually disagreed with by either 
objectivists or subjectivists – that beauty is in some sense ‘in eye of the beholder’: 
that, in short, aesthetic and artistic responses are importantly tied to, or dependent on, 
personal or (in some sense) ‘subjective’ human perception, taste or experience 
(Ward, 2005).  
Indeed, this idea is even further reinforced by observation that human aesthetic 
and/or artistic judgements may show extraordinary diversity and divergence between 






or regard as beautiful (or are approved of in a particular context) may be regarded by 
you or others (or in different context) as really tasteless or ugly. Moreover, a further 
step that is often taken along this line of reasoning is that such wide divergence and 
diversity is inherently resistant to rational solution precisely because aesthetic and 
artistic judgements are expressions of value rather than fact. Roughly, the idea is that 
disagreements of aesthetic (and also, on a subjectivist view, moral) judgement cannot 
be resolved, because – unlike empirical scientific statements – they are not open to 
empirical confirmation or disconfirmation/disapproval. Thus, since there is no 
rational decision procedure in terms of which one aesthetic or artistic claim might be 
judged true and another one false, such judgments cannot properly be considered to 
involve reason or rationality at all (ibid).  
From this inherently subjectivist perspective, aesthetic or artistic divergence or 
diversity serves to show beyond doubt that aesthetic and artistic taste or judgment is 
not so much, if at all, a matter of reason but of non-cognitive affect or feeling. On 
perhaps the best-known, most powerful and influential modern statement of this view 
– defended by the eighteenth century Scottish empiricist philosopher David Hume 
(1757; Shelley, 2001, pp.43–47; Smithurst, 2005, pp.197–199) and endorsed by his 
logical positivist heirs of the early twentieth century – any value claim that ‘x is 
good’ (beautiful, commendable, exemplary) can mean no more than that ‘x is 
personally pleasant, satisfying or agreeable’ to the person who makes that claim: in 
short, to say ‘x is good’ is to say no more than that ‘I like x’. For Hume (ibid), value 
claims could not be a matter of reason or argument at all, agents were entitled feel 
favourably or unfavourably disposed towards objects of their approval and 
disapproval as they pleased and there could be no rational grounds (apart from, in 
case of moral judgements, social convenience) for trying to convince someone of a 
view different from their own view around to one’s own view.  
However, though it would be hard to deny the place of either feeling in aesthetic and 
artistic judgement – part of the importance of human aesthetic experience and 
artworks is that we are moved by them (as we are not necessary moved by empirical 
facts) – and it is also true that artworks we find moving and valuable may not have 






a feeling of approval would seem unsatisfactory and extreme (Ward, 2001; Carr, 
1999). One general objection to ideas that a value judgement is only a matter of 
liking something or finding it pleasurable is that we can sensibly claim to like 
something but simultaneously not value it or find it good; or vice versa find 
something valuable or good without liking it. Thus, one might say that one thinks 
going to dentist is good, although one doesn’t like it, or that one likes smoking, 
although one considers it to be damaging (Carr, 1991, p.34). Moreover, the main 
difference here is that although one does not have to give reasons for feelings of 
liking (strawberries or peppermint toothpaste), one might well be expected to provide 
reasons for one’s aesthetic (moral or other) values or artistic preferences (ibid). Thus 
even where we disagree, we seem to engage in endless ‘rational’ discussion and 
debate about aesthetic and/or artistic value of Picasso’s painting or Schoenberg’s 
music. On the face of it, although humans do feel differently about aesthetic 
experiences and artworks, such difference is not just a matter of unreasoned like or 
dislike, approval or disapproval; but is often enough supported by reasons of a kind.  
4.1.1 Kant and Sibley; ‘reconciling’ different directions 
One cannot doubt that aesthetic and artistic subjectivism of the kind defended by 
Hume (and other British ‘sentimentalists’) has been influential, not only on 
mainstream aesthetics and art theory, but also (as noted elsewhere in this thesis) on 
art education (Korsmeyer, 2001, pp.193–202). Undoubtedly, many modern and 
contemporary attempts to conceive education in the arts as a matter of the ‘creative’ 
expression of feelings and emotions owe much to the modern value subjectivism that 
Hume and his followers did so much to promote. All the same, much post-Humean 
aesthetics has focused upon the question of how to base aesthetic and artistic reasons 
and justifications in a more objective view of the human aesthetic and artistic value 
(ibid). Thus Kant (1987), reacting to the radical value subjectivism of Hume, is 
notable for a heroic attempt in his Critique of Judgement and elsewhere, to show that 
while judgements of aesthetic and artistic value have subjective (affective) 







Since Kant’s views are complex and have generated enormous exegetic literature, 
their only barest outline can be considered here. Briefly, Kant (Ward, 2001; 
Whewell, 2005; Crawford, 2001) takes aesthetic judgements to have two main 
dimensions of subjectivity and universality. However, the subjective aspect of 
aesthetic judgement is not just simple matter of liking or agreeableness. On the 
contrary, for Kant, a subjective dimension of aesthetic experience is primarily 
characterised in terms of a certain attitude of ‘disinterest’ from which any simple 
desire for personal pleasure is absent. Thus, to take aesthetic attitude to an artwork is 
to value it and any properties in terms of which it may be considered valuable, 
entirely for their own sake, regardless of any feelings of pleasure or satisfaction that 
it might happen to arouse in one (or, more generally, for any personal or practical 
purpose one might find it useful for). But Kant also held that for any judgement to be 
genuinely aesthetic, it should be one that was also significantly universal: that is to 
say that a genuine aesthetic judgement should be one that is valid not only for the 
person who makes it, but for all who are perceiving the object of judgement in 
correct or appropriate way (ibid).  
However, Kant took such judgements to be based on a kind of non-conceptual 
perception rather than in anything that might make up or amount to the judgement of 
rational knowledge (Whewell, 2005, p.253): 
A pure judgement of taste is, then, one which expresses a disinterested and universally 
communicable pleasure in the perceptual form of an object, considered apart from any 
concept. The subjective principle which determines what it is about the perceptual form 
which pleases or displeases by feeling alone, Kant calls the ‘Form of Finality’. Since 
the form of finality can only be felt and not known, there is very little that can be said 
about it apart from its effect on the subject, which is to induce an harmonious 
interaction between the faculties of imagination and understanding. 
Kant seems to have thought that taste judgements are fundamentally resistant to 
conceptual expression in the manner of the rational judgements of (say) science, 
since there are no general rules that would insure direct inference from description or 
observation of the natural properties of objects to the conclusion they are beautiful 
(elegant, graceful etc) (ibid). The properties (spatial arrangements, organisation of 






and it is still possible for agents to agree on natural properties of an artwork, but 
disagree in their aesthetic judgements. Thus, universality of aesthetic judgements is 
closer to the prescriptive universality of Kant’s moral judgements (categorical 
imperatives): full subscription to an aesthetic viewpoint commits any agent to an 
object’s universal value, but – as in case of moral judgements – such prescription 
does not count as knowledge in same sense as an evidence-based scientific claim 
(ibid). 
A more recent influential attempt to defend the objectivity of aesthetic judgements 
that seems to reach similar epistemic conclusions to Kant’s is that of Frank Sibley 
(Lyas, 2001) in an important series of papers on aesthetic concepts of the 1950s and 
sixties. Sibley is concerned with showing that basic concepts of familiar aesthetic 
discourse may be sensibly used only by those who have mastered the ‘language 
game’ of such discourse. He does recognise a serious problem for any such aesthetic 
perspective in that there is no clear logical relationship between the non-aesthetic 
properties of aesthetic objects and artworks and the aesthetic properties that 
‘supervene’ on them (ibid). As noted above, it is not clear either that the same non-
aesthetic properties or arrangements in different artworks would necessitate same 
judgements as to their aesthetic quality. Aesthetic disagreements also do not 
ultimately seem satisfactorily resolved by appeal to non-aesthetic evidence. This, if 
so, would clearly have difficult implications for aesthetic and arts education, for 
while Sibley – like Kant – clearly believes that there is objectivity in aesthetic and 
artistic judgement, it is less clear how this might be taught (like other judgement) as a 
form of knowledge or instruction (ibid).  
Still, though Kant and Sibley seem sceptical about the possibility of genuine 
aesthetic or artistic knowledge, their work on objectivity of aesthetic judgement 
seems to have important educational implications – not least as such objectivity 
would seem necessary to questions of the educational status and justification of art 
and aesthetic experience in any school curriculum. Their work at least supports the 
view that aesthetic judgement and arts are of objective human importance and that 
there can be better or worse judgement about these important human questions of 






judgement. Thus, observing the distinction between value judgements (a distinction 
that Hume does not make) – between liking and finding good or valuable –the 
accounts of both Kant and Sibley give importance to reason and argument in moral 
matters – even if such argument cannot ultimately rest on empirical evidence. Thus, 
it would be possible for someone to say that while they did not personally like or 
derive pleasure from the music of Wagner, they could see (for this, that or the other 
reason) why it was great art; or that although they liked the music of Michael 
Jackson, they could also see (for this, that or the other reason) why it was not great 
art. 
Moreover, while the issue of whether arts can be genuine sources of knowledge will 
be considered in the next chapter, it is presently worth observing that for the most 
part Kant and Sibley focus mainly on aesthetic concepts and neither is concerned 
with making much of a distinction between the aesthetic and artistic – a distinction 
considered vital in other parts of this thesis. Indeed, it is probably true to say that 
Kant – while recognising that artworks are one (lesser) species of aesthetic objects –
is inclined to reduce the artistic to aesthetic (Carr, 2010a). Thus, while Kant(1956) 
did give an important artistic role to the expression of ‘aesthetic ideas’ – including 
the empirically unprovable ‘ideas of reason’ (freedom, God, immortality) in his 
Critique of Practical Reason – there is strong tendency in his philosophy to a fairly 
‘formalist’ account of art as mainly concerned with the expression of aesthetic 
properties. However, stronger appreciation of distinction between the aesthetic and 
artistic might leave more room for the idea that though artworks are certainly 
aesthetic objects – and there cannot therefore strictly be any aesthetic ‘knowledge’ – 
many (though perhaps not all) artworks might still be vehicles of a distinctive kind of 
artistic knowledge (Carr, 2010a).  
Further to this, it may also be said that Kant’s epistemology – unlike some ancient 
(e.g. Aristotelian, in for instance Carr, 1999) and more recent (e.g. Wittgensteinian 
for instance in Ward, 2005) theory of knowledge – carries too much unhelpful 
empiricist baggage for purposes of aesthetic and art theory. Although Kant (1961) 
tried to move beyond both rationalism and empiricism, his epistemology of Critique 






strict distinctions between fact and value, description and prescription and evidence-
based and non-evidence based enquiry widely questioned in latter day philosophy 
(Crawford, 2001). Indeed, it is a major aim of the present thesis to show that one 
unfortunate legacy of early modern and so-called ‘enlightenment’ philosophy and 
epistemology has been an assumption that only evidence-based claims of natural and 
social science can be regarded as genuine sources of knowledge: that, precisely – 
contrary to experience of readers of great fiction or spectators of great art – artistic 
insights cannot be regarded as giving genuine knowledge of the world or human 
condition (Carr, 2010a). A broader epistemic view of the kind taken by philosophers 
both before and after Kant may help to redress this defect and reclaim artistic insight 
as a genuine source of knowledge – and this possibility is pursued elsewhere in this 
thesis. For now, however, a specific defence of the idea that arts are sources of 
objective values and insights of major educational significance next follows. 
4.2 Subjectivism, scientism and other misconceptions 
   ‘Always you the coin and I the worship that gives it value’ 
        (Elytis, 1998, p.23) 
Both subjectivity and objectivity are slippery terms when applied to aesthetics and 
there have been many modern attempts to distinguish between different meanings of 
these expressions. However, one account of the objectivity of artistic appreciation 
has been extensively defended by David Best who has stressed the enormous 
importance of objectivity for arts education. The following discussion of this section 
(4.2) is based on his work and mainly his paper The Objectivity of Artistic 
Appreciation– unless stated otherwise. His work is primarily concerned with 
identifying a basic confusion in the arguments of subjectivists against objectivists; 
this fallacy, he believes, arises from a false contrast between the objectivity of 
science and the subjectivity of the arts. In his own words, Best (1980, p.115) 
considers the terms of this contrast to be two sides of the same ‘distorted coin’ that, 






...assumption that only its methods of substantiation are genuinely objective. Since 
artistic judgements are not open to scientific verification, such an assumption leads 
inevitably to the conclusion that they cannot be objective. 
If appreciation in the arts is held to fall short of the objectivity of scientific 
judgement, then the view that artistic judgement is subjective is inevitable. Such 
subjectivism results in the misconception that the diversity of critical opinions in arts, 
that may reach complete disagreement, precludes objective value and truth (ibid). 
From this perspective, it seems to follow that ‘beauty is in the eye of the beholder’ or 
that 'Beauty is no quality in things themselves; it exists merely in the mind that 
contemplates them’, as David Hume (1985, p.230) claimed. Accordingly, it seems 
that artworks deal only with subjective experience, and therefore, as Susanne Langer 
(1966, p.12) writes: ‘The arts objectify subjective reality, and subjectify outward 
experience of nature’. Put simply, such reasoning takes the following course: my 
senses, my impressions, my feelings, my appreciation and my judgements are 
therefore my world. If such a theory was true, then arts would have little or no 
function apart from such psychological or therapeutic effects as relaxation and 
entertainment (something that is often promoted within arts in schools and 
elsewhere). But, according to Best (1980), this theory has no justification, because 
although the arts may not use scientific methods to arrive at judgements of aesthetic 
or artistic value, artistic judgements may be no less objective than scientific ones 
Thus, if subjectivists believe that artistic experience has value only in terms of 
subjective expression of inner personal feelings then they do not, from Best’s 
perspective, realize the true nature of artistic appreciation, which is also a matter of 
objectivity and knowledge. Indeed, the basis of such appreciation is precisely not 
feeling, but knowledge and reasoning. Both artistic and scientific judgements rely on 
(their own) sorts of enquiry and reasoning. 
As Aristotle and others have argued, reasoning can take several forms. One form is 
the deductive reasoning of mathematics and another is the inductive reasoning of 
science (though it was not Aristotle’s view that science is inductive). To these, 
however, Best (1980) adds another kind of reasoning which he terms interpretive. 






both arts and sciences. Critical thinking in arts and science both depend upon this 
form of reasoning. On the other hand, however, scientific verification is not 
applicable to the arts or, if it were applied, it would not make the same kind of sense. 
It would not, for example, be very appropriate to try to appreciate the nature and 
value of an artwork – such as a classical symphony – in terms of variation of sonic 
wave pressure. The general trouble here, according to Best (ibid), is that there is a 
common prejudice to the effect that objects or events must be subject to scientific 
measurement in order to qualify as genuine knowledge or as of objective value. 
Hence, Best argues that since artistic/aesthetic qualities cannot be scientifically 
assessed, it is mistakenly assumed that they are not of objective worth. This is how 
what Best calls scientism leads to subjectivism about the arts. In conclusion, the 
objective nature of aesthetic and artistic appreciation rests for Best on interpretive, 
rather than inductive or deductive reasoning. 
Best (1980, p.119) uses the following example from a cartoon to show that 
emotions/feelings (an essential element in the arts for various reasons explored in 
other chapters) and other qualities are not readily measurable in scientific terms – 
though they are clearly not immeasurable in so far as people can have much real 
insight into them: 
 ‘I can't actually tell you how much I love you–I forgot my calculator’.  
As this example seems to show, scientific investigation cannot tell us many things 
that we may wish to know about the human condition – but that does not mean that 
other routes to objective knowledge are not available. Thus, in the above case, the 
person in love would be able to demonstrate his or her love, even if scientific 
calculation for this purpose would be regarded by most people as inappropriate or 
even as silly. In much the same way, artistic and/or aesthetic judgements are not 
scientific and therefore scientific methods for the assessment of works of art cannot 
be considered appropriate. Moreover, interpretative reasoning does seem more 
appropriate in the arts, though this may appear vulnerable to a subjectivist objection 
that interpretation leaves too much opportunity for disagreement and unlimited 






of ‘objective’ with ‘absolute’ (ibid, p.118) and a related confusion of ‘indefinite’ 
with ‘unlimited’ (ibid, p.122). 
To begin with, Best refers to some artworks that stimulate several interpretations that 
are objectively true: for example, a particular drawing (recalling Wittgenstein’s 
(1958, p.194) use of this image in his Philosophical Investigations to illustrate 
‘seeing-as’) may be interpreted in either of two ways as representing a duck or rabbit. 
In perceiving one or other of these representations in the drawing, observers are at 
the same time interpreting. Such interpretation is likely to depend on various factors 
such as cultural background, level of education and individual interest. Some may 
fail to recognise the possibility of some particular interpretation until they appreciate 
the existence of alternative conceptions and different dimensions of meaning of the 
object. Thus, prior to such appreciation there will only have been limited 
interpretation, and after it a new interpretation will have opened up. In terms of the 
example mentioned, the drawing might first have been considered to represent a 
duck, but after the shift of perspective it can also be seen to represent a rabbit. 
(Perhaps, indeed, a person from a country where there are no rabbits may only be 
able to perceive the shape as a duck until he or she moves to a place where there are 
rabbits.) From this viewpoint, objective interpretation is not final or absolute. That 
said, the possibilities of valid interpretations are nevertheless not unlimited. In the 
given example, the drawing could be regarded as a representation of a duck or a 
rabbit, but – as Best says – it could hardly be seen as a clock or as any other random 
object. Likewise, when observing a classic presentation of Shakespeare’s Hamlet, 
various interpretations are possible, but there are objective criteria and artistic 
conventions that would seem to preclude the possibility of understanding this drama 
as comedy (Best, 1980). To be sure, there may be many objectively correct aesthetic 
judgements or critical interpretations, but there may also be many objectively 
mistaken ones. 
According to Best (ibid), the nature of interpretive reasoning also applies to science 
in a similar way. Critical appreciation of the arts and scientific enquiry may use 
different means of judgement and measurement and/or express different sorts of 






as argued in other chapters), but they do share some characteristics in common, such 
as: (i) essential use of interpretive reasoning (since experiments are not plain proof of 
truth themselves, but require theory and interpretation); (ii) the possibility of 
objective knowledge; (iii) reference to objective standards; and (iv) some tolerance to 
diverse interpretation of the qualities and characteristics of objects and events. The 
last of these features may be more common to the arts, but it applies to sciences as 
well. This is why scientific research does not take a fixed, final or absolute view of 
its findings, but is ever in search of new perspectives and theories. Thus, as already 
highlighted, the nature of even scientific objectivity is by no means as absolute as 
often mistakenly believed. Of course, there is a theoretical background to scientific 
enquiry and argument that involves deductive, inductive and interpretative reasoning. 
But such theoretical backgrounds are to be found in the arts as well and these 
contribute to the setting of epistemic standards and criteria for aesthetic/artistic 
judgements (These arguments by Best may clarify some issues that this thesis 
explores, but it could also be argued, as by Carr (1999), that he sometimes plays 
down important differences between art and science).  
Indeed, Best (1980, p.124) argues that the ‘innocent eye’ – the idea that scientific 
observation registers directly perceivable un-interpreted facts – does not exist, since 
perception is inevitably mediated through interpretation. However, in light of the 
arguments so far, not only is an ‘innocent eye’ not possible, it is also not desirable. It 
is here that education is crucially concerned with providing the conceptual 
framework for objective aesthetic/artistic judgements that may enable spectators or 
audiences of artworks to ‘see’ anything at all worth regarding as artistic or aesthetic 
knowledge. In this regard, the objectivist perspective gives the teacher of arts a 
substantial educational task. On the other hand, however, subjectivism clearly 
undermines both the value of the arts and the role of teachers of arts education. That 
is to say, a subjectivist would regard an arts’ education teacher only as a provider of 
leisure or entertainment or of unjustified (or inadequately justified) self-expression, 
all of which would have to be regarded as equally subjectively worthwhile. But, then, 
such a view could only imply low educational status for the arts. Hence, according to 






knowledge should be at the very centre of arts education. As he (1980, p.124) 
emphasises: ‘Just as the underlying theory determines what can count as an 
objective scientific fact, so the artistic tradition determines what can count as a valid 
artistic interpretation’. 
David Best’s arguments indicate that the problem of the low status of arts in national 
educational policies and practices – in which science and technology are often 
promoted above the arts – is not only influenced by the economic, materialistic, 
technological and other emphases in present day education. The low status of the arts 
is also fundamentally fostered by the conceptual confusions and misconception 
described in this chapter. To summarise in Best’s own words (1980, p.127):  
An artistic judgement should certainly be personal, in the sense that one should have 
experienced and thought about the relevant work for oneself. But that does not preclude 
objectivity. On the contrary, to be intelligible at all, a personal judgement must be 
objective. And to be worthwhile and enriching it must be informed, educated. Education 
of artistic judgement consists in progressively extending and refining the capacity for 
discriminating interpretation. I submit, then, that an artistic judgement, in precisely the 
same way as a scientific judgement, can be justified or refuted only by reference to 
what is externally observable. From the point of view of objectivity, in the sense of 
accountability to reality, the two kinds of assessment are the same. A scientific 
statement has to be supported by objective facts. Similarly, if I make an artistic 
judgement it is incumbent on me, if challenged, to substantiate it by citing not my 
subjective feelings about it, but objective features of the work of art itself.  
4.3 Epistemic qualities and power in the arts: concluding remarks 
In retrospect, both objectivism and subjectivism provide important insights into the 
nature of aesthetic and artistic judgement. The former gives weight to the actual 
qualities of the artwork and to the knowledge that the artwork may contain, while the 
latter recognises that the personal feelings and responses of the 
audience/observer/learner may also be significant indicators of the artwork’s value 
(as an expression or celebration of such feelings). That said, the contemporary 
philosophical debate over the pros and cons of each philosophical perspective also 
appears to be endless. Still, following Best (1980), it is the conclusion of this chapter 
that any thoroughgoing subjectivism is prey to certain fallacies or misunderstandings 
concerning the nature of aesthetic or artistic appraisal. Such fallacies promote the 






along with the sciences. Such scientism encourages subjectivism about the arts which 
results in a low status for the arts in education policies and for teachers of arts 
education. To like or approve of a work of art is not at all the same as regarding it as 
good or valuable – for, in order to justify judgements of value, reasons for value are 
required. However, it follows that in order to arrive at good reasons for approving of 
a work of art, one needs to appeal to criteria or standards that extend beyond 
subjective taste. One significant source of such standards is to be found in the artistic 
traditions of human cultures that enshrine collective wisdom about what is and/or is 
not of enduring value in human artistic endeavour. On the other hand, this argument 
from particular traditions or conventions may be a slippery one and requires caution: 
e.g. Aristotle (Poetics, book IX) would have held that much great art is of universal 
value and it does not just depend on local taste. All the same, justified 
aesthetic/artistic judgement may be considered a step closer to artistic 
knowledge/truth – though, as explored in previous chapters, such knowledge is not 
perhaps well or best understood in terms of the propositional or factual knowledge of 
natural sciences. Rather, artistic knowledge should be regarded as closer to the 
acquaintance knowledge (Russell, 1967) or illustrative representation (Young, 2001) 
that enables exploration of life issues and imaginative insight into human nature and 
association (Russell and Young will be discussed extensively in the next chapter). 
Hence, when an artwork is judged better than others, it is not merely because 
someone may simply like it more, but because it exhibits distinct epistemic qualities 
and power. Taking all this into account and to return to the sentiment expressed in 
Elytis’ poem (in the beginning of the chapter), serious artworks may be considered as 
examples of highly valued tokens in a system of ‘coinage’ with objective value. 
However, as in any currency, the use of coins presupposes understanding of certain 
values. Consequently, to take part in this system of commerce (here a metaphor for 
the artworks), an individual requires an understanding of the practices, conventions 
and institutions that underpin these values. Accordingly, artworks do convey 
objective knowledge only to people who are able/educated enough to understand 






Chapter 5  
 
5. Art and Knowledge 
Art can certainly provide ‘hedonic’ pleasure, but many past philosophers have also 
argued that it has the capacity to educate by conveying knowledge. This latter 
function may also, of course, be seen as another kind of ‘pleasure’ that the arts 
provide. Accordingly, some philosophers would certainly argue that knowledge and 
truth are distinctive features of the arts. This chapter consists of three main parts, 
concerned with: (i) what knowledge is; (ii) what art is; and (iii) the relationship 
between the arts and knowledge (including the possible moral-educational status of 
the arts). It is particularly concerned to examine whether the arts are ‘candidates for 
truth’ (Lamarque, 2008, p.234) or whether, at least, they have cognitive or other 
value of some epistemic significance. If the answer is ‘yes’, the next issues that arise 
are those of how such knowledge is embedded in the arts, or whether knowledge 
provided by the arts differs from that of (for example) sciences and history. In 
conclusion, the chapter seeks to explore different respects in which arts may 
contribute to the development of knowledge, understanding or appreciation of human 
agents of themselves, their relationships with others and the world. The possibilities 
addressed are that art involves: (i) aesthetic appreciation; (ii) development of 
imagination; (iii) understanding of human psychology; (iv) education of emotions; 
and (v) moral understanding. 
5.1 Nature and definition of knowledge 
This chapter on art and knowledge examines the value of art as a source of 
knowledge. It is also concerned with investigating whether the promotion of 
knowledge – is a significant (if not the only or most significant) function of art. To 
this end, we may begin by briefly examining the nature of knowledge itself. 
‘What is knowledge?’ is a fundamental philosophical question to which philosophers 
have given different answers. For example, empiricism is one philosophical approach 






representation or idea in the human mind as caused by experience of the physical 
world. Even though there are some empiricists such as Berkeley (Gersh and Moran, 
2006) who are sceptical about any physical world beyond the senses, all empiricists 
believe that knowledge is derived from experience. The empiricist theory of 
knowledge may be summarised by two Latin phrases used by John Locke and other 
empiricists, who argued that, prior to experience, the human intellect is a ‘tabula 
rasa’ (Locke in Uzgalis, 2007, http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/locke/), with the 
consequence that nihil est in intellectu quod non prius fuerit in sensu, or that 
‘Nothing is in the mind that isn’t first in the senses’ (empiricist maxim quoted in 
Boeree, 2000, http://webspace.ship.edu/cgboer/empvsrat.html). In this respect, 
knowledge may be thought of as written by the senses on the blank slate of the 
human mind or intellect. David Hume (1757) developed the empiricist view, by 
arguing that the ideas of intellect are no more than the product of faded sense 
impressions. On Hume’s view, statements of facts and relations of ideas are the only 
meaningful forms of judgement – though only the former derives from sensory 
experience. Relations of ideas are merely definitions or rules for the uses of words 
such as ‘a bachelor is an unmarried man’ (Carney, 1975): only such truths may be 
‘known’ independently of experience. Generally, however, sensory experience is the 
only source of genuine knowledge and true judgement, according to empiricists and 
ideas are mainly mental representations of objects of such experience (Shelley, 
2001). This philosophical viewpoint is obviously problematic when it comes to 
judgements of moral, religious, aesthetic and other value, where someone might 
claim that he or she knows something which others disagree with. 
Rationalism contrasts with empiricism, in so far as the main source of knowledge for 
rationalists is not sensory experience but reason; and ‘the criterion of truth is not 
sensory but intellectual and deductive’ (Bourke, 1962, p.263). There are different 
versions of rationalism. There are moderate rationalists who hold ‘that reason has 
precedence over other ways of acquiring knowledge’, and there are radical 
rationalists who insist that reason is ‘the unique path to knowledge’ (Garber, 1999, 






arguing that only the exercise of the rational part of the soul (reason) may result in 
grasping ideas of the ultimate truth.  
Plato’s analysis (Chappell, 2009, http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/plato-Theaetetus/
4
) 
of the nature of knowledge in his dialogue Theaetetus starts by identifying what 
knowledge is not. Theaetetus offers a definition of knowledge by providing examples 
(146c). Socrates rejects the examples, because, whatever their force, ‘for any x, 
examples of x are neither necessary nor sufficient for a definition of x’. Such 
definition could lead to unlimited examples (an interminable diversion – in Greek: 
aperanton odon) with the inevitable result of incompleteness and circularity. 
Theaetetus is finally convinced by Socrates that his examples of knowledge fall short 
of identifying what knowledge is and he proceeds to define knowledge as perception-
belief (151d–e). Socrates objects to this definition as well, due to the relativity or 
subjectivity of knowledge that it seems to imply; he argues that the definition does 
not work because any given claim to knowledge could be expressed as both x and not 
x at a given time: for example, one person may say that the wind is cold and another 
that it is not cold, with the result that it both is and is not the case of something at the 
same time. However, since the qualities of experienced things are constrained by 
such ‘external’ physical circumstances as their particular location in time and space – 
knowledge of them must be more than just a matter of their subjective perception by 
agents. There must, in short, be external or ‘objective’ conditions of knowledge.  
Indeed, if reliable (truth-finding) sensory experience and perception are sufficient for 
knowledge, this would also mean that non-human animal perceptions – which also 
deliver true judgements – would also yield knowledge. But Socrates argues that 
human beings differ from other animals not in the capacity of perceiving-believing 
but in their power to judge in the light of reason whether a given perception-belief is 
true (161d–162c).  
But perception and belief cannot be the definition of knowledge for another reason: 
namely, that memory allows knowing without sensory perception (163a–168c). 
Therefore, knowing must extend beyond sensory perception. Further, if someone 
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cannot perceive something clearly or at all, this does not mean that they have no 
knowledge of it Concepts such as difference and sameness are not known only by 
sensory perception. Moreover, sometimes people have certain perceptions and beliefs 
about things but change their minds about them with further experience. It is also not 
only different people who may have different perceptions, but also one and the same 
person at different times and in different circumstances. The ‘peritrope’ objection 
(171a–b) by Socrates also shows the inconsistency to which knowledge defined as 
perception leads; if it is held that all perceptions and beliefs are true, there must also 
be the belief that not all beliefs are true. In that case, not all beliefs and perceptions 
can be sources of knowledge. On the other hand, if it is admitted that not all beliefs 
are true, the conclusion is much the same. In addition, the persuasion of rhetoric may 
engender beliefs which are not true – or, worse still, rhetoric may persuade people to 
change beliefs that may be true into false ones, in which case people will then cease 
to have knowledge.  
Following the Socratic objection to his latest definition of knowledge, Theaetetus 
suggests a new definition of knowledge: that ‘knowledge is true belief’ (187a10–e4). 
Socrates is not happy with this definition either for several reasons. Socrates argues 
that, for example, accidentally true belief cannot be regarded as knowledge. True 
belief does not count as knowledge unless it is grounded in some reasonable 
judgement which justifies it as true, as well as an engagement of the human mind 
with the true forms of things. True belief is important but mainly as a state which 
may lead to knowledge. Reason is necessary to establish true belief as knowledge. In 
this respect, the last definition of knowledge in the Theaetetus comes closest to the 
truth: that ‘knowledge is true belief with an account (logos)’ (201c–d) – and while 
this is not a completely satisfactory definition for Socrates, he is evidently 
sympathetic to it. To be sure, it has to be recognised that modern epistemology has 
seriously questioned the Platonic account of knowledge as justified true belief – 
particularly in the light of the ‘Gettier paradoxes’ (Gettier, 1963) – though this 
cannot be pursued in greater detail here. For present purposes, however, it may be 
enough to note that logos (reason) is a very important element in Socratic/Platonic 






important means to knowledge and at the same time the spiritual goal of the human 
soul. Perception is important for knowledge only in so far as the human mind is able 
to evaluate experience in the light of reason. In this respect, true perception is not just 
a reflection of sensory awareness, but also a result of the rational reflection required 
to make sense of the world.  
Although generally critical of both rationalism and empiricism, Immanuel Kant was 
broadly sympathetic to the empiricist idea that there can be genuine knowledge only 
if such concepts have empirical content. However, he also states (Kant, 1961, p.93): 
If the receptivity of our mind, its power of receiving representations in so far as it is in 
any wise affected, is to be entitled sensibility, then the mind’s power of producing 
representations from itself, the spontaneity of knowledge, should be called the 
understanding. Our nature is so constituted that our intuition can never be otherwise 
than sensible; that is, it contains only the mode in which we are affected by objects. The 
faculty, on the other hand, which enables us to think the object of sensible intuition is 
the understanding. To neither of these powers may a preference be given over the other. 
Without sensibility no object would be given to us, without understanding no object 
would be thought. Thoughts without content are empty, intuitions without objects are 
blind. It is, therefore, just as necessary to make our concepts sensible, that is, to add 
the concept to them in intuition, as to make our intuitions intelligible, that is, to bring 
them under concepts. These two powers or capacities cannot exchange their functions. 
The understanding cannot intuit nothing, the senses can think nothing. Only through 
their union can knowledge arise. 
Hence, Kant thought that although the content of our knowledge needs to come from 
experience, such experiential content needs to be made meaningful by the imposition 
on it of concepts that are not themselves derived from sense. In this respect, the 
Kantian understanding of knowledge as an amalgam of a priori structure and a 
posteriori content seems very much like a reconciliation of empiricism and 
rationalism. Kant also distinguishes between different kinds of knowledge or 
cognition – not all of them empirical – in ways that have been reflected in modern 
educational philosophy (Hirst, 1974). 
One of the respects in which Kant believes there can be objective cognition and 
perception – though not strictly knowledge – is in the realm of the arts. In this regard, 
the debate between empiricism and rationalism may remind us of the discussion in 






sometimes regarded as an exponent of a sophisticated objectivism (Ward, 2005). He 
criticized sophisticated subjectivism, but agreed with the latter that feelings of 
contemplative pleasure or displeasure are always and essentially determinative of 
justified aesthetic judgements. Nonetheless, he argued that strict (not merely 
‘contingent’) aesthetic universality is possible and that, under the right conditions, 
aesthetic judgement or taste should find everyone – without exception – in aesthetic 
agreement. Strict universality should be possible if two faculties of the human mind 
operate in the same way in all people when perceiving the same object. These two 
faculties, according to Kant, are understanding and imagination (ibid). If these 
operated in the same way in all people, they should result in the same feeling of 
contemplative pleasure or displeasure and in appreciation of the same objective 
aesthetic value. However, these do not operate identically in all people (ibid). This is 
because their activity is influenced and limited by various factors of ‘super-sensible’ 
experience – a dimension of practical reason that Kant distinguishes from lower 
sensible experience (ibid, p.246). It is impossible that the human mind can 
consciously have access to super-sensible experience and understand how its 
principles operate. At this point, human feeling intrudes to introduce the possibility 
of personal individual taste into aesthetic judgement. Such personal individual taste 
and aesthetic judgement may differ from person to person, due to the different levels 
that various – and probably different – factors influence the super-sensible dimension 
of human reasoning. Since people are not aware of how this happens (as it belongs to 
the super-sensible dimension), they can only control and educate understanding and 
imagination to a certain extent. Moreover, it is possible to predict the development 
over time of only some feelings and perceptions of the mind. 
In this respect, someone might wonder why Kant is regarded as any kind of 
objectivist at all, since he agrees that personal feeling is inevitably involved in 
aesthetic judgement (ibid). The answer would seem to be that while Kant accepts that 
individual feeling is an important factor for the development of aesthetic judgement, 
he does not think that it is necessarily determinative of a good aesthetic judgement. If 
personal feelings were the only factor, then appreciation in the arts would be only a 






is of little evident value as a piece of art (and vice versa), this surely is not the case. 
A justified aesthetic judgement should be based upon principles that all people 
without exception would accept as objective independently of any subjective 
feelings. That said, Kant claims a very strict universality on the basis of a particular 
metaphysical picture of the mind and a debatable formalist conception of art and 
beauty. Such a theory may be considered problematic for various reasons; but it 
importantly raises the issue of the need for some sort of objective basis for aesthetic 
judgement and grounds to admit the possibility of artistic knowledge and 
understanding (ibid). 
5.2 Knowledge and the arts 
So is knowledge promoted by the arts? Both Socrates and Plato were sceptical about 
this, since they did not generally regard arts as reliable sources of knowledge. To this 
end, Plato leaves open the question, important for any present understanding of the 
epistemic value of the arts, of whether the source of knowledge is sensory experience 
or intellectual reflection (or something else). Empiricists – as already noted – insist 
that the source of knowledge is experience; on this view, knowledge reaches us 
through our senses. Rationalists, on the other hand, regarded the human intellect as 
the main source of knowledge. Kant tried to reconcile empiricism and rationalism by 
emphasising their interaction. Bertrand Russell also (1967) tries to reconcile them 
but does so through distinctions between different kinds of knowledge.  
Russell (ibid) firstly draws a distinction between the appearances of things and their 
real essence; that is to say objects seem to be different from what they really are. 
Developing the Platonic insights alluded to above, Russell (1967, p.22) maintains 
that the characteristic appearances of objects are not inherent to them, but precisely 
dependent on people’s perception:  
The question of the distinction between act and object in our apprehending of things is 
vitally important, since our whole power of acquiring knowledge is bound up with it. 
On this view, there may be two kinds of knowledge and truth: truth about the 






Platonic forms and ideas which are the (hidden) truth behind appearance. Russell 
offers the example of a table and wonders whether it has any intrinsic property as a 
table that would persist even if no one were there to perceive it; or whether it is a 
table only because it is perceived as such by humans. Idealists, such as Berkeley, are 
in favour of the second explanation which attributes knowledge to the mental 
experience of human beings (in Russell, 1967). Even more radically, Berkeley would 
insist that all known things exist only in the mind. Russell objects to this radical 
view, but he still appreciates the essential contribution of the mind to the acquisition 
of knowledge. He understands that there are different kinds of knowledge, and as an 
objection to Berkeley, he introduces the idea of knowledge by acquaintance. 
Acquaintance knowledge departs from radical idealism, but it is also different from 
theoretical/propositional knowledge. In particular, Russell (1967, p.22) states that: 
‘The faculty of being acquainted with things other than itself is the main characteristic 
of a mind. Acquaintance with objects consists in a relation between the mind and 
something other than the mind; it is this that constitutes the mind’s power of knowing 
things’.  
Acquaintance is an important kind of knowledge, because it reminds us that the mind 
must engage with something other than itself in knowledge acquisition. Nevertheless, 
knowledge still seems to be an ambiguous term. To know something may mean that I 
know that it is true, but it may also mean that I am acquainted with that thing. The 
first case of knowing that something is the case is often described as propositional 
knowledge, because it involves true judgement even if there is no acquaintance with 
any sense-data. The second case is acquaintance knowledge or knowledge by 
acquaintance, which is primarily (for Russell) direct knowledge of the data of sense 
experience. However, this second kind of knowledge also implies the existence of 
something: that is to say, if someone is genuinely acquainted with an object, then 
such acquaintance is generally indicative of the existence of that object. On the other 
hand, if someone knows that something is true, they do not have to be directly 
acquainted with that object. Russell concludes that true judgement of something 
without acquaintance is description. He explains (ibid, p.24): 
What happens, in cases where I have true judgement without acquaintance, is that the 






existence of a thing answering to this description can be inferred from the existence of 
something with which I am acquainted.  
Knowledge by acquaintance is simpler than knowledge by description, because it is 
not dependent on any particular knowledge of truth, even though it is sometimes 
coupled with knowledge of truth (ibid, chapter 5). In fact, anything that the senses or 
mind are directly aware of results in knowledge by acquaintance; such as the colour 
of a table. Someone may see the table in the dark and think that it is black, even 
though under other circumstances the colour appears brown, or an animal may 
perceive it as grey. In this case, knowledge by acquaintance may or may not be 
knowledge of truth. We may only be sure that the table has some colour. In these 
circumstances, however, we might want to ask why Russell considers knowledge by 
acquaintance to be ‘knowledge’ at all. What does it in truth tell us about the world? 
Even though it seems that this part of Russell’s theory is obscure, he probably 
justifies knowledge by acquaintance as knowledge in so far as what it tells us in truth 
is how the world as experienced feels, compared to knowledge by description, which 
simply describes the world (ibid). 
By contrast, knowledge by description may well imply some grasp of truth 
(presumably if the description is true), and it can tell us something about how things 
are in themselves (or a priori). This contrast seems to be a version of the distinction 
between appearance and reality. Having true knowledge of a table means making and 
having a true judgement that tells us something about this object that has the label 
‘table’, and not just what it looks like. However, when confronted with the 
appearance of an object that matches the description I had in mind for ‘table’, then I 
am acquainted with the object in a way that gives me some reason to claim that it 
exists (ibid). Therefore, knowledge by description and knowledge by acquaintance 
are two different concepts, but they do not exclude each other; sometimes they even 
presuppose or entail each other. Arguably, however, the concept that seems to have 
most bearing on the epistemic value and power of arts is knowledge by acquaintance 






It is apparent that objects experienced by the human senses are things that can be 
known by acquaintance. But, it is not only things that can be experienced in the 
present that can provide acquaintance knowledge. Things previously experienced by 
the senses can still provide acquaintance knowledge through the agency of memory. 
Furthermore, acquaintance knowledge by introspection is an extension of direct 
acquaintance; in short, human beings may be acquainted with something and at the 
same time be aware of their acquaintance with that thing through consciousness. This 
kind of self-consciousness is distinctive of humans as compared with non-human 
animals. As we have seen, this recalls Socrates who also argued that animals may 
have more vivid experiential knowledge than human beings, but lack the intellectual 
capacity of humans to know that they know. However, this last argument about self-
consciousness indicates that even knowledge of truths other than knowledge by 
acquaintance is still grounded in a kind of knowledge by acquaintance. As Russell 
(ibid, p.26) concludes: 
All our knowledge, both knowledge of things and knowledge of truths, rests upon 
acquaintance as its foundations.  
It is worth mentioning here that knowledge of things does not always mean 
knowledge of particular or tangible things: that is to say, concepts such as whiteness 
and brotherhood imply knowledge by acquaintance, but they refer to general and 
universal ideas, not material things (ibid, p.28). This idea may be confusing, in so far 
as such knowledge is clearly also associated with the non-experiential knowledge of 
description. All the same, on the basis of all these observations, a fundamental 
principle of knowledge which associates knowledge by description and knowledge 
by acquaintance emerges (Russell, 1967, p.32):  
The fundamental principle in the analysis of propositions containing descriptions is 
this: every proposition which we can understand must be composed wholly of 
constituents with which we are acquainted. 
Therefore, acquaintance is clearly important for any sort of genuine knowledge. As 
we have seen, however, knowledge by acquaintance is not all there is to knowledge. 






knowledge, it is not knowledge in the fuller sense analysed in the previous 
paragraphs. But even though it is not full knowledge (the kind of knowledge of truth 
where description is also implicated), it may still count as a constituent of 
knowledge. 
What is of direct present concern, however, is that the knowledge that the arts can 
provide might be regarded as a good example of knowledge by acquaintance. With 
reference to Russell’s two ideas of knowledge by description and knowledge by 
acquaintance, it might be said that artworks communicate appreciation of (aspects of) 
how things are by providing a kind of acquaintance knowledge. However, to clarify 
the kind of knowledge in which arts deal, it is important to resist certain mistaken 
views about knowledge and/or meaning in the arts. For example, consider the 
following passage (Hirst, 1974, p.152): 
But in what sense do we have artistic knowledge? There are many different senses 
possible, some of which are mutually compatible, others mutually incompatible, but 
there is one and only one sense in which I wish to pursue the matter. [ ...] In the arts, 
whether we are talking about painting, poetry, opera, sculpture, the novel or ballet, the 
observable features are used as symbols, have meaning, can be seen as making artistic 
statements and judged true or false just as words and sentences can be used to make 
scientific statements. This is to take ‘Guernica’, Middlemarch, ‘Fidelio’ or a Haydn 
symphony, as a statement expressing a truth we can properly be said to know. 
Hirst takes the view in this passage that arts are vehicles of knowledge. However, 
under the influence of certain modern expressive theories of meaning, he takes the 
meaning of works of art to consist in the making of truth bearing statements about 
reality in the manner of scientific statements. Briefly, Hirst conflates artistic meaning 
and knowledge with the kind of theoretical or propositional knowledge that Russell 
contrasts with knowledge by acquaintance. But is this a useful way to think about 
artistic meaning and knowledge? 
We may compare this view with that taken by Young (2001), who precisely contrasts 
what he calls the ‘semantic representation’ of propositional knowledge with what he 
calls the ‘illustrative representation’ of artistic knowledge. Certainly, many works of 
art exhibit the property of ‘intentionality’ – that is, of being about something – but 






often concerned with representing something or has the intention of conveying 
knowledge of it to an audience, it is also concerned with getting an audience to 
register such knowledge in a particular way. Young (ibid, p.21) gives the following 
general account of representation:  
R is representation of an object O if and only if R is intended by a subject S to stand for 
O and an audience A (where A is not identical to S) can recognise that R stands for O. 
On this view, artworks can be said to succeed or fail in representing something. 
Artworks can be said to fail when they do not adequately convey the knowledge 
intended to be transmitted to an audience. Such failure may happen when either the 
artist’s efforts were inadequate, or because the audience was not sufficiently capable 
of appreciating the value of the artwork. Here a capable audience is a group of 
people who have a good understanding of the fundamental rules and conventions of 
art and also some basic knowledge about the object that is being represented (Young, 
2001). If the audience meets these criteria, then it is required of a successful artwork 
to bring to the mind: (i) recognition of the object that is represented; (ii) its manner 
of representation; and (iii) the artistic meaning of that representation (ibid). One 
question that emerges here is whether works that are not about something can be 
regarded as artworks. In the light of formalist and other developments in modern art, 
many people would here want to say ‘yes’. But from the position that only artworks 
with cognitive value are artworks, the answer would seem to be ‘no’. Of course, even 
in the case of works with cognitive content, artworks are often about things that do 
not exist – such as fictional characters. Nevertheless, these artworks are still about 
something: they are about varieties, types or classes of objects with universal truth 
(Young, 2001, pp.34–38; also Carr, 2006b). 
In this respect, art is about themes and/or topics into which human beings often have 
valuable insight. To have an insight into some of the themes art deals with can be 
educationally useful, but also pleasurable. Young (2001) justifies the significance 
and special pleasure of the arts in the light of the human knowledge that such 
experience provides. This knowledge includes insight into human agency and into 






pleasure and knowledge; and since art is a source of knowledge, artworks are not 
merely of subjective aesthetic value to audiences and spectators. On this view, 
artistic merit does not depend that much – if at all – on aesthetic beauty (or how 
much ‘hedonic’ pleasure audiences get from it), but mainly on the extent to which it 
affords insight into matters of human significance. In this connection, Young 
suggests that an artwork has more to offer than the hedonic pleasure of (say) a glass 
of wine. Even when artworks evoke negative emotions, these feelings can still be 
accompanied by understanding and insight. Indeed, the ‘paradox of tragedy’ 
phenomenon supports this view (ibid, p.109), in so far as the audiences of tragedies 
know a priori that they may experience unpleasant passions, but they nevertheless 
find something correctly identifiable as pleasure in the aesthetic presentation of the 
play’s events. Tragedies seem to have that kind of beauty that Winston (2006, p.299) 
describes as ‘a transformative [...] force for good’ and which operates ‘as a means to 
expand and heighten our consciousness, [one] whose moral potential is worthy of 
our full attention’.  
In this respect, it seems useful to draw a distinction here between the ‘artistic’ and 
the ‘aesthetic’ aspects of artworks. Many philosophers have discussed this issue, one 
of whom is David Best (1980; 1985). Best regards artistic merit as extending beyond 
aesthetic beauty or sensory pleasure, investing artworks with something more 
meaningful that he refers to as a concern with ‘life issues’. He points out that there 
are other natural or man-made objects that are aesthetically beautiful or pleasant to 
the senses without being of any artistic value, such as a beautiful sunset, a pleasant 
perfume etc. Young (2001) goes even further by arguing that in order to be 
artistically meaningful, artworks need to have some cognitive and/or epistemic value. 
Only artworks that possess such qualities may be considered of real artistic value or 
merit. As he puts it, only artworks that communicate knowledge possess ‘arthood’ 
and should be accepted as artworks by an ‘artworld’. From this viewpoint, the value 
of artworks extends far beyond their aesthetic significance (unless aesthetic value is 
given a broad definition to include both hedonic and cognitive value).  
However, for Young (2001, p.10), ‘arthood is not the property of having a kind of 






artworlds’. This statement suggests that arthood is not an intrinsic property: that an 
artwork does not have artistic value by virtue of its intrinsic characteristics. Arthood 
is an extrinsic relational and/or perspectival property, in so far as an artwork only 
counts as such due to its relation to an artworld: that is, because some artworld 
designates it as an artwork. However, ’artwork’ and ‘artworld’ now become rather 
loose terms, because there are many artworlds and anyone may be regarded as a 
member of an artworld in so far as he or she uses the word ‘art’. But the number of 
artworlds could be infinite, and therefore any work may have an opportunity to be 
regarded as an artwork when accepted by one of these ‘artworlds’. Nevertheless, an 
ideal artworld, for Young, would be one that only accepts artworks that possess 
valuable artistic properties of real cognitive value. 
All the same, in Young’s, view, artistic value is a ‘relative-to-an-artworld’ insight 
into truth and knowledge (2001, pp.4–10). Any given artwork, according to how well 
it performs this function, could be classified as good, poor etc. From this viewpoint, 
artworks should not be regarded as beautiful – in any artistically significant sense of 
‘beauty’ – in so far as they arouse sensory pleasure, but only if they are able to evoke 
or communicate valuable cognitive states (Young, 2001, pp.17–18). This capacity to 
stimulate valuable cognitive states may have non-instrumental and/or instrumental 
value, in which case artistic knowledge can be both intrinsically and extrinsically 
valuable. However, even in the latter case of instrumental application, the extrinsic 
value of arts may still induce cognitive processes of intrinsic value. Consequently, 
possessing artistic knowledge may be significant for its own sake as well as a means 
of enhancing hedonic value or pleasure in the course of stimulating particular mental 
states/cognitive processes (ibid). 
At all events, some of the mental states/cognitive processes stimulated by art are 
clearly affective and/or emotional, and emotions may for Young be a source of 
hedonic pleasure or knowledge. If emotions are enjoyable for their own sake, the 
artwork has hedonic value: but if artworks arouse emotions of either intrinsic or 
extrinsic cognitive value, then associated reflection on such emotions may directly or 
indirectly result in knowledge. This process could be regarded as something like 






such epistemic insight into or appreciation of emotions is something that would seem 
to differentiate art from science: ‘While science tries to exclude emotion, the 
emotional responses generated by artworks give them their cognitive value’ (Young, 
2001, p.i). 
Of course, artworks, scientific achievements and historical narratives may all provide 
insights into aspects of reality, but they seem to express or embody truth in different 
ways. For Young (2001, p.26), this means that there are different modes of 
representation, of which he identifies two basic types: namely, ‘semantic’ and 
‘illustrative’ representations. 
According to Young (ibid), semantic representations are those of scientific and 
historical narrative where perhaps ‘literal’ or factual truth is the main aim of 
scientific or historical claims. Illustrative representations are the business of artworks 
– and even though these may aim at truth, it is not the main point of artworks to 
make true statements about the world. Furthermore, semantic representations are 
entirely conventional. This means that semantic representations are constructed 
according to local or other conventions, in the absence of which representation would 
be impossible. Such conventions determine the composition of semantic 
representations. Semantic compositionality consists of two conditions (ibid, p.27): (i) 
the method of representing proceeds via the combination of basic grammatical and 
semantic elements that determine sense or meaning; (ii) it needs to be done in such a 
way as to represent objective truths about the world. Under these conditions, 
semantic representations facilitate knowledge in the sense that when the audience 
knows the semantic conventions, it is able to understand the meaning and truth of 
such representations. However, illustrative representations are not compositional in 
this sense because they are not constructed from a finite set of basic terms or 
elements in accordance with some specifiable set of grammatical rules (ibid, pp.28-
29). On the contrary, an audience grasps the meaning of illustrative representation by 
appreciating the similarity between the experience of the representation and the 
object represented. Thus, while understanding of semantic conventions may be 
important for appreciating artworks, this is not enough for an audience to appreciate 






To be sure, some literary artworks may certainly deal in semantic representations, 
insofar as the means of much literary representation is language. Thus a descriptive 
sentence in a story or novel may be no less a matter of semantic representation than 
in non-artistic contexts – such as a historical description or even a sign which says 
‘toilets are downstairs’ that (as a statement about the location of the toilets) indicates 
where the toilets are. However, language functions in a different way for illustrative 
representation in literary artworks (Young, 2001, p.31 and pp.44–52). Language may 
well be descriptive, but the representation is illustrative only in so far as the work 
aims to represent an object as it might be experienced Such representation is not just 
a statement about the object, it is a representation or expression of the experience of 
the object. Literary artworks usually represent utterances, types of utterances, 
characters, types of characters, states of mind, emotions and other human and natural 
situations (ibid. p.49). However, any attempt to understand such representations by 
regarding them as semantic would fall short of artistic knowledge, because literary 
artworks also consist of representations that are not literal truths. Thus, though 
semantic representations often occur in literary artworks, they are not the essence of 
the artwork. To put the point in reverse, illustrations (e.g. photos) may be found in 
historical or scientific accounts, but they are not the essence of these semantic 
representations (ibid, p.67).  
In relation to artistic representation as illustrative, according to the account of 
illustration so far, someone might object that any photo could be regarded as art. In 
this regard, however, two further characteristics of genuine artistic representation 
should be noted: (i) a distinction between direct and indirect illustrations; and (ii) the 
affective intent of much illustrative representation (this discussion is based on 
Young, 2001, pp.32–33; pp.54–60; and pp.88–93). A photo exemplifies a direct 
illustration in which there is resemblance between the object itself and the 
photographic image of that object. In this respect, however, direct illustration seems 
closer to semantic representation, and is therefore not the illustrative representation 
of genuine art. But when direct representation is combined with indirect 
representation, even objects that cannot be semantically depicted may be represented 






of its direct representation of a person. Indeed, if the function of the portrait is 
practical, for example as proof that women of a certain age dye their hair, then it may 
be regarded as a type of semantic representation. However, many portraits are also 
cases of indirect illustration because they enable viewers to recognise character traits 
of the sitter (ibid, p.33). Indirect representation occurs in so far as human agents 
desire to make connections between what can be seen directly and indirectly intuited. 
This point is very important, because indirect representation enables artists to engage 
in deeper exploration of their subjects and make critical commentary on society and 
the world (ibid. and also p.86). This is an essential feature of an artist’s work such as 
in Goya’s portraits. In science and history, the personal view of the historian or 
scientist is not especially relevant to the truth or otherwise of their work since is not 
the main (if any at all) purpose of historical or scientific accounts to provide such 
personal insight. But in most if not all artistic contexts, indirect representation is very 
important: e.g. in music where a composer may use musical sounds to represent or 
mimic natural or real life circumstances (such as the ascent of a lark) with emotional 
associations. But, then, absence of the more personal creative perspective implied by 
indirect representation may rule out some (though, of course, not all) photographs 
from qualifying as works of art.  
But a further very important type of illustrative representation is affective illustration 
(Young, 2001, pp.88–94). The objects of affective illustration are emotional states. 
Since the mental states stimulated by art are invariably emotional, resemblance 
between emotions and their expressions and representations is a fundamental feature 
of art. Affective illustration, according to Young, can be either introspective or 
extrospective. In introspective affective illustration, an emotion is represented 
independently of its relations to objects, e.g. in poems of lyric poetry where, for 
example, the poetic expression of anger may mirror the experience of anger itself. 
Another example of introspective affective illustration may be found in music, e.g. a 
joyful piece of music expresses or reflects the joy that an audience may experience in 
listening to that piece of music. In fact, with this kind of illustration, some actual 
similarity or resemblance between the emotions of the artist and the audience may be 






experience the represented object may be available. A semantic representation might 
represent emotion, but only as a report of what happened at a particular place and 
time. However, with affective illustration the audience may be put in the position of 
experiencing the very emotions represented at a specific place and time. It is in this 
spirit that it is often said that ‘a picture can be worth a thousand words’.  
On the other hand, extrospective affective illustration creates affective responses to 
the objects or situations an artwork depicts: it calls forth emotions appropriate and 
specific to understanding (for example) Picasso’s Guernica (ibid). This kind of 
illustration may assist spectators and audiences in so far as such emotional responses 
significantly reinforce cognitive appreciation of artworks. On the other hand, artists 
may misuse – deliberately or not – such representation for their own purposes, in 
order to influence the emotions of audiences in particular unfit or ‘mischievous’ 
directions (Young, 2001, p.97). One reason why Plato wanted to exclude artists from 
his Republic was fear of such immoral or rhetorical misuses of art. However, the 
possibility of such immoral misuses of art clearly does not preclude its use for more 
morally edifying purposes.  
Moreover, the use of art for morally edifying purposes may also be a source of 
propositional knowledge which directly contributes to theoretical as well as practical 
wisdom (e.g. the moral lesson from ‘Pride and Prejudice’ that ‘first impressions are 
a poor guide to character’) (ibid pp.46 & 95). In particular, propositional knowledge 
of the arts may serve to enhance judgement, which is beneficial to the capacity ‘to 
apply concepts and knowledge of what certain mental states are like’ (Young, 2001, 
p.95). Kant (1961) emphasises this role of judgement in his Critique of Pure Reason, 
arguing that judgement helps agents to identify concepts of understanding even when 
applied to unfamiliar objects or situations. For example, though hypocrisy is widely 
regarded as something to be avoided, it may be less easy to identify what counts as a 
hypocritical attitude (Young, 2001, p.95). Art can contribute to such discernment by 
enabling an audience to grasp in its particularity what they had so far only known in 
general terms. Also artworks provide practical knowledge in the sense that they 






Such practical knowledge has some characteristics in common with acquaintance 
knowledge (as previously analysed).  
One art form that may raise questions in this respect, however, is that of music 
(Young, 2001, pp.52–64). In particular, one may doubt that musical artworks are 
illustrative representations or more specifically involve indirect or introspective 
affective illustrations. However, such doubts may be overcome by recognising that 
music indirectly or directly represents or expresses emotions phenomenologically, in 
a similar way to that which audiences experience when they hear the piece of music. 
Here, the direct representation is the musical experience that provokes an affective 
response from the audience to the formal properties of the music. The indirect 
representation consists in the emotional identifications that an audience is able to 
make with the artwork. An argument against this view could be that music can often 
be regarded as lacking any object, and therefore any intentionality or ‘aboutness’ 
whatsoever. However, listeners’ responses to music do have an object – the music 
itself: ‘Listeners can be pleased about, frustrated by, or have a variety of other 
reactions to, formal properties of compositions’ (Young, 1991, p.63).  
In conclusion, art may be credited with cognitive value, though in a different way 
from history or the sciences. Even though both arts and empirical sciences may be 
concerned with observation or description of aspects of the world, they represent the 
world in rather different ways. Whereas sciences produce testimony which is usually 
a kind of report on the data of experience, the ‘testimony’ produced by the arts is 
more illustrative of topics or themes of human interest (Young, 2001, p.67). Of 
course, no testimony or illustration is actually sufficient for knowledge, in so far as 
such testimony can be false or deceptive. This being the case, justification is always 
necessary for knowledge. In the sciences, the reliability of scientists and of scientific 
methodology is crucial; and of course any interpretation of such findings invites 
rational theory and explanation (ibid).  
In the arts, on the other hand, the basic tool of interpretation is perspective. As 
Young (2001, p.68) states: ‘A perspective is a way of conceiving of an object that can 






demonstrations of perspectives, but they can be illustrative of the truth of a 
perspective. Artworks may illustrate events according to a perspective and 
audiences/spectators can come to appreciate the rightness of that perspective. This 
does not necessarily mean that a perspective can be judged ultimately as true or false, 
since it is only a means of insight into an event. To be sure, Young (2001, p.69) says:  
Readers can learn from Pride and Prejudice that ‘First impressions are a poor guide to 
character’ is true’. But the fact that perspectives can provide such knowledge is no 
guarantee that they are strictly either true or false. A glance at my computer provides 
the propositional knowledge that my computer is blue. But the glance as such is neither 
true nor false. It is simply a means of apprehending the truth. Perspectives, in this 
sense, are means of apprehending the truth of certain propositions. 
But now another class of illustrations emerges: ‘interpretive illustrations’ (Young, 
2001, pp.80–88). Interpretive illustrations may be contrasted with affective 
illustrations in so far as they do not provide a way of feeling about things, but a 
perspective on them; a way, as it were, of thinking about them. Such a perspective is 
not, however, an ordinary way of thinking. Rather, it adds to the knowledge of an 
object, by changing the way it is perceived: Consider, Young’s (ibid, p.81) example 
of Monet’s painting’s of the cathedral in Rouen (in contrast to a vacation snapshot). 
In this regard, Young (2001) brings the following examples of interpretive and 
affective illustrations: amplification, connection, correlation, juxtaposition, selection 
and simplification – though for the purposes of this thesis these will not be pursued 
in any detail. However, it may be worth mentioning Lamarque’s (2009, p.236) point 
that:  
There might be disagreements about the aims of interpretation and the nature of 
interpretive support, but these do not challenge the fact that derived thematic content 
can take propositional and truth-assessable forms.  
To summarise, interpretive and affective illustrations providing perspectives on 
events, can change the perspectives of audiences/spectators. That is to say, art may 
change the way an audience looks at the world. To this extent, this function of the 
arts is also a moral one, since the audience changes its vision not only by formulating 
general rules, but also by exploring the particularities of ‘forms of life’ (ibid, p.240). 






important not because it may make an audience virtuous by bringing them into 
‘conformity with anyone’s preconceived ideas of virtue, but because it is a part of 
knowing what kinds of things hypocrisy and war and love are’. 
In conclusion, arts go beyond mere ‘hedonic’ pleasure, and education – not least 
general development of understanding and moral education – does seem to be 
possible through the arts. This is true in so far as the arts have various important 
functions: they can illustrate general rules, enable exploration of ‘forms of life’, 
cultivate reasoned judgement, provide conceptual clarification and insight, and 
instruct in forms or modes of truth. They may instruct by (Lamarque, 2009, p.220): 
opening the mind to new possibilities, by developing novel perspectives on its subject 
matter, by ‘defamiliarizing’, the everyday, by training the emotions, or even just by 
having a serious content, worthy of serious thought. 
This kind of instruction enlarges the audience’s imagination. Shelley (2003, p.684) 
claimed that:  
the imagination is enlarged by a sympathy with pains and passions so mighty that they 
distend in their conception the capacity of that by which they are conceived. 
This may happen through the artistic exploration of narratives which give 
audiences/spectators the opportunity to grasp through imaginative participation how 
something might feel (Lamarque, 2009). However, this is not a matter of mere 
subjective response on the part of the audience, since good art has cognitive 
dimensions and connections with reality and ‘truth’ (ibid, p.226). What is meant here 
by ‘truth’ would include: propositional truths, new perspectives on the world, self-
knowledge, self-awareness, authenticity, veracity, honesty, realistic description, ideal 
possibility, concrete or universal depth of meaning, thought with emotion, emotion 
with reason, worldly truth or artistic truth. In short, truth in the arts (as elsewhere), 
can have various meanings. In relation to this, Iris Murdoch (1992, p.86 and p.321) 
states:  
Truth is not a simple or easy concept. Critical terminology imputes falsehood to an 
artist by using terms such as fantastic, sentimental, self-indulgent, banal, grotesque, 






avoidance of these faults is a kind of transcendence: the ability to see other non-self 
things clearly and to criticise and celebrate them freely and justly. [...] Truth is 
something we recognize in good art when we are led to a juster, clearer, more detailed, 
more refined understanding. Good art ‘explains’ truth itself, by manifesting deep 
conceptual connections. Truth is clarification
5
, justice, compassion. 
Thus, the arts are not only about propositional truth but about truths of life and 
human nature. When an artist creates a piece of art, they at the same time invent 
‘their own relevant tests of truth’ (Murdoch, 1992, p.86), these tests are artistic forms 
that possess a rhetorical power that audiences/artworlds can be brought to appreciate. 
Meeting these tests may require that the members of an artworld become: (i) more 
knowledgeable; and (ii) more virtuous. That is, knowledgeable in the sense that they 
know more about their own nature, the world and their relationships with others, and 
virtuous – not only in the sense they have ‘achieved a rational grasp or appreciation 
of certain moral truths, rules or imperatives’ – but in the deeper Aristotelian sense 
that they have ‘come to experience, feel about and respond to the world in a 
particular range of morally appropriate ways’ (Carr and Davis, 2007, p.106). 
In sum, art may promote moral knowledge by exploring the world of human 
emotions, imagination and understanding. This may result in greater insight into 
and/or knowledge of many aspects of human experience and psychology. Knowledge 
by acquaintance presupposes some aesthetic and artistic appreciation of the 
illustrative representations of artworks, which may thus reflect, but also greatly 
extend beyond, the propositional knowledge of justified true beliefs. In this respect, 
arts promote epistemic and moral knowledge in diverse ways, but there can be no 
doubt about the distinctive role that they perform in the education of human agents in 
rich aspects of human understanding. 
                                                 
5
Clarification - as an element of the definition of truth - reminds us of what Caroll (2001, p.283; also 
in Lamarque, 2009, p.252) said about clarificationism: ‘clarificationism does not claim that, in the 
standard case, we acquire interesting, new propositional knowledge from artworks, but rather that the 
artworks in question can deepen our moral understanding by, among other things, encouraging us to 






Chapter 6  
 
6. The ‘intrinsic’ educational value of the arts and literature in Matthew 
Arnold and beyond 
In this chapter, the discussion will be mainly about literature in particular rather than 
art in general. The question of the epistemological status and educational value of 
literature has occupied philosophers, poets and literary theorists from antiquity to the 
present day. Some latter day trends, such as the American Great Books tradition and 
British Literary criticism have influenced educational policies significantly, and 
therefore merit special attention here. 
 As already shown, Plato (Republic 603a–b) held that imitative arts are: (i) far from 
real knowledge (Lodge, 1953, p.37); and (ii) mislead the mind progressively further 
and further away from truth and knowledge (Carr, 2007). On the other hand, as also 
seen, Aristotle argued that arts/poetry may educate through the training of emotions 
and the promotion of moral knowledge and understanding. Poetry can be also valued 
as a means to both entertain and educate. Again, as Horace says in Ars Poetica, 
‘Poets would either profit, or delight,/ Or mixing sweet, and fit, teach life the right 
[...] Sweet mix’d with sowre, to his Reader, so/ As doctrine, and delight together go.’ 
(Norton, 1999, p.200). The power of poetry to please, to arouse emotions, to 
embellish stories and to convey knowledge or information has been both appreciated 
and criticised throughout the history of western literature.  
The educational value of literature and the arts has been acknowledged by both 
British educational philosophers and theorists, as well as by theorists in the American 
'Great Books' tradition as having a central place in modern liberal educational 
thought. Arnold (1960; 1975), Eliot (1973; 1997; Reid, 2010), Leavis (1983) and 
Oakeshott (1981; Fuller, 1989; Williams, 2002) are examples of the former, while 
Hutchins (1955), Allan Bloom (1987) and E. D. Hirsch, Adler, H. Bloom 
(Satterfield, 2002; Carr, 2010a) represent the latter. These and other philosophers and 
theorists have emphasised the importance of literature and the arts, though in various 






literature and art is different from knowledge in other contexts of human inquiry (e.g. 
science or history). Some others, however, have argued that knowledge in, through, 
or of literature and arts is knowledge in a more standard sense and therefore not in 
principle different from other sorts of knowledge. In what follows, an overview is 
presented of some of these views as well as some assessment of the contemporary 
educational relevance of this debate.  
6.1 Two schools of thought in defence of literature 
Both the American Great Books Tradition and British cultural and literary criticism 
have defended the place of literature in education. Moreover, the Great Books 
Tradition – as well as such post war educational philosophers as Peters and Hirst 
(1970; 1986) – has argued for the educational parity and complementary nature of 
literature with science. On this view, the forms of knowledge that these apparently 
different types of human enquiry communicate are not just compatible, but of equal 
epistemic value. On the other hand, however, there is a time-honoured tradition that 
literature possesses a uniquely moral educational power that distinguishes it from 
other modes of human enquiry. Hence, literature (what sort of literature will be 
explored later) may convey knowledge that significantly differs from the more 
practical concerns of science and technology. This tradition even suggests that 
knowledge gained through the arts may be more educationally valuable or relevant 
than any knowledge gained from science. 
6.1.1 American Great Books tradition  
 In this country and abroad there are men who see that the onset of barbarism must be 
met not only by programs of rearmament, but by another revival of learning. It is the 
fact, moreover, that after tentative beginnings in several of the American universities, 
Columbia, Virginia and Chicago, a revival is actually begun. (Lippman in Haarlow, 
2003, p.1) 
The American Books Tradition offers some of the greatest modern day support for 
the educational value of literature. In general, this movement has sought to defend 






cultivation of human wisdom. From this point of view, the knowledge that literature 
provides is of at least equal human value to scientific knowledge. The Great Books 
Tradition originated in debates in the ‘20s and ‘30s between American academics 
such as Robert Hutchins, Mortimer Adler and others, prompted by Professor John 
Erskine of Columbia University. The key issue was about reforming higher 
education in the direction of western literature and liberal arts with a view also to the 
promotion of cross-disciplinary learning. The perceived need for change was a 
reaction to the narrow specialization of modern times which results in trained people, 
rather than people broadly educated in the timeless treasures of western culture and 
civilisation. In his book The Closing of the American Mind Alan Bloom (1987, 
p.337) observes: 
The university now offers no distinctive visage to the young person. He finds a 
democracy of the disciplines which are there either because they are autochthonous or 
because they wandered in recently to perform some job that was demanded of the 
university. This democracy is really anarchy, because there are no recognised rules for 
citizenship and no legitimate titles to rule. In short there is no vision, nor is there a set 
of competing visions, of what an educated human being is. […] On the way the student 
can pick up in elective courses a little of whatever is thought to make one cultured. The 
student gets no intimation that great mysteries might be revealed to him, that new and 
higher motives of action might be discovered within him, that a different and more 
human way of life can be harmoniously constructed by what he is going to learn.  
Before Erskine, Adler, Hutchins and others talked about the ‘Great Books’, 
otherwise referred to as ‘the classics’, Charles Eliot referred to something similar that 
he called the ‘five-foot shelf’ of Harvard Classics (Satterfield, 2002). What he meant 
by this is that a set of Harvard Classics that might fit on a five-foot shelf could be a 
window to liberal education. A long debate among academics resulted in the creation 
of a list of around one hundred essential books regarded as the greatest literary 
achievements of western arts and thought. This list was proposed as a literary 
‘canon’ for the educational development of all students.  
Hutchins (1955), who contributed to the construction of the canon, clearly did not 
believe that this list represented the definitive best works of western culture and 
civilization – bearing in mind, not least, the omission of other realms of art such as 






with regard to the field of literature. All the same, we might still here appreciate the 
general move towards a more liberal education in which literature and arts were 
given a central place. In general, it was held that philosophy, political thought, 
theological writings, poetry and other genre of literature might serve to cultivate and 
broaden the minds of students. Even if some of the prescribed works were written 
thousands of years ago they might still be regarded as of present day significance and 
relevance to all people in all walks of life.  
Even Hutchins (1955) a leading exponent of the American Great Books Tradition, 
claimed that these books would not: (i) address all important human concerns; and 
(ii) constitute the only books worth humanly reading. However, he and others argued 
that such books could nevertheless cast significant light on enduring human interests 
and concerns. At the very least, they might generate interest in further reading as 
well as serving to develop some moral judgement, critical acumen and artistic and 
aesthetic appreciation (Hutchins, 1955, p.47). 
 We do not think that these books are the only books worth reading. We think that these 
books shed some light on all our basic problems, and that it is folly to do without any 
light we can get. We think that these books show the origins of many of our most 
serious difficulties. We think that the spirit they represent and the habit of mind they 
teach are more necessary today than ever before. We think that the reader who does his 
best to understand these books will find himself led to read and helped to understand 
other books. We think that reading and understanding Great Books will give him a 
standard by which to judge all other books. 
In sum, it would appear that the American case for Great Books is grounded in a 
strong desire for the rounded individuals of the kind that a liberal education has been 
usually considered to produce.  
6.1.2 British Literary Criticism 
The ‘intrinsic’ educational value of the arts and literature has also been strongly 
defended by such British thinkers as Matthew Arnold, T. S. Eliot, F. R. Leavis, G. H. 
Bantock, Michael Oakeshott, Roger Scruton and others. The essence of such thought 
is located in a school of cultural and literary criticism that has long defended the 






As a key figure in British literary criticism, F.R. Leavis vehemently held that 
literature (and the arts) has an ethical purpose that is not generally shared by the 
sciences. In this sense, arts and sciences have different and distinct educational roles 
and do not share a common knowledge base: indeed, not only is the sort of 
knowledge they embody different, but the way in which they communicate 
knowledge is also different. This points to an epistemological dualism that was 
perhaps first recognised by ancient Greeks, but is also expressed very clearly in the 
writings of Matthew Arnold. In a study of his work entitled ‘Literature and Science’. 
Greenberg and Schachterle (1992, p.13) suggest that:  
his [Arnold’s] pairing of substantives reflected his belief that ‘literature’ and ‘science’ 
name the principal sources of knowledge about all the various parts of our experience. 
However, Arnold does not leave obvious room for connections between arts and 
sciences. Rather, he seems to adopt the view (see Greenberg & Schacheterle, 1992, 
p.13) that: ‘‘literature’ represented what could be learned about human nature, while 
‘science’ designated the systematic investigation of the physical environment…’ This 
would not necessarily mean that he thinks of knowledge as being of two 
(epistemically) different kinds, but that science and arts are just different fields of 
knowledge.   
Arnold (see Gribble, 1967, p.150) famously defined culture as ‘the best that has been 
thought and said in the world’. He also argued that literature makes a major 
contribution to culture, and – though he did appreciate the cultural and educational 
(rather than merely economic) value of scientific understanding, because he saw 
science as contributing to an educated understanding of the world – he seems to have 
mainly regarded those who were primarily educated in humanities rather than in 
sciences as cultured (1975, p.140): 
If then there is to be separation and opinion between humane letters on the one hand, 
and the natural sciences on the other, the great majority of mankind, all who have not 
exceptional and overpowering aptitudes for the study of nature, would do well, I cannot 
but think, to choose to be educated in humane letters rather than in the natural 






Consequently, life and literature are inseparable since literature contributes to the 
development of human moral and spiritual potential and formation. It seems that 
Arnold and his followers do not separate culture from life, knowledge from ethical 
purpose, and the arts from moral significance (Thiher, 2005, p.8).  
Even though this discussion could be further extended to cover other advocates of 
liberal education such as Eliot, Leavis, Oakeshott and Scruton, it will be limited here 
to the aforementioned thinkers as representatives of the prevailing spirit of this 
generally Arnoldian liberal tradition. 
6.2 Economic determinism, sociological determinism and other 
oppositions to the literary focus of liberal education 
There are various sources of opposition to the liberal and Great Books traditions. The 
main source is a contemporary utilitarian or instrumental approach to education that 
has focused more upon training than education. Much of this utilitarianism and 
instrumentalism has been driven by the modern global economic growth that 
Hutchins calls economic determinism. Ian Martin (2009, pp.3–5) explains: 
 We are increasingly exposed – and expected to conform – to the hegemony of technical 
rationality and narrowly conceived and economistic forms of vocationalism and 
competence [...] To a greater or lesser extent, we are forced to operate in an 
educational market place in which knowledge becomes commodified and 
credentialised, and educational institutions and agencies exist in relationships of 
competition rather than co-operation or collaboration with one another[ ...] This 
market place – and, in particular, its workers – are subjected to the rigours of the new 
managerialism, enforcing an accountant’s view of the world in which we seem to know 
the cost of everything and the value of nothing.[...] There is a growing and seductive 
tendency to celebrate the authenticity of personal experience rather than test its social 
and educational significance.[...] Despite its undoubted potential, the enthusiasm for 
information and communication technology (ICT) as the medium of instruction in adult 
education/learning raises crucial, if widely neglected, questions about the authority of 
the text, the privatisation of knowledge, the control of learning and the autonomy of the 
learner. 
The consequence of such a situation is the emergence of a very different kind of 
culture from that which Arnold describes. A more instrumental or therapeutic 
approach to education has emerged that seems mostly concerned with helping people 






(Hutchins, 1955). Such culture leaves little time or space for the indulgences of 
liberal education. On the other hand, it also results in loss of morale, or in de-
moralisation in the sense of ‘stripping out morality from our lives (in a way) that 
leads to a loss of purpose…the loss of belief in what might yet be possible’ 
(Ecclestone & Hayes, 2009, pp.137–138; Martin, 2009, p.5). 
Hence, with reference to the Great Books, without a liberal education that includes 
appreciation of great past and present artworks, not only will people lose sight of 
great moral and spiritual traditions, but they may also lack an important resource for 
the cultivation of moral sensibilities and virtues (Carr, 2005). Such a situation may 
have dangerous sociological consequences and result in a vicious cycle of cultural 
deprivation. That is to say, the aims of an instrumental education system may impede 
individual moral and spiritual formation. In turn, morally impoverished individuals 
will, as part of the wider social structure, impact upon their society with damaging 
effects. Eventually, such impoverished society must adversely influence the 
education system and its aims and processes for generations to come. If a culture 
excludes appreciation of great past and present artworks, then these artworks may 
gradually become completely unfamiliar and the role of education may change 
forever. Any liberal dimension of education that arts represent may come to be 
regarded as no more than an obstacle to the instrumental purposes of schooling. This 
argument is thoroughly underlined in Hutchins’s (1955) ‘Great Conversation’.  
Furthermore, Hutchins argues that industrialization, specialisation, mechanization 
and technical rationality are ultimately – if not inherently – opposed to democracy, 
since in the conditions and process of economic determinism people may have many 
qualifications but are not ‘qualified to govern themselves’ (1955, p.56). While a 
healthy economy is inevitably the base of any successful society (as, for example, 
Marx forcefully argued), liberal education is needed to appreciate the true human 
meaning and value of prosperity, so that citizens are fit for democracy (ibid). 
Otherwise, economic determinism prevails, resulting in problems – such as the kind 
of anarchy against which Arnold, Hutchins and others have warned – that only the 
cultivation of moral virtue and the full development of the human spirit can 






literature and liberal arts offer a unique route to such civilised cultivation and 
development (see the chapter of this thesis on art and knowledge).  
As previously said, economic determinism may lay behind the instrumental and 
vocational spirit of the contemporary social and educational system. But, in addition 
to this, what Hutchins (1955, pp.51–52) calls ‘sociological determinism’ reinforces a 
kind of alienation from full moral and spiritual potential that effective education in 
arts is well placed to resist. Hutchins (1955, p.51) argues:  
As economic determinism holds that all activity is guided and regulated by the 
conditions of production, so sociological determinism claims that intellectual activity, 
at least, is always relative to a particular society, so that, if the society changes in an 
important way, the activity becomes irrelevant. 
According to this view, liberal education may become irrelevant to society’s aims 
and, being regarded as irrelevant; it may also be given such dismissive labels as 
‘elitist’. 
For example, as Carr (2005, p.145) observes:  
The contemporary liberal climate of suspicion of an allegedly elitist and socially 
exclusive traditional literary canon, combined with communitarian misappropriation of 
religious and other cultural narratives in the name of so-called ‘politics of recognition’ 
(see Taylor, 1994), has probably played a large part in reducing literature, the arts and 
humanities to a position of marginal educational significance in many if not most 
contemporary school curricula. 
In this light, ‘Great Books’ are often regarded as elitist and socially exclusive – 
perhaps especially in contexts of oppression in which people are faced with 
subjection and deprivation (Hutchins, 1955). In such contexts, where it is perhaps 
more important task to promote basic justice and human rights and/or to raise basic 
standards of living, a liberal education may be considered redundant or utopian. 
However, as soon as people are free from economic and other burdens in these 
contexts, then the value of a liberal education may be more apparent, because 
instrumentally useful education/training is no longer so desperately required. To be 
sure, a liberal education cannot solve all of a society’s problems: its purpose is rather 
to cultivate and enhance the human perspectives and sensibilities that may promote a 






this point by arguing that an educator should be concerned with educating human 
beings as such, irrespective of the professional or vocational expectations or 
prospects of the pupil – precisely, because education is a more about becoming 
human than learning (like an animal) to ‘survive’ (from Rousseau’s Emile in 
Hutchins, 1955, p.68). 
Still, some might suggest that liberal arts would consume important time that might 
otherwise be used to train people to earn a living. But whatever the human 
importance of earning a living it should not be used to warrant a narrow focus on 
vocational or other training that would preclude the wider (liberal) education that 
defines us as really human. Furthermore, the need to make a living should not be 
used to justify depriving those in more trying economic circumstances from exposure 
to the benefits of wider cultural resources that are more spiritually enriching. In this 
respect, Doris Lessing (Crown, 2007, Guardian news) makes an ironic plea for the 
importance of a liberal education, wondering: ‘Why do wealthy students of England 
have less desire for books than poor students in southern Africa or other parts of the 
third world?’.  
Arnold (1960, p.245) might respond with the following:  
I remember, only the other day, a good man [...] said to me: ‘The one thing really 
needful is to teach these little ones to succour one another, if only with a cup of cold 
water, but now, from one end of the country to the other, one hears nothing but the cry 
for knowledge, knowledge, knowledge!’ And yet surely, so long as these children are 
there in these festering masses, without health, without home, without hope, and so long 
as their multitude is perpetually swelling, charged with misery they must still be for us, 
charged with misery they must still be for us, whether they help one another with a cup 
of cold water or no; and the knowledge how to prevent their accumulating is necessary, 
even to give their moral life and growth a fair chance!  
Having said this, it might be that even if all agree that an introduction to the Great 
Books and liberal arts is humanly beneficial, it may also be a sociological and 
political problem as to whether it is possible for everyone to receive or be provided 
with such an education (according to the democratic ideal). In past times, such 
education was regarded as only appropriate for those who had leisure time, political 






only for the ‘best’ (elite), why should it not, in a democratic society, be thought that 
equal access to the best education be available to all? (Hutchins, 1955).  
Still, it may also be argued that a liberal introduction to arts and Great Books is elitist 
due to its emphasis on classics and high arts. However, turning towards a liberal 
education, arts and Great Books is not necessarily about the exclusive defence of 
high arts and/or attacking present day popular culture – especially, bearing in mind 
that many high arts of the present day were formally popular culture e.g. 
Aristophanes’ Frogs or Verdi’s operas. It is perhaps more about cultivating 
receptivity to art and culture which connects people with all that is best about human 
cultural inheritance. It is upon such continuity between the past and the present that 
any and all true sense of human identity depends. As T.S Eliot (1986, p.16) argued:  
The difference between the present and the past is that the conscious present is an awareness 
of the past in a way and to an extent which the past's awareness of itself cannot show.  
 
This continuity is less likely to be preserved, if at all, through mass culture, most of 
which, as Peter Abbs (2003) observes, appears to serve commercial rather than 
educationally formative ends. Moreover, the distance between these commercial and 
educational ends is about as far as the distance between philosophy and 
entertainment. And it can hardly be denied that much of the entertainment of present 
day popular culture is not generally conducive to educational ends. Indeed, much of 
present day mass culture seems aimed mainly at promoting relatively ‘mindless’ and 
commercially driven consumerism, focused on spectacles of simulated sex and 
violence with little real human meaning or value. Peter Abbs (2003, p.39) takes the 
extreme view that this culture is surrogate, analgesic and deprives people of: (i) the 
appreciation of real art; (ii) the fulfilment of their spiritual potential; and (iii) any 
cultural insights that might enrich and expand their experience of the world. As he 
puts it (ibid): 
Millions of lives are daily dissipated in the endless simulacra of manipulated desire. In 
the vast machine of pseudo-gratification every object becomes deprived of its intrinsic 
virtue: William Blake becomes a plastic bag, Van Gogh a drinking mug, Frida Kahlo a 






This cultural and artistic predicament may be exacerbated by the fact that Great 
Books and liberal arts have been widely identified ‘with dead languages, arid 
routines, and an archaic, pre-scientific past’ (Hutchins, 1955, p.59). On this view, the 
march of progress might be speeded up by getting rid of such outdated knowledge 
and by using science for the dual aim of promoting technological progress and curing 
the social ills that industrialisation has brought in its wake (ibid). 
In addition, people may think worse of Great Books when teachers fail to uncover 
their magic, richness and cultural significance, focusing rather too much on the 
literary or grammatical technicalities of Latin, Greek or English. This may happen 
either because teachers have an unclear view of the educational significance of such 
works or because they are under pressure to prepare their pupils for the more 
educationally arid or pedestrian requirements of school examination and 
certification. Indeed, the consequences of such pressure are discernible in what 
Hutchins (ibid) observes of American schooling: that there is often little real 
difference in the final outcome between ‘uneducated’ and ‘educated’.  
Moreover, another source of confusion in popular art and educational policy about 
the value of Great Books and liberal education is a supposed opposition between 
culture and the self. As argued by the likes of Eliot (Reid, 2010 p.115), true self-
awareness should exhibit some continuity with cultural tradition. Real emotional, 
moral and spiritual development is a matter of gradual discovery of the self though 
the treasure-trove of cultural inheritance. However, contemporary focus on self-
discovery in the arts and art education has often led to self-expressive self-
indulgence with little scope for real artistic and spiritual growth. As Abbs (2003, 
pp.49–51) observes: 
... a psychological paradigm of the present tense: of personal learning, of immediate 
process, of sincerity and of spontaneity with as little formal mediation as possible. 
According to this powerful and animating paradigm the teacher was essentially the 
releaser of child’s innate creativity through acts of self-expression and self-discovery 
[...] Consistent with this model of arts teaching nearly all the necessary resources were 
seen to reside in the natural self, not in the collective culture and not in the specific art 
form the teacher was claiming to teach. One released; one did not initiate, nor 
transmit. Not surprisingly in the late 1970s and early 1980’s English and drama 
reconceived themselves as learning media and went across the curriculum. [...] At such 






into an infinitely tolerant yet hopelessly misguided psychology. On the one side self, on 
the other art; on the one side expression, on the other side tradition; on the one side 
private, on the other public. 
6.3 Conclusion and the way forward 
The American and British Great Books tradition may seem outdated, but in the light 
of education systems which fail to develop the full moral and other potential of 
students, the liberal spirit of these traditions may still hold much educational 
promise. A look, not only directly at society and its problems, but also at current 
research proves that it is now more important than ever to change the direction of 
education. According to a recent Cambridge interim report on primary education 
(BBC, 2009, http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/education/7896751.stm), reported to be the 
largest independent inquiry into English primary education for 40 years, 
contemporary British primary education is too narrow and generally deficient in the 
following respects: 
It [the report] calls for an urgent debate about the purpose of primary education. The 
report says inadequacies in the primary curriculum stem from a mistaken belief that 
breadth in the curriculum is incompatible with improved standards in the ‘basics’ of 
maths, literacy and numeracy. History, geography, science and the arts have been 
‘squeezed out’, it argues. The report's authors suggest learning in primary schools is 
skewed towards subjects which are formally tested in the national tests, used to draw 
up league tables. It calls testing ‘the elephant in the curriculum’, noting that in Year 6 
especially, the final year of primary school, ‘breadth competes with the much narrower 
scope of what is to be tested.’ Professor Robin Alexander, director of the Cambridge 
Primary Review, said: ‘Our argument is that their [children's] education, and to some 
degree their lives, are impoverished if they have received an education that is so 
fundamentally deficient. 
In the light of such evidence, lessons may be learned from the past. To be sure, one 
has to be careful about the spirit of past education here; much of it may have been 
more like that of Dickens’s notorious headmaster Gradgrind than Arnold’s sweetness 
and light. However, many past educational philosophers and theorists of note have 
advocated a view of education focused on the pursuit of intellectual excellence, 
wisdom, moral goodness and self-knowledge. Hume (1985, p.237), for example, 
mentions that the same treasures that Greek and Romans were able to enjoy and 






irrespective of the great social and technological changes that have overtaken modern 
cultures; so, as he (1985, p.238) states: ‘while the world endures, they maintain their 
authority over the minds of men’. In other words, great literature embodies the 
wisdom of the past and is fertile ground for enduring insights into the human 
condition. Great literature may help readers to see the world with the insight of past 
and present day writers and to derive inspiration from their wisdom. There is 
undeniable wisdom in the works of e.g. Eliot, Goethe, Shakespeare, Dante, Ovid, 
Sappho and Homer – as well as in the myths of antiquity on which all these authors 
have drawn. The benefits of such wisdom are not only, of course, to be found in the 
moral development of learners; but literature and arts may be expected to play a 
central role in such development. Such development, undoubtedly, is not an easy 
task, since moral learning is often – as Plato and Aristotle both argued – a difficult 
matter. But as Whitehead (Hutchins, 1955) and Hutchins (1955) have pointed out, if 
teaching wisdom from a book was an easy task, there would be a danger that the 
book was of no real educational value anyway. This recalls the saying ‘no pain, no 
gain’, and much of the same thought probably lies behind Robert Frost’s that (2002, 
p.219) well-known line in the poem ‘The road not taken’ that: ‘...Two roads diverged 
in a wood, and I /I took the one less travelled by/And that has made all the 
difference...’ Enjoyable or ‘fun’ learning is currently very fashionable in education. 
However, apart from the obvious motivational benefits of such learning, there is the 
ever present danger of possible curricular neglect or exclusion of those educational 
elements that are not so readily perceived as fun. A Shakespeare play may initially be 
very difficult to appreciate and not immediately fun; but this does not warrant neglect 
or omission of such educationally significant and powerful works (Hutchins, 1955; 
Russell in Hutchins, 1955). The true way forward lies in better pedagogical 
appreciation and cultivation of the intellectual and artistic meaning of such works 
(ibid). If carefully promoted, this approach may well result in radical moral and 
spiritual transformation of human lives (Abbs, 2003, p.83). Such transformation also 
probably seldom follows from latter day ‘cramming’ for examinations.  
It is when arts go beyond what R. S Peters (1986, p.32 & p.71) called ‘inert’ 






they begin to have real educational impact and value. This is the power of great 
literature when it is well taught. This makes a case for a more central place for great 
literature in the curriculum of contemporary schooling. If the aim of (liberal) 
education is human excellence, then Great Books and liberal arts may claim to be the 
most precious jewel in the crown of education. Having analysed in this chapter how 
the lack of liberal education and the influence of socioeconomic determinism 
threaten to diminish human potential, the place of arts in general education becomes 
a matter of human urgency. In retrospect, if a society aims to be democratic, Great 
Books and liberal arts may offer the best means to democratic education (Hutchins, 
1955, p.50): 
 The democratic ideal is equal opportunity for full human development, and, since the 
liberal arts are the basic means of such development, devotion to democracy naturally 
results from devotion to them. On the other hand, if acquisition of the liberal arts is an 
intrinsic part of human dignity, then the democratic ideal demands that we should 
strive to see to it that all have the opportunity to attain to the fullest measure of the 






Chapter 7  
 
7. Justification and critiques of the arts in the school curriculum 
7.1 Clarifying ‘education’ 
Education is a contested notion which may have both wider and narrower senses 
covering a wide range of intrinsic and/or extrinsic developmental concerns and 
purposes. Various distinctions – between (for example) education and learning, 
education and schooling, education and training, education and ‘educatedness’ – are 
helpful in clarifying the nature and meaning of those various processes generally 
referred to by the term ‘education’.  
First, it is common for the term ‘education’ to be used in loose ways to mean any 
experience that may result in some sort of learning e.g. the friends of a groom-to-be 
may call a ‘stag-night’ party a pre-marital ‘education’ for the groom (Carr, 2003b). 
On the other hand, it may be used more specifically to refer to the pursuit of certain 
activities of ‘cultural’ or value – involving knowledge of the good life – which may 
be concerned with (for example, according to Kant (Jesus, 2006)): discipline, 
civilized association and morality. Looking more closely at the looser use of 
‘education’, it seems that it lacks much clear theoretical significance since not all that 
can be learned or acquired is educationally worthwhile. Such a wide definition of 
education seems to confuse education with learning as such; but, whereas non-human 
animals clearly learn many things, we would not readily speak of them as ‘educated’ 
(Carr, 2003b). Thus, narrower and more specific concepts of education may be 
needed to help us to be clear about the kinds of learning that schools – as well as 
other educational bodies and agents – should aim to provide. We may be sure that 
they cannot and should not promote anything and everything, and therefore the loose 
inclusive definition earlier described needs revising for more a more useful account 
of education (ibid). 
The issue of what should be taught in schools raises further questions concerning the 






school learning can be mis-educational or educationally deficient; whose aims are 
served by education; whether a formal curriculum is an educational necessity; what 
particular subjects a curriculum should include; what the educational benefits are of 
particular curriculum subjects; who should determine the content of the curriculum; 
and so on. To address all these issues comprehensively is beyond the scope of this 
thesis. However, attention to two philosophical and educational approaches to these 
questions may serve to identify some of the crucial issues and we may refer to these 
as ‘instrumentalism’ and ‘non-instrumentalism’. Instrumentalism is often associated 
with utilitarian views, and non-instrumentalism with more liberal ones. Matthew 
Arnold – the founder of modern liberal educational thought – defended his explicitly 
liberal perspective as an alternative to the threats of utilitarianism. He argued that 
education should be about a broad initiation into culture defined as ‘the best that has 
been thought and said in the world’ (Gribble, 1967, p.150). Carr (2005, p.137) 
suggests that Arnold’s view is very important in so far as it addresses four key 
educational points:  
First, his conception of education is one of wider moral formation rather than narrow 
vocational or other training. Second, he appears to have construed such moral 
education more in terms of the cultivation of refined sensibilities and attachment to 
civilized values than of routine conformity to extant social norms. To that extent, such 
education might be expected to have an affective as well as a cognitive dimension. 
Third, Arnold also held that a certain quality of personal regard for what is learned is 
presupposed to the cultivation of such sensibilities and attachments. In short, learners 
need to appreciate what is learned for its own intrinsic or inherent worth. But fourth, 
although learners may indeed come to value any form of knowledge, understanding or 
skill for its own sake (including scientific and technical knowledge), such inherently 
non-instrumental, affective and aesthetic components of the curriculum as literature 
and the arts (as well as such other subjects such as history and religion) have an 
especially privileged part to play in the formation of personally and/or morally 
formative values. 
A modern liberal account of the meaning of education may be also found in the work 
of the British philosopher R.S. Peters who drew a distinction between education and 
other processes of human learning or formation such as socialization, therapy and 
training (Carr, 1988, p.155; Carr, 2003b, pp.197–198). Peters adopts a normative 
account of education as broad initiation into forms of objective knowledge and 
understanding that enable learners to make rational or ‘disinterested’ sense of the 






rather than for extrinsic purposes, and therefore ‘education’ differs from vocational 
and other forms of training. Whilst trained people may be trained for particular 
practical purposes, educated people are educated for its own sake in the view of 
Peters and other liberal theorists who support non-instrumental education. On this 
view, therefore, it may be misleading or to miss the point to ask what ‘education’ is 
for. This non-instrumental view questions the educational place of specialization, and 
underlines the importance of broad knowledge, implying that a person who is an 
expert in only one subject, but entirely ignorant of others can hardly – if at all – be 
regarded as really educated. In this separation of training from education, Peters 
affirmed the importance of academic or ‘theoretical’ knowledge over vocational and 
other skills.  
This liberal non-instrumental view of education was supported by such post-war 
British analytical educational philosophers as Richard Peters and Paul Hirst (Carr, 
1988). Paul Hirst (1986, p.8) has said that ‘when Richard Peters began his 
outstanding work in philosophy of education the subject barely existed in Britain as a 
distinct academic and professional area.’ A feature of Peters’ work was that 
‘explorations of interconnections between knowledge, belief, truth and evidence were 
harnessed to classroom-level issues of learning and the curriculum’ (White & White, 
2001, p.17). In curriculum development, on Peters view, the aims of education were 
to be determined by reference to what constitutes human flourishing and good living. 
As for Socrates, the key question would be that of what counts as a successful, 
fulfilled life. While some have suggested that there are no objective standards to 
determine this, others have argued to the contrary. Socrates and Plato were among 
the first to regard the acquisition of ‘rich’ knowledge as the key to understanding 
education. Peters and Hirst (1970) broadly follow them in arguing that knowledge is 
fundamental to conceiving and pursuing any humanly worthwhile life. Hirst (1970, 
p.13) stated that ‘educating people suggests developing in states of mind which are 
valuable and which involve some degree of knowledge and understanding’. Hirst 
also argued that this educationally valuable knowledge might be understood in terms 
of seven basic forms of rational knowledge and understanding (ibid). Even though 






learning, the educational curriculum should for them be primarily concerned with 
introducing students to these seven forms of knowledge – usually identified as: (i) 
understanding of formal logic and mathematics, (ii) understanding of the 
physical/natural sciences, (iii) awareness of our own and other people’s minds, (iv) 
moral judgement and awareness, (v) objective aesthetic experience, (vi) religious and 
(vii) philosophical understanding (ibid). 
Such liberal views may be challenged from various perspectives, some of which 
question: (i) the intrinsic worth of knowledge; (ii) the objectivity of knowledge; and 
(iii) the idea of ‘broad initiation’ in general (see Carr, 2003b; Pring, 1995). Starting 
with the last challenge, Mary Warnock (1973, 1977) questions the idea of ‘broad 
initiation’, arguing that this may result in sterile and superficial acquaintance with a 
range of subjects, which of course would be useless for any practical purpose. On 
this view, it seems over-strict to say that the educated are only those who have been 
broadly initiated. Warnock (ibid; also in Carr, 2003b, p.199) concludes that it is 
better for pupils to leave school with a ‘genuine enthusiasm’ for some particular 
form of knowledge or learning. Such a view might be reinforced by the existence of 
electronic and other information ‘banks’ with endless data that might make any 
attempt to master a broad range of knowledge redundant (if ‘broad range’ here 
applies to the acquisition of propositional knowledge which may sometimes mean no 
more than ‘inert’ information).  
However, criticisms of an account such as Peters’ may also come from 
instrumentalists (Carr, 2003). Whereas non-instrumentalists take a more liberal view 
and value education for its own sake as a process that contributes to the formation of 
individual personal identity and character, instrumentalists regard education in 
schools as a form of training that prepares students for their social and economic 
future. Whereas the former argue that initiating students into forms of knowledge is 
important for understanding the world and the individual’s place in it, the latter 
consider training students in appropriate knowledge and skills as necessary in 
competing for a ‘successful’ place in the world. Here, a distinction between ‘person-
centred education’ which focuses on personal development, and society-centred 






distinction is not sharp since, for example, personal development of character and 
virtues may be reconciled with a more instrumentalist political emphasis on the role 
of humans as economically useful citizens (ibid). Again, liberal educationalists such 
as John White would also argue that all instrumental justifications must logically 
lead to some things that are valued for their own sake: that is to say that even 
knowledge and skills of extrinsic value may ultimately aim towards goals of intrinsic 
value such as pleasure, happiness or success (Carr, 2003b). But these thoughts are 
not exactly those of Peters who would argue that the intrinsic value of objective 
knowledge consists mainly in the potential of such knowledge to make students 
better people in some more significant moral sense (ibid). Thus, although White’s 
argument that all knowledge may finally lead to states of intrinsic value may be true, 
not all intrinsic value would be necessarily of educational value in Peters’ sense 
(ibid).  
Still, Peters’ distinction between education and training has also attracted criticism 
from Marxist, Deweyan and other philosophical and ideological quarters. As Carr 
(2003b, p.200) comments: 
According to such philosophers, Peters’ (alleged) separation of training from 
education has led to widespread denigration of vocational skills, a failure to recognise 
the rich intellectual and moral, as well as economic, contribution that such skills have 
to make to human flourishing, and hence also their rightful place in any well-conceived 
school curriculum. 
However, Carr (2003b, p.201) also continues: 
Indeed, idealist, pragmatist and communitarian claims that knowledge is a matter of 
social construction in the service of all too local human interests clearly does much to 
reinforce an educational instrumentalism that insists education is just a means to the 
achievement of particular social and cultural goods and goals. In this light, since 
different cultural constituencies have diverse if not incommensurable goals, any answer 
to the question about the meaning of education is liable to differ from one location to 
another: education is essentially contested and cannot have universal meaning. 
Such a criticism raises the fundamental issue of whether there can be objectivity of 
knowledge and truth, something that will be explored more thoroughly in the next 






empirical support (positivism), is a matter of social agreement (social constructivist 
non-realism) or of practical utility (pragmatism), are all (in different ways) 
vulnerable to the objection that apparent evidence, social consensus and the social 
character of meaning are not sufficient for truth (ibid, p.204). There are occasions on 
which claims are backed by interpersonal or social agreement, apparent evidence or 
utility but are still at odds with the truth. Indeed, arguments may be valid, but still 
untrue. Thus, an appropriate epistemological response to positivism and social-
constructivist non-realism might be (ibid): 
A critical realism that combines appreciation of the social constructedness and 
provisionality of our best current knowledge with due recognition that the windows of 
human reason and perception (when cleansed) can lead us beyond the veil of 
sociocultural conditioning to locally transcendent (moral as well as scientific) truth 
and wisdom. 
Epistemic objectivism is therefore important because it recognises the significance of 
education for moral and spiritual emancipation beyond local cultural norms, giving a 
‘universal’ value to education (ibid, p.205). That is to say, epistemic objectivism 
gives education the potential to assist learners to truths about themselves, their 
relationships with the others and their place in the world. In this way, education goes 
beyond economic utility or successful citizenship. At the same time, the fundamental 
goal (of truth) is not external to the person. The goal is precisely personal 
development in terms of development of virtue and moral understanding. Carr (ibid) 
criticizes a certain modern interpretation of virtue-Ethics ‘influenced by a 
fashionable, but misguided communitarian construal of virtue, as instrumental to 
particular socially defined practices and purposes’ which fails to appreciate the 
objective nature of virtuous character. Such virtue relativism is arguably misguided, 
in so far as the ancients (Socrates, Plato and Aristotle) argued for the inherent and 
intrinsic value of virtue; that is for the value of becoming a virtuous person as such. 
Nevertheless, non-instrumental approaches to education do not exclude the broader 
or looser ‘educational’ value or necessity of instrumental knowledge, since education 
is one function of schooling, and schooling will involve forms of training as well as 






Indeed, in a broader sense, the term ‘education’ is often used to refer to the general 
process of schooling. Notwithstanding such usage, not all schooling does seem to be 
‘educational’ in the ‘liberal’ sense of having ‘intrinsic’ purposes. Schooling in the 
familiar sense is about all the processes that take place in schools as social 
institutions, which may cover formal, non-formal and informal forms of learning. 
Again, the term ‘education’ may also be more widely employed to embrace lifelong-
education, a term that is less easily used in connection with schooling (e.g. the idea 
of lifelong-schooling is rather odd). However, the aims of schooling usually coincide 
with the content and targets of established school curricula that are in turn wider than 
‘education’ understood in Peters’ liberal sense. Thus, a school curriculum could 
include various activities and purpose such as (Carr, 2006a): (i) general care, welfare 
and supervision; (ii) socialization; (iii) life and coping skills; (iv) vocational 
education and training; (v) examinations and certification; and (vi) ‘education’ as 
learning for its own sake. In Pring et al’s (2009, pp.102–103) broad definition of 
education, a curriculum framework may consist of the following areas: knowledge 
and understanding of the world; practical capability and learning; community related 
learning; big issues such as environmental change; moral seriousness; pursuit of 
excellence in various areas; self-awareness; careers education and guidance. In short, 
schools – unlike education – are funded social institutions that are publicly 
accountable and serve diverse purposes including – inevitably, but still importantly – 
socialization, training and welfare (ibid). Nevertheless, the aims of liberal education, 
such as initiation into intellectual and moral commitments, should not be neglected in 
all of this. Such purposes should not be forgotten, not only for the sake of justice to 
the diverse aims of schooling, but also for their vital contribution to the wider 
educational development of young people. That is to say, although students should 
be given access to as a wide a variety of life choices and opportunities in school as 
possible, they should also be educated to evaluate such opportunities and choices in 
the light of some broader educated conception of a flourishing life. In order to clarify 
this point, some further attention to the concept of vocational education and the 
distinction between vocational training, vocational education and education (in the 






While vocational education is not a clear concept, it seems broader than that of 
vocational training (Carr, 2003b). Vocational training is necessary for the preparation 
and pursuit of fulfilling work, work that can be mindless and unfulfilling if students 
are not educated widely enough to understand the purpose of what they are doing. In 
any case, sterile training in skills and competences is not adequate for the acquisition 
of skills relevant to many forms of work. In this spirit, however, a certain ‘new 
vocationalism’ attempts to blur the distinction between education and vocational 
training. Essentially this view of vocational education aims to bridge the gap between 
academic knowledge and practical skills in the school curriculum – arguing that both 
are essential for fulfilment of the full potential of the working person (ibid, p.206). 
Despite this laudable aim, new vocationalism may still fail to recognise that even 
acquisition of such theoretical vocational understanding or expertise is not enough to 
call a trained individual ‘educated’. ‘Educatedness’ requires ‘broad initiation’ and 
‘intrinsic commitment to knowledge, understanding and virtue of the liberal kind that 
Peters identifies, and not just vocational and other training’ (Carr, 2003b, p.206). As 
Peters argued, such broad educational initiation extends far beyond, and has quite 
different purposes from, such external vocational goals as job efficiency or 
satisfaction (let alone financial gain).  
The distinction of education from schooling is important precisely because there is 
an ever present instrumentalist danger of confusing education with schooling, leading 
to the inclusion of only practically ‘useful’ subjects in the school curriculum. On the 
other hand, of course, there is also a liberal non-instrumentalist danger of confusing 
schooling with (liberal) education, and regarding only personally formative and non-
instrumentally valuable modes of knowledge as developmentally significant (Carr, 
2003b). Broad non-instrumental initiation should not preclude specialization and 
vocationally useful processes and purposes, or vice versa. That said, such broader 
liberal initiation should also be regarded as an essential ‘right’ of the many, rather 
than a ‘privilege’ of the few. In this regard, as Carr (2003b, p.210) says:  
It is difficult if not ultimately impossible to accommodate individual educational needs 
entirely satisfactorily to any normative generalities of the kind dreamed up by 
educational theorists and curriculum policy makers. [...]. But in this respect the liberal 






well be rather better placed than many of its competitors if we are seriously committed 
to the moral task of trying to realise the full human potential of the many rather than 
the few.  
7.2 Traditionalism and generic arts 
Often linked to liberal education, educational traditionalism is a perspective that lays 
considerable emphasis on the value of established traditions of thought and enquiry 
and on the transmission of such knowledge and values from one generation to the 
next (Carr, 1988, pp.152–153). Traditionalists tend to regard received forms of 
knowledge as objective accounts of the world. In this sense, past educational 
curricula in many countries have been broadly traditionalist. Hirst’s own liberal 
traditionalist approach to the curriculum also directly influenced the subject-centred 
approach to the post-war Scottish secondary curriculum. Support for the secondary 
subject curriculum in Scotland came from The Munn Committee curriculum report 
(1977; 1978, p.6) which is here cited as in many respects typical of the spirit of other 
British reports and curriculum publications (such as Arts in Schools Project of 5–16: 
Curriculum framework).  
The subject-based approach to the curriculum has been firmly established in Scottish 
secondary schools for many years. The Committee recommends that the basic unit of 
study remains the individual subject but with a number of qualifications [...]The 
recommendation of the Committee is that all pupils should undertake study in each of 
seven areas: English, mathematical studies, physical education, moral and religious 
education, science and technology, social sciences and creative arts’.  
 Despite a discernible ‘progressive’ influence on latter day Scottish primary 
education (from the 1965 Primary Memorandum) – and the recent Scottish 
Curriculum for Excellence developments – the Hirst-influenced Munn model still has 
distinct echoes in the current Scottish secondary curriculum components of 
languages, mathematics, health and wellbeing, religious and moral education, 
sciences and technologies, social sciences and Expressive Arts (though the key 
components have now become eight with the addition of technology). Having said 
this, it is also true that from the beginning the Munn report supported its traditional 
subject-centred approach to curriculum planning by appeal to rather instrumental 






Moreover, the general subsuming of arts education in the Munn Report and other 
Scottish educational developments under such generic terms as ‘Expressive Arts’ or 
‘creative arts’, whereby such diverse fields as art and design, music, drama, dance 
and physical education are regarded as having common epistemic or rational 
features, is clearly problematic (Carr, 1988). However, according to policy makers or 
philosophers such as Hirst, it is the aesthetic form of arts rather than the connection 
of arts with creativity that encourages curriculum planning for a general or ‘generic’ 
arts experience.  
While this idea of ‘generic arts’ has been very influential (e.g. in educational policy 
documents), it has also been much criticized. Mary Warnock (1994), for example, 
has argued that the idea of generic - scientific and/or artistic - forms of knowledge 
does not adequately take into consideration the significant rational and epistemic 
differences between different sciences and/or art forms. However, David Best (1992) 
has more particularly condemned the idea of generic arts, considering the term to be 
an ‘expedient myth’ that fails to appreciate the distinctiveness and the potential 
power of individual arts, and also leads to dangerously confused ideas about arts on 
the part of students. To be sure, Best (ibid; also 1980; 1985) would agree that arts are 
forms of knowledge in which artistic form serves to illuminate knowledge of what he 
calls ‘life issues’ (a contribution of the arts that will be discussed in due course). 
Moreover, in using the phrase ‘expedient myth’, Best (1992, pp.27–44) appears to be 
suggesting: (i) that the term ‘generic arts’ is fallacious; but nevertheless (ii) that such 
fallacy could be in some way ‘desirable’. With regard to the second point, Best (ibid) 
does seem to believe that the ‘entertainment value’ of much art risks undervaluing 
the educational status of the arts compared to ‘more useful’ scientific and other 
subjects. In short, the present day utilitarian ethos favours other disciplines that are 
regarded as more useful and practical for society (e.g. science and technology). At 
worst, this leads to the ‘sidelining of arts’, and at best results in use of them as tools 
for the promotion of ‘more useful’ capacities and knowledge. Furthermore, such 
other subjects and areas may be easier to assess than the educational outcomes of the 






more convenient for policy makers to aggregate the arts, even if this is a rather 
superficial approach to them.  
For Best (ibid), however, the notion of generic arts is a fallacy, as it is based on the 
mistaken idea that all arts share common characteristics that distinguish them from 
(say) scientific and other enquiries. Of course, arts do have distinctive characteristics 
and structures. Nevertheless, the words ‘art’ and ‘arts’ do not identify any distinctive 
characteristic or feature of arts taken as a whole. Indeed, there is no characteristic 
common to arts that cannot be found in other areas of knowledge and enquiry; either 
with regard to the aesthetic dimension or to the mental or other processes that are 
involved in artistic practice – such as imagination, or creativity. Such capacities, 
qualities and processes are after all central to learning across all areas of the 
curriculum, and are not therefore distinctive only of arts. Moreover, the term ‘art’ is 
for Best used far too widely and vaguely (e.g. the art of cooking or the art of breast-
feeding) to be useful for generic justification of arts (ibid).  
In this respect, generic justification takes a superficial view of the art experience and 
fails to appreciate the depth and complexity of particular arts. To be sure, Best (ibid) 
does recognise that co-operation between arts and/or attempts to integrate arts may 
be educationally beneficial; but he sees that there is nothing more to such integration 
and co-operation than there would be to the integration and co-operation of other 
disciplines within the school curriculum. Furthermore, really fruitful co-operation 
between art or arts and other curriculum areas could only be a secondary approach, 
since such co-operation or integration logically presupposes education in particular 
art forms such as literature, painting or dance. However, in relation to the general 
idea of generic arts, Best (1992, p.42) wonders: ‘do we opt for one or two arts in 
greater depth, or offer at most a basic introduction to all the arts, at the cost of 
relative superficiality?’ While Best recognises that either option has its advantages 
and disadvantages, he concludes that policy should advocate education in all the arts 
separately and in depth – since, he (ibid, p.43) argues they have the potential for 
‘significant personality development and awareness of social and moral issues’. In 
fact, Best (ibid) claims that the mistaken generic arts approach just noted provides no 






7.3 Form, Expression and the ‘Aesthetic’  
Considered as one of Hirst’s seven forms of knowledge, the term ‘aesthetic’ is 
problematic in its own right. It is often used widely and loosely in connection with 
the term ‘artistic’ (for distinction between these terms, see Best (1980; 1985) and/or 
the previous chapter of this thesis on knowledge). Conversely, it is often used in a 
more narrow sense to apply to the formal features of artworks. This is a narrow sense 
as compared, for example, to Noel Carroll’s (1999) pluralistic view of art as 
encompassing representation, expression, form, aesthetic experience, and so on. As 
previously noted, Hirst seems to suggest that artworks employ artistic ‘means’ to the 
symbolic expression of propositional knowledge. This would suggest that the types 
of knowledge gained through, for example, reading novels and conducting scientific 
experiments are methodologically different, but nevertheless compatible and equally 
important, ways of accessing knowledge. Having said this, his position may also 
appear to justify arts in instrumental rather than intrinsic terms.  
As previously explained, instrumental justifications of education concern the 
extrinsic or external socio-economic and other benefits of knowledge, skills and 
dispositions. From this perspective, arts education may aim to promote knowledge 
and skills that are not intrinsic to arts in themselves – such as various cognitive and 
social skills. However, such extrinsic positive effects of arts may often be achieved 
equally well or even better through other educational means and methods, suggesting 
that arts are not yet justified on their own terms. Thus, for example, dancing may be 
regarded as a pleasant form of exercise; but a team game may be considered a more 
effective exercise. From this perspective, the educational place of arts does not seem 
assured if arts are justified in extrinsic terms (Gingell, 2006). 
Furthermore, as also previously seen, David Best (1980; see also McFee, 1994) 
underlined the important capacity of arts to convey and express truths about life 
issues. On this view, artworks may express human moral and socio-political issues 
that are of considerable educational significance – providing strong support for their 
curricular inclusion (also in Gingell 2006). But while this is an important point, it is 






exactly ‘about’ anything, but would still appear to be of considerable artistic merit. 
Even though Young (2001) would not entirely agree, we might think here of abstract 
painting or non-representational sculpture. Secondly, if the (propositional) content of 
works of art is of key importance, then why should we regard different artworks 
depicting the same subject as individually important, since they may all ‘say’ the 
same thing? For example, Gingell (2006, p.20) mentions that the majority of 
Vermeer’s valued paintings are mainly on the same topic: the sanctification of 
everyday life. Why then do we not only value highly this diversity of expression of 
common themes, but also revisit the same artworks again and again? In this light, 
there has to be something beyond the propositional ‘message’ of artworks, but also 
beyond any purely sensory pleasure in the arts that justifies their educational value. 
Despite this, John White (1998, p.194) seems to have agreed up to a point with Best 
in connection with the ethical aspect of the arts, in arguing that: 
Experiences of art, in encouraging us to dwell on the springs of our ethical life, 
recommit us to what we value, thereby strengthening their role in our life, both 
individually and communally.  
White, adopting elements of Hirst’s theory, has attempted to justify arts 
educationally on non-instrumental grounds, concluding that while people might 
(materially) flourish without art, they would nevertheless be culturally or 
educationally poorer in the absence of such acquaintance. Although Koopman (2005, 
p.88) criticises him for actually offering an instrumental justification, White (ibid) 
takes the view that the efforts of Osborne and Beardsley to justify the arts on 
aesthetic grounds is not satisfactory because: i) it is not true that aesthetic 
appreciation has more general appeal than the acquisition of knowledge for its own 
sake (as Osborne maintained) – since artworks involve more than sensuous and 
formal structures; and ii), engagement in artistic appreciation is not primarily 
aesthetic (so that, in that case, aesthetic experience cannot provide a basis for 
knowledge in arts). Still, White (ibid) argues that while aesthetic appreciation is not 
the key element of artistic experience (as Beardsley suggested), it is yet not entirely 
disconnected from it as he takes O’Hear to argue. White (Koopman, 2005, p.88) 






... (1) by means of its sympathetic re-enactments of anthropomorphic perspectives on 
the world, art can play a central role both in value enquiry and in coming to an 
understanding of the nature of one’s own existence and the meaning available in it; (2) 
through its ability to resolve fundamental tensions in our existence, art can play a role 
in fostering harmony in one’s existence (White, 1988, pp191–192).  
White precisely holds that the first claim excludes the possibility of genuine aesthetic 
engagement with artworks above and beyond any ethical understanding and insight 
that artworks may provide. As for O’Hear’s second claim, White is unsympathetic to 
the ‘religious’ connotations or overtones of his claim about bringing meaning and 
harmony into someone’s life above and beyond everyday life experiences. While the 
religious connotations of art may be important to some people, White’s criticism of 
O’ Hear might seem fair, in so far as art could not have the form and functions of 
religion. In addition, art has educational value for all people irrespective of their 
religious beliefs (Koopman, 2005).  
Still White also concludes that ‘mirroring our psychic constitution, art invites ethical 
contemplation and enhances self-knowledge’ (Koopman, 2005, p.89). He continues 
that besides enlarging life options, education in the arts serves the purpose of 
fostering self-knowledge, reinforcing our ethical values and binding us together as 
members of communities. For these reasons, he believes that the arts should have a 
central place in the school curriculum (ibid). On the face of it, these arguments may 
also seem to be non-instrumental, in so far as the supposed aim of such artistic 
engagement is personal moral development within an aesthetic context. Further, the 
aesthetic appears to serve an ethical purpose in the manner of traditional educational 
aims of self-knowledge and moral development. Simply put, from White’s point of 
view, form in art is a vehicle for ethical content. 
However, the implied dichotomy between aesthetic form and (moral) content may be 
not only artificial – as will be argued shortly – but morally dangerous. For one thing, 
as Carr & Davis (2007, p.109) argue, it may entail failure to recognise that ‘while 
aesthetically
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 deficient literature and the arts can also be morally settling in 
negative and damaging ways’. The latter, for example, may result in the production 
of works which are: (i) not of high artistic value; and (ii) not morally worthwhile, but 
ethically deceitful – portraying, for example, the triumph of good over evil in 
morally shallow or trivial ways (ibid). The film of Harry Potter provides an example 
of a movie that is praised for its ‘moral message’ about the triumph of good over 
evil, but has attracted much criticism for its artistically and aesthetically shallow 
concept of good and evil. Superficially represented moral content may lower the 
artistic expectations of people who in turn will not be sensitive to complex artistic 
appreciation of deeper moral themes. While the distinction of aesthetic form from 
moral content may help us to appreciate such a danger, any over-sharp dichotomy 
between these may also be catastrophic for the educational appreciation of arts.  
This dichotomy of form and content is also criticized by Koopman (2005), on the 
grounds that such dualism diminishes one aspect of the nature of arts (the form), 
while also taking an instrumental turn in viewing arts as merely a means to (moral or 
other) knowledge – even if such knowledge may be valued for its own sake. 
Koopman explains that the process of aesthetic experience is no less important than, 
or inseparable from, artistic content and he proceeds to suggest an approach for 
educational justification of the arts that is more clearly non-instrumental or intrinsic.  
To this end, Koopman (ibid) re-introduces the idea of fulfilment as an artistic benefit 
sufficient for the justification of arts education. He construes fulfilment as a lifelong 
process that is less static and more complete than happiness or wellbeing. Koopman 
(ibid, p.92) combines Gadamer’s with Dewey’s definition of fulfilment, arguing that 
the one implies the other. On this view, a work of art is an episode of fulfilled time 
(Gadamer, 1977, pp.55–56) providing the possibility of systematic fulfilled or 
completed aesthetic experiences (Dewey, 1989): in sum, as a worthwhile activity that 
contributes to the fulfilment of someone’s life. Such fulfilment is something, so 
Koopman argues, that policy makers neglect. As he explains (Koopman, 2005, p.93):  
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Educators and educational philosophers concentrate on bringing about certain states 
of affairs associated with happiness: possessing literacy and other basic skills, being 
independent economically, possessing moral virtues, being autonomous and so on. In 
this way, the conditions for leading a happy life tend to be reduced to a number of 
static factors. Life as time lived through remains outside of the picture. It is forgotten 
that, besides acquiring the knowledge, skills and dispositions that allow us to function 
normally in contemporary society, individuals will also need to develop activities that 
fulfil their time. Hence, educational policy makers have a wider responsibility than to 
secure the so-called basic subjects. They should also include in the curriculum a 
selection of activities that, though not necessary for subsistence, crucially can 
contribute to the fulfilment of one’s life.   
The differentiation between fulfilment and happiness here seems significant, because 
many activities may make people happy, without being fulfilling (Koopman, 2005). 
Some activities may even not make people feel happy, but may still be worthwhile as 
a means to fulfilment. Beyond the intense but transient satisfactions that people may 
find in this or that experience, there is a higher level of ‘existential’ fulfilment that 
may make life worth living (ibid, p.94): ‘We experience not only intensity but feel as 
if we have broken through to new, superior domains of awareness [...] a strong 
qualitative change of consciousness’. In addition to these worthwhile experiences, 
there is a further third level of fulfilment: that which is (often in religious contexts) 
envisaged as the ultimate aim of life (ibid). Arts may contribute, in a way that no 
other area of human experience can, to all three of these aspects of fulfilment. For 
one thing, they can certainly satisfy as creative and inspiring activities, going beyond 
the superficiality of sensory pleasure to affective and emotional satisfaction (ibid). 
Such benefit becomes more important in so far as art yields answers to, or provokes 
questions about, human nature and existence (that are relevant to all people). Thus 
great works of art touch upon people’s innermost thoughts and feelings, transporting 
them to heights beyond the limits of ordinary experience (Koopman, 2005, p.95). In 
this respect, arts may contribute to a more intense appreciation or value of the 
mundane or ordinary events of life, or to more complex levels of metaphysical, 
transcendent, or redemptive awareness. While such awareness may not be explicitly 
‘religious’, it may yet be characterised as a kind of higher spiritual appreciation of 






A previous chapter on knowledge explained how significant artworks may be sources 
of appreciation and inspiration that move and touch the human soul; in view of this, 
no further discussion of ‘how’ artworks succeed in doing this will be pursued at this 
point. However, if something like Koopman’s notion of fulfilment does provide a 
reasonable basis for the intrinsic educational justification of arts, then some 
systematic introduction to the various arts in schooling would seem to be important 
(ibid): 
Extending and deepening their [students’] experiences can be achieved only by 
engaging them in activities that strengthen their acuity of perception, enhance their 
critical abilities and acquaint them with a wide range of art forms and styles. Initiation 
into artistic experience must fall within the province of well-developed education, yet 
many children are unlikely to receive anything very much of this other than at school. 
The conclusion is warranted, therefore, that arts education at school is desirable on the 
following grounds: (1) the arts allow for highly fulfilling experiences, (2) these 
experiences can be developed only through systematic training, and (3) only when such 
training is provided by general education can we be sure that every child will receive it.   
At this point, it should be clear that such justification of the arts within school 
education is not only about training in capacities and skills – though the arts (as other 
disciplines) may be well-placed to provide this. It is rather a justification in terms of 
fulfilment-orientated non-instrumental values. This notion of fulfilment may sound 
vague or dubious, in so far as much of the school curriculum is assessment 
orientated. Given the difficulty of objectively assessing such potential of arts it may 
seem an unrealistic way to view arts education. But such criticism may also appear 
both irrelevant and unfair. Indeed, to question this potential of the arts might be to 
question life itself, in so far as art is on this view valued precisely for its power to 
help people understand life, and the arts are clearly themselves part of any 
worthwhile or fulfilling life. Gingell (2006) suggests something similar when he 
argues that art both constitutes and contributes to a fulfilling human life: on his view, 
the importance of arts lies in their contribution to human appreciation of the meaning 
of life as well as to the development of any skills that might be useful in life.  
In this respect, the aesthetic and the ethical are certainly not unrelated. As Armstrong 
(2005, p.83) argues: ‘in apprehending aesthetic necessity, in giving ourselves up to 






felt experience, what it might be like to live the happy life’. Here, of course, ‘happy’ 
is used in the wide sense of ‘fulfilling’ already indicated in Koopman’s theory. In 
this light, education in the arts is – ideally, according to Murdoch (1997, p.371), and 
contrary to the utilitarian spirit of the instrumentalist policy makers – ‘a training in 
the love of virtue’. 
In the justification of education generally, or in the school curriculum in particular – 
including the arts – references to knowledge and moral value are clearly significant 
(Gingell and Brandon, 2001). Nonetheless, in opposition to any view of the arts as 
focused on knowledge and/or moral appreciation, Michael Oakeshott (1981; Fuller, 
1989; Hinchliffe, 2001) argued that the world of art is not about offering wisdom but 
wonder. The world of art is wonderful because it is also delightful: art is wonderful 
and delightful where: (i) wonder is a feature, not an effect of contemplation; and (ii) 
delight is not reducible to pleasure. Thus, while Oakeshott might agree with what 
Koopman and Gingell suggest – that arts are part of life and constitute worthwhile 
activities that are intrinsically valuable and not merely means to some extrinsic end – 
he would disagree with Nussbaum and others in not regarding the primary 
significance of literature or arts as moral educational.  
That said, when Oakeshott (1981, p.243) stated that ‘Imaginative literature cannot 
offer thoughts about the world in general and about the conduct in life’; he may not 
have meant that aesthetic experience is entirely irrelevant to the cultivation of moral 
character. Delight in the arts, and recollections of artworks that endure long after 
direct experience with them, may well be associated with personal moral sentiments 
and appreciations, even if these are not always or necessarily the intended outcomes 
of artistic experience. Moreover, Oakeshott admits that art has epistemic content in 
common with sciences and history, even though he denies that it is the main purpose 
of arts to contribute to inquiry about the world in the manner of these other 
disciplines (all involve some wonder of different nature though). Nevertheless, 
Williams (2002, p.169) criticises Oakeshott for failing to explain ‘how the sensibility 
acquired through engagement within the world of aesthetic experience can inform 
and enrich the quality of practical experience’ – which he regards as important for 






emotions, thoughts, and ideas cannot be entirely separated from the literal and 
narrative discourse of practical life in which such emotions, thoughts and ideas are 
naturally implicated. Indeed, any distinction between the emotional and aesthetic 
aspects of art cannot ignore their connection, especially when it comes to 
understanding the affective and psychological impact that aesthetic effects may have 
on an individual.  
Oakeshott’s suggestion that literature and arts should be studied for their aesthetic 
merit is important, however, in so far as there may be a danger in over-emphasizing 
the ethical aspect, and simply focusing on the propositional content of artwork (ibid). 
The trouble with those topic-based curriculum programmes which have this kind of 
emphasis is that they may result in mere social commentary that neglects the ‘beauty’ 
and real impact of the arts. As Gribble (1983, p.158) has said: ‘to tear the ‘thought’ 
out of the delicate organic structure of a work of literature is to destroy it’. What is 
destroyed is the aesthetic quality of the thought (Williams, 2002, p.165). Perhaps the 
main point here is that one cannot clearly distinguish the ideas, thoughts, emotions or 
other aspects of human psyche that are expressed in arts from their modes of artistic 
presentation: artistic form, content, activity, experience and outcome are inseparable. 
On this view, there is a danger in using arts as vehicles of moral and other knowledge 
apart from their aesthetic embodiments. To be sure, many works of literature or art 
do seem to set out to illuminate aspects of the human condition; but Oakeshott offers 
a useful corrective to liberal views on the contribution of the arts to education that 
over-emphasise the epistemic or moral content of artworks. However, Oakeshott’s 
work may also offer powerful arguments against more recent ‘progressive’ 
educational trends. 
7.4 Educational progressivism 
From the mid-sixties onwards, ‘progressive’ or child-centred education changed the 
direction of British educational policy for decades to come (see, Plowden Report 
(1967), Scottish primary memorandum (1965), Cope (1983); for criticisms: 
Alexander Report (1975)). Such progressivism led to emphasis on qualities of self-






(through themes, projects and environmental studies), open play learning contexts 
and more informal and personal teacher-pupil relations (Carr, Allison & Meldrum, 
2006). The basic idea was that education should move away from the imparting of 
‘inert’ or ‘sterile’ knowledge or information towards the promotion of the active 
learning of skills and capacities that might result in the production of socially and 
economically successful citizens. To be sure, even though there are educational 
progressives who also emphasized the intrinsic value of educational learning, most 
progressives of latter day educational policy making seem to have been more in 
favour of an instrumental conception of education (ibid). 
In most respects, educational progressivism has stressed the importance of acquiring 
knowledge through experience and emphasised the practical utility of such 
knowledge. Certainly, one welcome consequence of progressive initiatives may be 
seen in the more relaxed, lively and attractive conditions of much contemporary 
(particularly primary) schooling. However, progressivism has also often promoted 
the following ideas – criticised and described as ‘dogmas’ by Carr (1988, p.160): 
... (i) that genuine knowledge is exhibited essentially in certain capacities for practical 
problem solving, (ii) that interest at least in the initial stages of learning is best 
engaged by what falls naturally within the experience of children, (iii) that intellectual 
development is essentially a matter of progress through a sequence of qualitatively 
distinct modes of mental operation, and (iv) that the individual history of knowledge 
acquisition is also to be understood in terms of progress from an interest in what is 
concrete and particular towards what is formal and abstract.  
In this progressive climate, educational policies have often proposed skills-based 
curricula. For example, the present-day curriculum in Scotland (which owes much to 
the progressive 1965 Primary memorandum) focuses on four key capacities that 
learners should be encouraged to develop: to be successful learners, effective 
contributors, confident individuals and responsible citizens (LTS, 2010f). Such focus 
largely emphasises the need for development of such capacities in various contexts 
of practical (scientific, social, economic, vocational) engagement, rather than in 
terms of development of knowledge for its own sake. As the curriculum has become 
orientated towards the development of these capacities, the arts (as one of the generic 






even where knowledge sometimes does appear to be emphasised for its own sake – 
through problem-solving or similar capacities and skills – such knowledge is more 
often scientific or other evidentially grounded knowledge rather than artistic, 
aesthetic and/or moral knowledge. At all events, two of the most common qualities 
that are used to justify arts in education/curriculum, are creativity and self-expression 
(Gingell, 2006). 
The idea that it is the primary concern of arts to nurture creativity is regularly 
emphasised in educational policies – but in a very particular way. Creativity may 
have moral and other dimensions, but what is usually meant by the use of this term in 
policy making is that learning in arts is primarily a matter of active engagement in 
artistic and cultural activities by way of (for example) dance, music-making, painting 
and so on (ibid). However, such justification of the arts within education has been 
much criticised on various grounds. To begin with, it is not obvious that in order to 
be creative one needs to be educated as such. In addition, creativity may not always 
be educationally valuable. Furthermore, if to be creative means to be able to produce 
something ‘authentically’ – in so far as the process is often said to matter more than 
the product – then the quality of artistic processes and artworks may be seriously 
neglected or ignored (ibid). To be sure, focus on creativity for the sake of creative 
development as a (possible) skill does not exclude the possibility of producing a 
good piece of art, but any such quality may also be accidental (ibid). 
An attempt at a more precise definition of creativity, however, was made by the 
report of British National Advisory Committee on Creative and Cultural Education 
(1999): ‘All Futures: Creativity, Culture and Education’. According to this 
document, creative processes possess four characteristics (ibid, p.29): 
First, they always involve thinking or behaving imaginatively. Second, overall this 
imaginative activity is purposeful: that is, it is directed to achieving an objective. Third, 
these processes must generate something original. Fourth, the outcome must be of 
value in relation to the objective.  
This and other definitions (e.g. by Woods and Barrow, 1975) are rather wide and 
‘inclusive’, but they also seem to set the standards excessively high with regard to 






extraordinary talents of original artists. Not many school learners are likely to 
become capable of producing much that is original. The same committee (Gingell, 
2006, pp.9–14), recognising something of a problem here, proceeds to distinguish 
three different types of originality, namely: individual originality (in relation to own 
previous work), relative originality (in relation to peer and same age work (this 
category has degrees of more or less originality) and historic originality (in relation 
to any work of any time (which category has also degrees).  
Still, such definition of originality – and therefore of creativity – still seems too wide, 
in so far as almost any learning may require some imaginative effort and result in 
items to which some value may be given (ibid). Such originality may draw on home-
based cultural capital (in the case of children of educated or well-to-do parents), 
which may have value, but does not necessarily reveal any extraordinary creative 
achievements on the part of learners. It might to that extent be fairly unoriginal 
without opening up any new artistic avenues (ibid).  
Peter Abbs (2003, pp.51–55) explains how a psychological paradigm of present-
tense is the result of a historical process that however overlooks the importance of 
the past, with the following result:  
...personal learning, of immediate process, of sincerity and of spontaneity with as little 
formal mediation as possible. According to this powerful and animating paradigm the 
teacher was essentially the releaser of child’s innate creativity through acts of self-
expression and self-discovery. Indeed, the term ‘self-expression’ is one of the key 
concepts of the old model, as is the related notion ‘child-centred’ [...] The arts are 
committed to a general learning process related to the psychological development of 
the child [...] for the new paradigm there was to be no quick passing through but more 
often a staying in, an in-dwelling, a deepening, a cultural centring. [..] Consistent with 
this model of arts teaching nearly all the necessary resources were seen to reside in the 
natural self, not in the collective culture and not in the specific art form the teacher was 
claiming to teach. One released; one did not initiate, not transmit. [...] Endless self-
expression with little prospect of artistic advance. The dilemma was an inevitable 
outcome of an approach which tended to set up the terms ‘self’ and culture as 
opposites. At such a point the art teacher becomes a therapist while the discipline if the 
art disappears into an infinitely tolerant yes hopelessly misguided psychology. On the 
one side self, on the other art; on the one side expression, on the other side tradition; 
on the one side private, on the other public. 
The present day outcome of this process is that bonds between education and culture 






indicates the rise of a therapeutic education. Ecclestone and Hayes (2009) regard this 
rise as dangerous for some of the reasons already given by Best, Carr, Koopman, 
Gingell and Abbs. For not only is the truly educational potential of arts not 
developed, but this approach to educational practice seems actually quite anti-
educational. Ecclestone and Hayes (2009) add that despite any good intentions, this 
creates a curriculum of the self that makes learners feel vulnerable when they are 
low-achievers. Given the therapeutic turn, revealing their vulnerable selves to 
teachers and professionals makes such learners feel even more vulnerable and lowers 
their expectations. Such a situation cultivates a mentality according to which people 
need treatment, instead of education and development of their potential. Replacing 
education with treatment may result in replacing real fulfilment with pleasures in 
accordance with today’s hedonistic and materialistic spirit. In addition, formal 
attempts to shape appropriate emotions or to promote such conceptions of happiness 
create an education system driven by mass media and commerce that is more like a 
business selling ways to ‘happiness’. In short (Ecclestone and Hayes, 2009, p. xiii): 
A diminished image of human potential opens up people’s emotions to assessment by 
the state and encourages dependence on ritualised forms of emotional support offered 
by state agencies. Therapeutic education replaces education with the social 
engineering of emotionally literate citizens who are also coached to experience 
emotional well-being. 
Such an approach presumes to make students happier by ridding them of the 
problems they have inherited from their past (from childhood, family environment, 
stress, low self-esteem and lack of confidence). The solution to such problems comes 
from rejecting the idea of reflective learning in preference of engagement with an 
alternative pleasurable world of favourable experiences or pursuit of easy ‘success’ 
in school or wider society. It seems that much latter day formal education adopts the 
following scheme: people have psychological problems which render them 
problematic and vulnerable; consequently, people need to be ‘cured’ and therefore 
education, in from of a culture of psychotherapy or shallow self-satisfaction, is the 
‘cure’. According to this approach individuals are to be regarded and treated as 
victims of: i) their environment; and/or ii) their own emotions (Ecclestone and 






The role of arts here is therefore either that of pleasurable entertainment or of 
emotional therapy. Art education becomes a matter of self-obsessed personal 
problem solving and permanent awareness of vulnerability in a culture of therapy. 
Ecclestone and Hayes (2009, p.137) characterise this as a ‘demoralising’ process 
which actually strips morality out of people’s lives by focusing on social and 
individual emotional problems with little or no concern for real moral development 
or moral concerns. Although there is much contemporary debate on Ethics and 
rights, such debate is largely conducted at a level of pragmatic or technical 
rationality that does not address real moral issues. Ecclestone and Hayes (2009, 
p.164) conclude that educational (and other) policies unfortunately resort to the mere 
‘satisfaction’ of people who are regarded as emotionally problematic and are 
therefore as little more than patients to be cured. Such a superficial approach to well-
being is questionable as it may be better – and of even more ethical and educational 
value ‘to be a human dissatisfied than a pig satisfied; Better to be Socrates 
dissatisfied than a fool satisfied’, as Stuart Mill argued (1863, p.140). Finally, with 
reference to the arts, the mere externalization of psychological states is not to be 
confused with the shaping of human affect, understanding of which is a common 
outcome of arts education. To understand students’ problems and needs is important; 
but Richardson’s (1948, p.13) claim: ‘I could free it, but I could not teach it’, when 
reflecting on the policies and tendencies that underline the importance of self-
expression and other psychological states, points to the danger of failing to fulfil the 
genuine educational potential of learners. To stimulate self-expression may be 
valuable, but this alone is not enough to develop learners’ true educational potential. 
For example, if someone sketched a self-portrait in order to express themselves 
(either randomly or regularly/systematically), this might well yield some sort of 
pleasure (pleasure of achievement or pleasure of self-expression); but there is no 
reason to suppose that it would contribute to the self-development of genuine 
education. Take the community in the film Pleasantville (1998), in which people are 
content, but only because they are blissfully ignorant of anything outside their ‘safe’ 
and controlled environment. Similarly, the comforts of therapy may fall well short of 






7.5 A paradox and concluding remarks 
The arts in schools have experienced ‘the paradox of having high esteem but low 
status’ (Bell and Chisholm, 1998, p.51). The paradox can be described further 
(Gingell and Brandon, 2001, p.138) in that: 
 We belong to a culture which can boast world-class art galleries and orchestras, our 
twentieth-century sculptors and architects are of the first rank, the English-speaking 
film industry is dominant worldwide and the English philosophical literature is at least 
as rich and important as any found elsewhere; and yet we have a school system which, 
in general, does nothing to enable those being educated to appreciate any of these 
things. 
Bearing in mind that most curriculum time at schools may be spent reading and 
writing (Gingell and Brandon, 2001), the arts in the school curriculum occupy a 
position that, in the context of largely instrumental policies, is more peripheral than 
central. Arts have rich and diverse human value, and recognition of this should lead 
to a secure educational place for them. However, such recognition should start with a 
proper understanding of why we need the arts in education and in the school 
curriculum. Moreover, while the activity of questioning and justifying may well have 
a worthwhile liberal character and purpose, it would be a serious political, moral and 
spiritual mistake to employ such questioning to the end of giving only instrumental 
justification and weight to the artistic and other practices which actually give human 






































Chapter 8  
 
8. Cinematography of Ethics in arts education; a summary of the 
philosophical arguments 
This chapter will concentrate on two movies. Using various illustrations from these 
movies, the chapter will attempt to underline several key points of this thesis. The 
two chosen movies address a wide variety of themes, such as friendship, love, human 
relationships, education, morals, and art. Taking into account that these two movies 
are about art as such, the main focus will be on how the different arts that these 
movies deal with may be seen to offer their own distinctive insights into significant 
areas of human experience: precisely, what these films purport to show about the 
distinctive artistic contribution of poetry and dance to understanding and shaping the 
human condition. Therefore, the general argument is arts are able to convey humanly 
significant moral or other knowledge.  
8.1 Il Postino: a movie about poetry and a beautiful story as poem  
‘Poetry doesn't belong to those who write it; it belongs to those who need it’. This is 
the conclusion that the postman of Il Postino (Radford, 1994), Mario Ruopollo, 
reaches by the end of the film. With reference to this movie and a further one, this 
chapter will explore the respects in which poetry in particular, and arts in general, 
belong to those who need them. The essence of this issue is essentially given in 
previous chapters. While people may fulfil their educational potential in a wide 
variety of knowledge and skills, the arts represent a unique source of personally 
formative knowledge and understanding. The importance of the arts consists in the 
personal development of human beings, of their appreciation of themselves, their 
relationships with others and their place in the world. While the postman of the 
movie Il Postino is culturally illiterate, his experience of poetry gradually enables his 
appreciation of aesthetic and artistic beauty, develops his imagination and educates 
his emotions. In this way, he comes to understand human association and 
relationships better and in general to make better sense of his life and the world 







Figure 8.1 The postman becomes a keen learner. (Image courtesy of Cecchi 
Gori Group Tiger Cinematografica) 
8.1.1 Plot Summary 
Mario Ruopollo is a poor and uneducated Italian villager who does not want to be a 
fisherman like his father and other men of the village. He finally finds a job as a 
postman, delivering letters by bicycle to only one person. The recipient is the 
political exile and Chilean poet Pablo Neruda, who lives a quiet life by the sea with 
his partner. He receives mainly love letters, and Mario – impressed with the appeal 
that Pablo has for women – desires to make the young and beautiful Beatrice fall for 
him by the same poetic means. With this dubious motive, he seeks entry to the world 
of poetry and his educational journey into the arts and life begins. The postman 
enters into a relationship with Pablo Neruda which eventually develops into real 
friendship as well as leading to love and a family with Beatrice, and a more 
meaningful life for him. Some months later, the poet is allowed to return to Chile, 
but it seems that his life is so busy he forgets that his former friend Mario is awaiting 
news or some further gesture of friendship from the poet. Years go by without 
significant news, and Mario comes to admonish himself as an unimportant postman 
who is not worthy of being remembered by the poet. As a consequence, he decides to 






Not only does he develop social concerns, he also determines to show the poet that 
the beauties of simple experiences such as his island, his feelings and his friendship 
are worth remembering. Mario’s own poetic gesture therefore takes the form of audio 
recordings of various moments reflecting the beauty that he wants Neruda to know 
and remember or be reminded of. He also writes a poem for Neruda, but the day he is 
invited to read it in public, he is tragically killed by a government attack on the 
communists. Neruda goes back to the Italian village to visit the postman a couple of 
years later, but of course his friend is longer there. The two year old son of the 
postman called Pablito (little Pablo), is there to welcome the poet. Beatrice is also 
there and she tearfully gives Neruda her husband’s tape, bringing the movie to a 
moving and poignant end.  
The film is perhaps best summarized by the words of the English trailer 
(http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5QvYXPwF798): 
Mario was a humble postman who lived a simple life in a small Italian island. For 
years he loved Beatrice, but he just didn’t know how to tell her, until Pablo Neruda, the 
famous poet, and world renowned romantic moved in. Now this great man is about to 
teach him that every moment has its meaning. Every word has its place. And there is a 
way to every woman’s heart. [...] The story of one man that gave another the courage 
to change his life and the passion to live out his dreams. 
8.1.2 An initiation into the mysteries of poetry  
As already argued in this thesis, artworks may be of epistemic and educational value 
in so far as they convey knowledge by ‘acquaintance’ (Russell, 1967), often as 
modes (rather than forms) of knowledge (Cothey, 1990), as 'illustrative' (as opposed 
to 'semantic') representations (Young, 2001), or as affective presentations (Wynn, 
2000; cited in Carr & Davis, 2007, p.106). Such knowledge occurs when learners 
appreciate and/or feel the imaginative power of artistic representations of ordinary 
human experiences. In this way, audiences become imaginative explorers of familiar 
worlds: they learn how to experience and appreciate the mundane world in new and 
unfamiliar ways – precisely in terms of artistic truth and aesthetic beauty. The 
postman of Il Postino is initially struck by such an appreciation in encountering 






‘tired of being a man’. Mario confesses then that he liked it when he read it because 
this feeling has touched him too, he just never knew how to express it himself. With 
these words, the poetry started speaking to Mario, but there was still so much that he 
could not understand in Neruda’s poems – for example, why Neruda had said in a 
poem that the smell of barber shops makes him sob. When he asks for an 
explanation, Neruda explains that: ‘Better than any explanation is the experience of 
feelings that poetry can reveal to a nature open enough to understand it’. However, 
it soon becomes apparent that a nature open enough to understand poetry only means 
a nature potentially (rather than actually) open enough. Thus, the postman needs to 
take further gradual steps to unfold such educational potential. In the same way, 
pupils/students need to be exposed to a culture of arts, and to a good arts education 
based on strong foundations, in so far as superficial experiences alone cannot 
develop what is needed to cultivate artistic sensibility. We may recall the observation 
of Peter Abbs (2003, p.53) on the problem of contemporary arts education, wherein 
the teacher facilitates ‘endless self-expression with little prospect of artistic 
advance’. Such arts education ‘disappears into an infinitely tolerant yet hopelessly 
misguided psychology’ of the teacher-therapist who does not transmit knowledge or 
foster appropriate appreciation of arts (ibid). We may also recall Aristotle who 
argued that releasing emotions is not enough; it is training and ethical habituation 
that cultivates people (e.g. in Politics, 1339a; in Pappas, 2001, p.18). 
Mario struggles to understand poetry and is particularly confused by metaphors. He 
regards the term metaphor as a very complicated word with an even more 
complicated artistic meaning. Moreover, Pablo Neruda explains that he cannot tell 
him what some of his metaphors mean in words any different from those that he has 
used. This recalls arguments presented in other chapters of this thesis (see also Carr 
& Davis, 2007): namely, that content and form are very much inseparable in arts. In 
the arts there is a real sense in which the medium is constitutive of the message. It is 
the effective use of artistic means that yields the artistic truth and beauty to which 
human emotion responds so readily. (Although, as clarified in other chapters, such 
artistic beauty should not necessarily be confused with aesthetic beauty (Best, 1985; 






propositional knowledge would be enough to convey their content or import. 
However, the acquaintance knowledge of illustrative representations is determined 
by the non-propositional artistic means used by artists to present the more ordinary or 
literal (propositional) meanings or messages of their artworks. 
Metaphors are thus prime artistic modes of illustrative representation which may 
yield artistic acquaintance knowledge. They may well be vehicles of propositional 
knowledge also, but propositional knowledge is not the main object of 
communication of either artist or spectator. Hence, Mario the postman reads 
Neruda’s poetry, but his main concern is not to know specific information about the 
appearance of Neruda’s lovers, or about how well they treated his friend etc. He is 
more interested in what art has to reveal about the quality, intensity and power of 
human relationships, emotions and love through distinct artistic modes of 
representation and appreciation. Likewise, any audience who watches the movie Il 
Postino will not primarily be concerned to acquire propositional knowledge, such as 
demographic or geographic information about the Mediterranean island on which the 
story is enacted. Rather, indeed, the audience expects to be ‘transferred’ to other 
imaginative and emotional worlds that lie beyond mundane reality.  
It is notable here that ‘metaphor’ is a Greek word that means ‘transfer’. Indeed after 
significant exposure to poetry and the world of metaphors, the postman begins 
precisely to acquire insight into the artistic meaning of metaphors and to be 
‘transferred’ to the world of poetic sensibility. He even claims to feel ‘seasick’ when 
the poet composes a poem about the sea. Mario appreciates the power of the poem 
and tells Pablo: ‘Weird, how I felt while, you were saying it. I don't know. The words 
went back and forth. Like the sea. I can't explain it. I felt like, like a boat tossing 
around on those words’. Pablo Neruda explains that this was a poem with metaphors 
and strong rhythm, and he also observes that this has inspired the postman to create 
his own metaphor! It is another step in Mario’s gradual education and the postman 







Figure 8.2 Mario writes his first poem (Image courtesy of Cecchi Gori Group 
Tiger Cinematografica). 
Thus, Mario now comprehends metaphors and is even able to invent his own. 
However, he is still not satisfied because his invention of metaphors seems not to be 
intentional. The poet replies that intention is not always artistically necessary since 
images may arise spontaneously. This may be due to inspiration, artistic talent or for 
other reasons. While this point recognises the distinction between the intentional and 
non-intentional in artistic creativity, this does not of course diminish the significance 
of artistic ‘intentionality’. Indeed, the poet elsewhere affirms the indispensability of 
such intentionality. He describes how he was moved by the suffering of a struggling 
coal miner and inspired to write poetry for the ‘mistreated’. Such inspiration results 
in poetry that is ‘intentional’ in the (philosophical) sense of being ‘about’ something. 
This is especially true of his love poems. For this reason, however, he refuses to 
write a poem for Mario’s beloved Beatrice, because he does not know the woman in 
question and therefore lacks inspiration from the potential subject of the poem. To be 
sure, poetry is not always about specific subjects. As seen in other chapters, there are 
artworks (often works of music) that can be regarded as lacking any subject, and 
therefore any such intentionality or ‘about-ness’. At this point, Young (2001, p.63) 
might argue that it is a delusion to think that there is no about-ness to genuine 






reactions to formal properties of compositions’ is to be focused on an object: the 
artwork itself (rather than on the content of the artwork). In this regard, Young 
observes another distinction between introspective and extrospective affective 
illustrations (already described and analysed in previous chapters). All the same, 
when the poet develops a friendship with the postman, and after he gets to know 
Beatrice, he is inspired to compose a beautiful poem for their wedding. 
 
 
Figure 8.3 Mario’s effort to impress Beatrice (Image courtesy of Cecchi Gori 
Group Tiger Cinematografica). 
Furthermore, the poet is also inspired by Mario’s reflection on his poems to 
philosophise about the nature of art. Indeed, by accepting that artworks may be 
serious candidates for truth, it may seem possible to say, following Plato, that a poet 
who tells the truth qualifies as a kind of philosopher. Plato (e.g. in Republic) does 
not, of course, himself accept that artists tell the truth; but the point here is that if 
poetry tells any truth and conveys knowledge, then it can be fertile ground for 
philosophy. To this end, philosophy and arts – as Aristotle argues (e.g. in 
Metaphysics 982b) – have at least the potential for dialectical engagement of the 
human mind and heart. This may happen when agents are brought to wonder at the 






truths of philosophy rather than particular and contingent knowledge of sciences and 
history, raising difficult questions rather than providing easy answers. When the 
postman develops a better understanding of metaphors in poetry, he starts 
philosophising and pondering over the world as a sign or symbol, observing that: 
‘...the whole world, with the sea, the sky, with the rain, the clouds etc etc, the whole 
world is the metaphor for something else?’ The poet is puzzled by this, cannot easily 
respond, and admits that he has to ponder over this question too. The poet’s reaction 
shows that he has a nature open enough to embrace the postman’s metaphor of the 
world as a symbol. 
 
 
Figure 8.4 Mario and Beatrice fall in love (Image courtesy of Cecchi Gori 
Group Tiger Cinematografica). 
As already described: ‘Better than any explanation is the experience of feelings that 
poetry can reveal to a nature open enough to understand it’.  In contrast, the one 
who does not seem to have a nature open enough to understand poetry is Beatrice’s 
elderly aunt Rosa. Rosa fails to understand, for example, that when Mario says that 
Beatrice’s breast resembles a fire with two flames, this does not necessarily mean 
that Mario has seen Beatrice naked. Aunt Rosa can only interpret language literally 
and she sees the role of poetry as potentially seductive. She senses some of the power 






but she cannot understand the true beauty (artistic, aesthetic or other) of poetry. On 
the other hand, Mario reflects on poetry more and more. He takes his education 
further. He can now understand life issues better through poetry, he understands love 
better and with this understanding he is able to express himself better and more 
movingly. He finally shares his insight into poetry with Beatrice and she falls for 
him, proving that she too is someone with a nature open enough to experience the 
feelings that art can reveal. Appreciating art here is a matter of sharing sensitivities. 
Beatrice was the most beautiful and desired young woman of the village. As the 
owner of a restaurant she meets many admirers and is pursued daily by rich and 
politically powerful suitors. However, she falls for the poor postman who wins her 
with a pure love inspired by and expressed through poetry.  
An important point here concerns subjectivity and objectivity in the arts. Comparing: 
(i) Aunt Rosa who condemns poetry as falsely seductive and who cannot perceive 
Mario’s sensitivity; and (ii) Mario who discovers the beauty of this art through 
gradual education, seems to confirm Kant’s argument against artistic or aesthetic 
subjectivists (Cooper, 2005). Kant argued that there are two faculties of the human 
mind, though they do not operate in the same way in all people when perceiving the 
same object: namely, understanding and imagination (Ward, 2005, p.246). If they did 
operate in the same way, then strict universality of objective truth/beauty in the arts 
should be possible (ibid).  
 
Figure 8.5 Beatrice’s aunt is shocked at the news of the romance (Image 






Aunt Rosa cannot appreciate poetry and/or Mario’s sensitivity, not because art 
is of subjective value and Rosa has different taste from Mario, but because her 
imagination and understanding are limited. To be sure, she is biased because 
she loves her niece and would prefer her to marry a richer man. Thus, she is 
unwilling to entertain the insights of poetry that might give her any other 
perspective. She remains artistically illiterate (as well as educationally illiterate 
in general) and this makes her blind to Mario’s sensitivity and poetic 
expression. But now, the question emerges of why Beatrice, who is also 
artistically illiterate, appreciates Mario’s poetic overtures. One answer could be 
that moved and inspired by love she is sufficiently curious and willing to 
enrich her perspective and to cultivate her imagination and understanding. She 
is charmed by Mario’s metaphors not only because they are beautifully 
arranged words – such that any linguistically educated person might also have 
created – but because when Mario whispers that Beatrice’s laugh is a sudden 
silvery wave, and that her smile spreads like a butterfly, this expresses and 
reflects the intensity of his feelings in a way that enables her to grasp the 
power of his love.  
 
 
Figure 8.6 Aunt Rosa takes Mario’s poem for Beatrice to the priest (Image 






Mario continues to cultivate his appreciation of poetry and its emotional power, not 
only to gain the hand of his beloved, but also to win the respect of Neruda who even 
asks him for adjectives (artistic advice) to qualify the nouns in his poems. Poetry 
nurtures the postman’s sensibilities and sensitivities to such an extent that he is able 
to make better moral and political sense of his life, his family, and the world. He also 
composes a poem dedicated to Pablo Neruda, and creates a poetic audio-tape of the 
beauties of his island world as a gift of devotion to his friend. His poetic gestures are 
not necessarily of high artistic value, but they are from a heart rich in generous 
feelings and they provide a faithful mirror of Mario’s soul. Before his poetic 
education, Mario was unable to speak even a word about his island when the poet 
had previously asked him. Now, however, he is bursting with enthusiasm to describe 
and share the beauties of his island. He records sounds that he hears around him, and 
while the audience (and at one point Neruda) listens to the sounds that he has artfully 
assembled, they are also able to hear Mario’s need for emotional expression and 
communication. After Neruda’s departure, Mario craves further contact with his 
new-found friend. With his friend now absent, Mario is surprised to realise that, even 
though he has left, Neruda has not taken with him all the beauty of their friendship. 
Neruda’s poetry has offered him riches that cannot be taken from his life by anyone 
or by any circumstances. It is just this kind of bounty that the arts may provide for 
learners at school. That is why art does not belong only to the artist, but to those such 
as the postman of the movie who need the emotional and spiritual nourishment it 
provides. 
Mario’s death is poignant: he is killed in a public political attack. It is interesting to 
note, however, that although this attack and Mario’s death contain nothing 
aesthetically beautiful, they are nevertheless (in a sense) artistically ‘beautiful’, in so 
far as they contribute significantly to the message and meaning of the movie. 
Differences between aesthetic and artistic have been highlighted in previous 
chapters. So the end of the movie brings out many important differences between 
aesthetic and artistic significance. Of course, differences do not necessarily imply 
opposition. To be sure, Neruda’s poems about the beauty of love and the intense 






may not always or necessarily undermine the artistic value of an artwork. On the 
other hand, lack of artistic point or beauty in the sense explored in this thesis may 
mean that a work is (aesthetically and otherwise) bad art or sometimes not even art at 
all.  
The art of poetry has been explored so far with the aid of another art: that of cinema. 
Through this film, an audience may gain considerable insight not only into poetry, 
but into many life-issues with significant impact on human emotions. They may 
learn, for example, about education and relationships between teachers and learners, 
about friendship, about the connection between character and emotion, artistic 
inspiration and much more. To understand or appreciate via illustrative 
representation or by acquaintance – as a cinema audience learns with the help of the 
film director, or as the or the main character of the movie learns through the poetry 
of his teacher Pablo Neruda – is to gain knowledge that (as already stated) awakens 
and enhances appreciation of the world which is no less emotional than cognitive 
(Carr, 1997, p.359). It is important to note that as soon as we touch on the training of 
emotions, the shaping of experienced feeling and exploration of life issues, we are 
already in the territory of morality and moral education. To cultivate the human soul 
and ‘awaken’ its emotional and spiritual potential is a matter of clear educational 
value with distinctly moral implications. Such possibilities may now be investigated 
with help of another movie entitled Take the Lead.  
8.2 Take the Lead: a movie about teaching for human growth  
8.2.1 Plot Summary 
The film Take the Lead (Friedlander, 2006) is based on the life of Pierre Dulaine, an 
accomplished dance teacher and owner of a dance school, largely for privileged and 
wealthy people in New York. One night he witnesses teenager Rock vandalise the 
car of the principal of his school in an outburst of anger. On visiting the school –
situated in a seriously deprived area – to report the crime the next morning, he 






grave problems, such as alcohol and drug abuse, poverty, assaults and violence, 
among other issues. Sympathy with these issues prompts Dulaine to offer free 
ballroom dance classes, in so far as he believes that dance can help the school’s most 
challenged pupils. The head teacher puts Pierre to the test by accepting his offer and 
leaves him in charge of the ‘detention’ students, generally regarded as the ‘school 
rejects’. Pierre rises to the challenge, and despite the opposition of reluctant students, 
he manages to earn their respect and friendship – including that of Rock, the most 
alienated student of all. In due course, the students manage to secure a place in a 
dance competition that greatly helps to boost their sense of self-worth and 
confidence. More importantly however, their experience of dance with Dulaine 
opens up to them a world of values and possibilities that transcends their everyday 
struggle for survival in the face of limited opportunities. It enables them to see some 
beauty in the world around them, and equips them with the courage to face their 
difficulties and have higher aspirations.  
8.2.2 An initiation into the mysteries of dance 
Pierre Dulaine:   I want to teach your kids to dance. 
Principal Augustine James: Believe me, the one thing they do know is how to 
dance. 
Pierre Dulaine:  Ballroom? 
Principal Augustine James:   What did you say? 
Pierre Dulaine:  Waltz Foxtrot all the basics. It would be great for 
them. 
Principal Augustine James:  Ok, where's the camera? Because if you're saying 
that you want to teach my kids the foxtrot I must be 
on TV. 
 
Mrs James’ reaction raises many specific questions about dance, but it also 
introduces two general problems regarding arts and arts education that are the main 
focus of this thesis. Firstly, it is significant that when Mr Dulaine suggests teaching 
dance, Mrs James claims that her students already know how to dance. Mr Dulaine 
asks whether they know ballroom dance, and she then laughs at him. This is because 
she assumes that students at her school, especially the detention teenagers, would 






conflict between popular culture and other forms of art. However, the issue seems to 
be more about conceptions of art and of what art can offer to benefit students. 
When Mrs James claims that if there is one thing her students do know it is how to 
dance, she assumes a limited view of dance. When Mr Dulaine speaks of dance, he 
has a broader educational experience in mind. The students have the same impression 
as Mrs James, that dance is about shaking their bodies rhythmically -- something that 
robots or trained chimpanzees might probably do equally well (Carr, 1987, p.356). 
Mr Dulaine asks a student, who seems very confident, whether he is a dancer and he 
replies ‘I can shake it’. In contrast, when Mr Dulaine teaches them, he says ‘Eyes off 
the floor. Your soul is not in your feet’, and he will shortly defend his art by 
explaining that it is not only about moving the body rhythmically. 
 
          
Figure 8.7 Mr Dulaine in front of his reluctant students (Image courtesy of New 
Line Corporation). 
Mr Dulaine does not share the view of the principal and other teachers that his dance 
lessons might prove to be such an unpleasant punishment for the students that it 
would discourage them from getting into detention. He believes, on the contrary, that 






initiation of the students into dance is part of a wider ‘dance-as-life’ philosophy. The 
students of course are initially uncooperative, because they think that ballroom dance 
is boring and out of date. They even regard the classic ballroom songs of great 
composers that Mr Dulaine plays as ‘noise’. However, Mr Dulaine starts by talking 
about the history and values of dance. He recalls ancient times when it was believed 
– as he states – that ‘any man who could kill with speed and accuracy should be able 
to dance with grace as well’. He also adds that ballroom dancing is for kings and 
empresses as it expresses the depth and strength of romance and love. His words – 
expressed as propositional knowledge – do not convince his students at all. 
Nevertheless, they can dance very skilfully in the style of dance that they prefer (a 
sort of rap), something that gets Mr Dulaine wondering: 
Mr Dulaine:  Now guys: why can’t you put that emotion and energy into my style of 
dance?  
Student:  That’s impossible man. 
Mr D:  Really, why so? 
S:  Because your music sucks. It’s corny. There ain’t no feeling in it.  
Mr D:  How can you say that? Lena Horne, Joe Williams, Nat King Cole – these 
songs are all about love.  
S:  Maybe you love different than we do. Look at you; you are all flowers and 
things. Talk to woman all sweet, saying shit trying to make her feel nice.  
 Well we ain’t got no time for that. We want to get right down to the ill na na. 
Mr D:  Love is universal my friend. We just may look for it different ways. Hearing 
different songs. 
 
This conversation raises issues of a generation gap, conflict between popular culture 
and high arts, gender politics, social class and many more. For the purposes of this 
thesis, however, we may focus on the particular direction of Mr Dulaine’s 
educational efforts. Dulaine does not attack the style of music that the students like. 
He shows respect for the music and for them. In addition, he tries to utilise what 
skills and knowledge his students already have; for example, they can understand 
very well some internal formal characteristics of music such as harmony and rhythm. 
Furthermore, he emphasises some of the common values of art and the ways in 
which these common values may be expressed through different forms of dance. In 
an effort to make ballroom dances ‘speak’ to his students, he dances a passionate 






power of art to convey knowledge by acquaintance through illustrative 
representation. This tango illustration is so convincing in communicating feelings of 
passion that the students are overwhelmed – one of them shouting ‘Check Mr 
Dulaine, just getting his flirt on!!’ Although the passionate tango is far from arousing 
only moral emotions in the students, this may nevertheless be regarded as a first step 
in their wider moral education, in so far as the dance begins to deepen their 
emotional appreciation of even erotic human feeling and association. This also 
inspires the students to compose some re-mixes of their music with Mr Dulaine’s 
music. This is definitely a further step in their education and may remind us of the 
postman from the previously discussed movie when he composed his first metaphor; 
a simple step, but nonetheless a step forward. 
 
Figure 8.8 Mr. Dulaine wows his students (Images courtesy of New Line 
Corporation). 
Mr Dulaine generally avoids mechanical teaching of meaningless movements. As 
Carr (1987, p.347) argues ‘Although dance may be regarded as just ordered or 
organized movement in much the same way that music may be ordered or organized 
sound, it is not any sort of movement but human movement with which dance is 
concerned, and more specifically intentional human movement’. In this respect, 
Dulaine’s aim is to engage the students’ reflection and understanding of the cultural 
and moral factors that endow dances with meaning and significance (Carr, 1984). 
Such teaching is clearly implicated in forms of imagination and creativity that are not 
just aesthetic but ethical. In short, Dulaine’s dance teaching affords insight into life-






As Carr (1997, p.356) observes ‘Dance concerns action rather than movement, 
because actions rather than movements are bearers of meaning’. 
In addition, he (ibid) argues that ‘dances are distinguished from other physical 
activities by virtue of their ‘intentionality’ – their capacity to be ‘about’ something’. 
Moreover, ‘the meaning of dance – what dances are ‘about’ – is largely explicable in 
terms of aptness for the artistic expression of ideas, themes, feelings (or what Best 
and McFee call ‘life-issues’)’ (ibid). But (ibid): ‘the kinetic vehicle of dance 
expression is internally rather than externally related to what is expressed [...] so 
that one could not begin to convey the distinctive meaning of a dance simply by 
relating (propositionally) what it is about’.  
This view clearly applies to meaning in the arts in general – though its truth needs 
qualification, because as Carr (1997, p.359) adds works of art, including dancing, 
may be meaningful even if they do not concern knowledge in any propositional sense 
(also in Young, 2001). The cognitive and other value of arts clearly also rests on the 
emotional responses that artworks may engender (Carr, 1997, p.359). But appropriate 
and well-formed emotional responses are also nevertheless crucial to the 
development of the moral sense that is inherent in Aristotelian virtue. Thus (Carr and 
Davis, 2007, p.106): ‘a moral or virtuous agent is not just someone who has 
achieved a rational grasp or appreciation of certain moral truths, rules or 
imperatives, but one who has come to experience, feel about and respond to the 
world in a particular range of morally appropriate ways’. 
This Aristotelian moral journey of the soul or character through appreciation of art is 
what Dulaine attempts to defend when the school maths teacher attempts to enlist the 
support of the parent-teacher association to terminate his dance classes. The maths 
teacher argues that the detention students are wasting time with something 
impractical, since they are never likely to be involved in ballroom dancing again. 
Dulaine disagrees, not only because all children are entitled to a ‘little culture’, and 
no-one has the right to create a dividing line that precludes some kids from learning 
about art, but also because he thinks that art may assist with their real life problems. 






To do something, anything, is hard. It is much easier to blame your father, your mother, 
the environment, the government, the lack of money. But even if you find a place to 
assign the blame, it does not make the problems go away. I am trying something new. 
I‘m trying it. [Then he dances with the principal who is entirely ignorant of 
dance]...You see, if she allows me to lead, she is trusting me. But more than that, she is 
trusting herself. Now if your 16-year old daughter is strong and secure and trusts 
herself, how likely is she to let some idiot knock her up? And if your son can learn to 
touch a girl with respect, how will he treat women throughout his life? So, ladies and 
gentlemen this is what I do here at this school. I teach dance. And with it a set of rules 
that will teach your kids about respect, teamwork and dignity. And that will help to give 
them a vision of the future they could have. A vision of the future they could have.  
It is in this spirit that the students do, indeed, start to feel hope and the possibility of 
escape from their difficult lives. For example, when the boyfriend of LaRhette’s 
prostitute mother offers to pay for sex with her, and tries to assault her when she 
refuses, she escapes literally to the basement of her school. However, she also 
escapes metaphorically by dancing in solitude to a song that she dances as a waltz. 
Then, when Rock – who also sleeps at school due to family problems – sees her, she 
again communicates her appreciation of Rock’s admiration for her through dance. 
Soon, however, they start arguing and end up in a police station. The next day, Mr 
Dulaine takes responsibility for their educational ’punishment’, recognising that 
these two students share strong negative emotions that may be channelled through 
art. He perceives that dance can make them realise that they have more in common 
than they think (e.g. more than anger) and advises them that often a good way to 
conquer the enemy is to ‘get right up in his face’ by finding ways to communicate. 
When LaRhette complains that Rock should not have the superior role of leader, 
whom she should follow when waltzing, Dulaine explains that the leader is not the 
boss. The leader just proposes the movement, without dominating or imposing, while 
skilfully and respectfully inviting the follower on a journey. It is the follower’s 
choice to accept and follow. Both leading and following take strength, courage and 
trust that must be mutually earned. In the end, LaRhette confesses ‘You really made 
me believe that magic can happen anywhere Mr D.’. Meanwhile, in his own battle 
for survival, Rock risks his life by crossing some drug dealers in order to escape the 
criminal life into which they are trying to lead him. He arrives late at the dance 
competition where Dulaine and LaRhette have almost given up on him. However, 






has clearly become a better person through a vision of the future he is now able to 
envisage. To be sure, it is not only dance education that educates Rock and other 
students, but also the values and personality of their teacher. But art nonetheless 
plays a powerful role. 
 
 
Figure 8.9 Rock and LaRhette become closer through dance (Images courtesy 
of New Line Corporation). 
Dance discloses possibilities and choices to all the characters in the movie narrative. 
As a result, friendships and romances develop. For example, Caitlin gets to know and 
like the young man who is called ‘Monster’ (due to his appearance); Kurd falls for 
the ‘Big girl’; and Sasha charms her two admirers. Although they initially fight over 
Sasha, Mr Dulaine persuades them to co-operate and dance together as a team. This 
co-operation results in a breathtaking three-way tango in the dance competition that 
once again celebrates the emergence of new moral characters in the co-operating 
students. The tango expresses their development as new moral beings – something 
appreciated by the audience. This contrasts with the dance of Morgan and her partner 
(a posh couple from the dance school) who are technically flawless, but seem showy 







Figure 8.10 The art of dance compared to mechanical dancing (Images 
courtesy of New Line Corporation). 
Some (for instance, students and teachers in Take the Lead) have argued that arts do 
not or cannot connect with the ‘real’ world in which pupils/students live. On this 
view, art is merely an irrelevant and (perhaps) elitist pastime. However, this movie 
seems to shows the audience, in the way that Mr Dulaine shows his students, that art 
(cinema and dance on these occasions) may have considerable educational value – 
not least, moral educational value – for the real lives of students. Of course, even 
though there are some artworks of undoubted and timeless value and artistic beauty, 
not all cinema, dance and other artistic expressions are either artistically or 
educationally valuable (Carr, 2006b). However, both these movies raise a wide 
variety of morally significant issues, and only a few of these have been analysed for 
the sake of the purposes of this chapter. 
In conclusion, Take the Lead and Il Postino explore various respects in which art can 
richly contribute to individual cultural capital and moral development; opening up 
wider perspectives and a deeper understanding on the world that can have a direct 
bearing on the problems of real life. The moral journeys through which art may lead 
us are, of course, not always comfortable or easy. However, in light of the examples 
considered in this chapter, it may be argued that schools should ‘equip students with 
the intellectual and emotional resources to appreciate the moral and spiritual 
significance and value of so much great modern cinema’ as well as dance, poetry and 
other arts (Carr, 2006b, p.333). The benefits of such artistic journeys are not always 






even painful steps. But it should nevertheless be clear from the examples given in 
this chapter that arts offer infinite potential for the growth of human personality, 
moral character and soul.  
Alasdair MacIntyre’s (1981; also in Carr, 2006b) view that human beings identify 
themselves with the characters of (religious, spiritual, moral and artistic) narratives, 
in a way that may result in moral and spiritual self-understanding, is very relevant 
here (MacIntyre, 1981). Certainly, it is important not to construe this view of moral 
formation in the light of artistic narrative in simple moralistic terms. The moral 
power of artworks is not that they tell audiences what is morally wrong or right. This 
is something that they may well already know: such as, for example, that it is wrong 
to cheat or murder. It is rather that serious art may vividly highlight (by ‘illustrative 
representation’ in Young’s (2001) term) issues with which we are already familiar in 
ways that may provoke deeper thought and reflection. In particular, the importance 
of the arts for moral and spiritual education lies in their potential for the cultivation 
and refinement of moral sensibilities, emotions and feelings – without which the 



































Chapter 9  
 
9. The Scottish case 
There has recently been significant policy development in Scottish education from 
the ‘5–14’ and ‘Standard Grade’ curricula to the new Curriculum for Excellence. 
Having explored the nature and the potential of arts and arts education from a 
philosophical perspective in the previous chapters of this thesis, this chapter explores 
Scottish educational policy and its recent development with reference to the role of 
arts in arts education and in education more generally through: i) the exploration of 
policy documents and official guidelines; and ii) the eyes of interviewees and other 
research participants who are involved in Scottish policy making. 
9.1 Methodological issues 
9.1.1  Research questions 
The questions that emerged at the outset of this study, with regard to arts education 
within the Scottish curriculum and its development, were: 
 Does Scottish educational policy development accord much significance (and 
to what extent) to the arts?  
 What, according to Scottish policy, is the key role of arts education in healthy 
human formation? 
 Does policy development in Scottish arts education recognise the educational 
potential (and to what extent) of the arts?  
The main purpose of these questions is to discover whether contemporary Scottish 
educational policies take into account the full educational potential of the arts as 
explored in previous chapters of this thesis. From Aristotle to more modern 
philosophers of art and aesthetics, a strong case has been made for the intrinsic 
cognitive and moral benefits of arts, as well as for cultivating the moral feelings and 






education may be inclined to emphasise more extrinsic and utilitarian aspects of arts 
education. Such instrumentalism is sometimes expressed or exhibited in an emphasis 
on assisting learners to acquire forms of skill or knowledge (e.g. maths through 
music) that are incidental to the arts being learned: on this view, the arts are mere 
tools for other learning. Such instrumental attitudes to arts may also be enhanced by 
the domination of ‘technical rationality’ and ‘economistic forms of vocationalism 
and competence’ (Martin, 2009, http://www.rizoma-freireano.org/index.php/whither-
adult#a1; Preece, 2006, p.318; see also Carr, 2003a, pp.10–12). 
In the light of these and other educational perspectives, tension between diverse 
potential ‘useful’ roles of the arts in education may occur: for example, between 
more liberal perspectives and more utilitarian or instrumental ones. In particular, 
Carr (2003a, p.251) describes pragmatism as a form of instrumentalism which is: 
... especially associated with John Dewey by which human knowledge is conceived as a 
tool for the (technical or other) management, manipulation or exploitation of 
experience, rather than as a form of (passive) depiction or description of it. In this work 
however, curriculum instrumentalists are those who would regard educational 
knowledge as valuable for some extrinsic (social or economic) end, rather than as 
worthwhile for its own sake.  
Somewhat opposed to this is the view of liberal educationalists for which education 
has intrinsic value. Carr (ibid) explains that intrinsic educational value is:  
The value that certain forms of knowledge of modes of human activity might be held to 
have for their own sake, rather than as means to the achievement of other externally 
related purposes.  
 On this view liberal educationalists would hold that (ibid, pp.251–252): 
 The school curriculum should be constructed around such intrinsically worthwhile 
forms of knowledge, and it seems reasonable to suppose […] that the teaching of such 
subjects or activities such as history, poetry and dance is primarily justifiable in terms 
of the intrinsic or personally formative character of such subject. 
In this regard, this study investigates what is the appropriate attitude and direction of 
arts education policy of a northern British education system that sets out to promote 






9.1.2 Qualitative methods 
The research questions concerning Scottish education policy with regard to arts 
education formed the starting point for a practical investigation employing 
qualitative research methods: in particular, the method of preference was that of the 
interview. Although extensive guidelines, policy documents and curriculum 
information are available from many sources (e.g. http://www.ltscotland.org.uk/), 
these tend to be more descriptive than analytical. In addition, although available 
documents may contain explicit principles and aims, many of these also tend to be 
unhelpfully articulated in loose, general or vague terms. Furthermore, with the 
limited time available to schools, there is a question of which aims are most likely to 
be pursued. This being the case, questioning the precise meaning of policy or 
guideline aims as well as why these have been preferred may be better investigated 
through interviews. So while the researcher has studied and gained a good grasp of 
Scottish curriculum policies and guidelines this was not considered enough to give a 
full perspective on the current thrust of Scottish arts education policy. Indeed, the 
main problem was that while the researcher identified a clear emphasis on skill 
development in what seemed to be a capacities-led curriculum, she did not want to 
assume that this was the actual view taken by authors of the policies. Thus, 
interviews promised to provide a more adequate research method, because as Patton 
(1990; in Esterberg, 2002, p.87) states: ‘we interview people to understand what life 
is from perspectives other than our own’. 
Furthermore, semi-structured interviews were preferred, because ‘the semi-structured 
interview has the advantage of being reasonably objective while still permitting a 
more thorough understanding of the respondent’s opinions and the reasons behind 
them’ (Borg & Gall, 1989, p.452). Semi-structured interviews allow the researcher 
and the interviewees to interact and to shape the interview accordingly, even if the 
researcher had in advance a rough plan of the interview and its basic ideas and 
questions. The process resembled the dance of a couple that Esterberg (2002, p.87) 
describes as: ‘a dance in which one partner (the interviewer) must be carefully 
attuned to the other’s movements’. It is worth mentioning that in the wording of this 






of interview sought to be sensitively receptive to interviewees’ responses with a 
neutral attitude. While aware of postmodernist or critical-theoretical caveats, the 
interviewer sought to avoid presenting her own opinions and beliefs. Even when the 
interviewee asked personal questions of the interviewer, she tried either to deflect the 
question or occasionally to answer it only after the interviewee had offered his or her 
own view. In addition, the interviewer’s questions were open-ended and dichotomies 
or leading questions were avoided. However, given the special interest of this thesis 
in the distinctive role of the arts and their moral implications, two of the research 
questions were slightly more critically focused.  
Interviews were not the only method used, however, because while three of the 
people whom the researcher had approached were willing to contribute, they 
suggested that due to personal time constraints they would prefer to fill in a 
questionnaire. To be sure, such a method may have several disadvantages, such as 
the lack of opportunity to know not only what is said but how something is said, less 
human interaction and therefore less flexibility, less adaptability and clarity, 
insufficiently deep exploration of a topic, and lack of opportunity for the participant 
to reveal more information etc (Borg & Gall, 1989, p.445). In addition, the mailed 
questionnaire is better used for the collection of more factual and less ambiguous 
information (ibid); something that is less applicable to this study, since it seeks to 
analyse more than to describe. On the other hand, the mailed questionnaire has some 
advantages over the interview, such as that (what is called) ‘response effect’ is more 
likely to happen in an interview than with mailed questionnaires. Response effect is 
defined by Borg & Gall (1989, p.448) as the difference between true information and 
the inaccurate or misleading response to interview questions given possible hidden 
agendas on the part of the interviewee or interviewer. Such tendencies may take 
several forms such as: i) predispositions of the interviewee e.g. they may be 
suspicious of or wish to please the interviewer; ii) predispositions of the interviewer 
e.g. certain a priori expectations or prejudices; and finally iii) errors related to 
research procedures e.g. arising from time available for interview.  
 In such circumstances, interviews may be affected by degrees of subjectivity. The 






various methods employed and decided to accept mailed questionnaires with an eye 
to both the advantages and disadvantages of both adopted methods. The adoption of 
such methodological pluralism (i.e. i) study of policy documents; ii) interviews; and 
iii) mailed questionnaires) reflects what Cohen, Manion & Morrison (2000) describe 
as ‘triangulation’, defined as the multi-method approach to a problem which is held 
to ‘increase validity, reduce bias or bring objectivity’ (ibid, p.115). However, it is 
also worth mentioning here that triangulation usually refers to the combination of 
qualitative and quantitative methods, unlike the present research that has used only 
qualitative methods. In this regard, Cohen, Manion & Morrison (ibid) argue that 
there have been researchers such as Silverman (1985), Fielding and Fielding (1986) 
who do not consider triangulation to be a necessarily successful approach. Still, the 
present researcher used the methods so far mentioned with the intention of increasing 
validity, enriching the enquiry and bringing as much credibility to the findings as 
possible.  
Prior to conducting the interviews, the researcher had constructed two interview 
formats: the first contained seven general questions about the main topics, expecting 
them to provide effective stimuli for interviewees to talk about those issues of most 
significance to them; the second containing more detailed questions for more 
thorough follow-up. The first interview format was also the one that was mailed as a 
questionnaire to the three participants who elected to contribute in this way. The 
relevant questions can be seen in Figure 9.1 as follows.  
During the interview, the interviewer allowed interviewees to speak fairly freely, not 
always keeping them firmly on track. Just a few written notes were taken, but all 
interviews were recorded with the permission of interviewees. It is interesting that all 
interviewees, without exception, seemed well at ease with the use of recorders. A 
possible reason for this might be that due to their public roles they would have been 
used to such recording. Such evident ease with recording reduced the interviewer’s 








Figure 9.1 Basic questions of interviews 
9.1.3 The sample  
One example of a holistic approach to the study of the various influences on policy 
making may be found in the work of Hofferbert (1974, p.228) who used a funnel 
diagram to represent diverse influences on the policy making process, such as 
historic/geographic conditions, socio-economic composition, mass political 






acquaintance with the world of education policies through exploration of educational 
policy documents and curriculum guidelines, the researcher decided to interview 
those with managerial and other influential roles in governmental institutions and 
who appeared to have contributed to the formation of the new Scottish curriculum in 
some significant way. 
 
Figure 9.2 Modelling the Policy Making Process (Hofferbert, 1974, p.228 as 






In the context of this research, 30 Scottish policy makers and/or other influential 
agents of Scottish arts policy education contributed their views. That said, these 
people may be said to represent the wider population of Scottish policy making as 
influential on Scottish arts education; and/or they may be responsible for the policy 
that influences the whole population of Scottish schools and therefore the wider 
society of Scotland (in the recent past and/or currently).  
According to Esterberg (2002, p.93) research participants should be chosen ‘for the 
specific qualities they can bring to the study’ and for the fact they are those who ‘can 
give the greatest possible insight’ into the relevant issue. The interviewer tried to 
identify key policy makers in Scotland with influence on arts education policy by 
searching the official governmental websites of education such as that of Learning 
and Teaching Scotland (LTS) which ‘is committed to providing world-class teaching 
and learning experiences for Scotland’s children and young people’ (Mearns Castle 
High School, 2008, http://www.ea.e-
renfrew.sch.uk/mearnscastle/parents/usefulLinks.asp). In addition, ‘as the lead 
organisation for curriculum development in Scotland, LTS provides advice, support, 
resources and staff development to the education community, creating a culture of 
innovation, ambition and excellence throughout Scottish education’ (ibid). 
In the light of what Esterberg (2002) calls ‘purposive strategy’, the researcher made a 
deliberate attempt to approach a wide range of policy makers in order to open up 
several different aspects of a given topic. Bearing in mind that some policy makers 
were elected or may have been appointed by elected people, and therefore that 
politics and policy may sometimes be intertwined, as many research relevant people 
as possible were approached for the sake of a wide sample, a wide range of views 
and objective findings. For example, with regard to members of the Scottish 
Parliament, all eight members of the committee that considers and reports on: ‘i) 
further and higher education, lifelong learning, schools, pre-school care, skills and 
other matters falling within the responsibility of the Cabinet Secretary for Education 
and Lifelong Learning; and ii) matters relating to culture and the arts falling within 
the responsibility of the Minister for Europe, External Affairs and Culture’, were 






(SPCB, 2008, http://www.scottish.parliament.uk/s3/committees/ellc/index.htm) 
The breakdown of the 30 research participants is as follows. Twenty policy makers 
or other influential agents of policy were interviewed and another two contributed 
with responses to mailed questionnaires. These 22 research participants held a wide 
range of posts. It is worth clarifying that in the context of this research ‘policy 
maker’ means not only those who officially ‘make policy’ but also those who in 
various other ways influence strongly the development of official policy. In addition 
to the 22 ‘policy makers’, four cultural coordinators (who are not policy makers but 
influence implementation of policy) were interviewed and a further one contributed 
with answers to the mailed questionnaire
8
. While cultural coordinators may not be 
policy makers they may also influence educational policy in so far as their own 
creative ideas play an important role in supporting the work of schoolteachers. In 
particular, the cultural co-ordinators are expected to (Scottish Arts Council, 2005, p.4):  
Encourage and facilitate cultural participation through a wide variety of projects, 
visits, productions and performances; liaise with artists and the education officers of 
cultural organisations at both local and national levels; develop local authority and 
                                                 
8
 The first interview was conducted on the 11th of February 2008 and the last one on the 15th of July 2008. The research 
participants who contributed with letters/emails did so during that period as well. Although there may be some good reasons for 
including a list of research participants, following discussions and consultation with various people, such as my supervisor Dr 
Patrick McLaughlin and Dr Ken McCulloch who is Chair of the Moray House School of Education Ethics Committee, I 
decided that the names of the research participants should not appear in this thesis in order to follow the University 
of Edinburgh Ethics Policy and the British Sociological Association guidelines. For example, Section 37 of the British 
Sociological Association Statement of Ethical Practice states that: ‘Guarantees of confidentiality and anonymity given to 
research participants must be honoured, unless there are clear and overriding reasons to do otherwise, for example inrelation 
to the abuse of children.'   (www.britsoc.co.uk/equality/Statement+Ethical+Practice.htm#_anon). There might also be an issue 
with Personal Data in terms of the Data Protection Act. If a list of names was provided, the anonymity of individuals could 
not be maintained; especially in some cases, given explanation of their educational role, the source of a particular quotation 
would be obvious. As I also mention on page 152 of this thesis, the research participants were identified as people holding high 
official positions, and as such likely to give responsible answers to the researcher’s questions. The researcher assured research 
participants of the anonymity of the data, so that they could be as open and honest as possible. In this way, it was hoped that the 
research participants would not feel pressure to represent any particular group or party and might contribute to the research with 
an unbiased view.  Taking into account that people who hold key positions of high (Scottish) policy influence are not numerous 
and widely known to the public, if names were provided, it might be easy to link some quotes to some of the research 
participants. Furthermore, some of the research participants are politicians and therefore some quotes might be correctly or 
mistakenly attributed to political parties and also thereby linked to some names on any included list.  All the same, the research 
design and data collection methods used were open to scrutiny to academic supervisors and examiners as part of the supervision 







school awareness of the potential contribution of culture to young people’s learning 
and development – both within and outwith the curriculum. 
Furthermore, an academic and a head of education in a major Scottish performing 
arts organisation whose views and educational activities may have had some 
influence on policy-making were also interviewed. Regardless of the latter’s 
influence on policy, the researcher considered academia and major performing arts 
organisations as affording significant potential insight into the present enquiry. 
Finally, the First Minister of Scotland kindly contributed to the research with 
personal correspondence to the researcher by answering the questions of the 
questionnaire. Teachers and head teachers, however, were not interviewed, because 
the researcher thought that their practices would have been mainly influenced by 
those represented in the sample of policy-makers finally consulted in this research.  
Something that was evident from the earliest stages of this research is what Biernacki 
and Walford (1981) have called ‘snowball sampling’ or ‘chain referral’ sampling. In 
this regard, either some of the people that the researcher approached at an early stage 
would recommend some others to be interviewed, as more familiar with or relevant 
to the research topic, or later on such further interviewees might recommend yet 
others to be interviewed as also potentially informative to the research. Many of the 
people that first approached interviewees recommended were already in the 
researcher’s list for future interview in a way that reinforced confidence in the initial 
research design of the investigator. Apart from ‘snowball sampling’, the interviewing 
for this research reflects what Cohen, Manion & Morrison (2000, p.104) have called 
‘dimensional sampling’ and ‘multiphase sampling’. Sampling was dimensional by 
virtue of having at least one representative of each major governmental institution, as 
not many people occupy key positions and such people are invariably very busy. 
However, there is no Scottish governmental institution that this research did not 
approach without gaining interviews from some of its representatives. By 
‘representatives’, moreover, the researcher does not mean junior assistants of key 
policy makers, but the key people as such. Finally, the sampling was ‘multiphase’, in 
so far as the researcher realized that the research might benefit variously from a 






who were interviewed or who participated in this research with completed 
questionnaires were key people from Scottish government, as well as the following 
organisations: Learning and Teaching Scotland (LTS), Scottish Qualifications 
Authority (SQA), HM Inspectorate of Education (HMIE), Educational Institute of 
Scotland (EIS), Society of Local Authority Chief Executives and Senior Managers 
(SOLACE), Association of Scotland's Colleges (ASC). Association of Head-teachers 
and Deputes in Scotland (AHDS), School Leaders Scotland (SLS), General 
Teaching Council Scotland (GTCS), Scottish Secondary Teachers' Association 
(SSTA), Deans of Universities’ Faculties of Education, Association of Directors of 
Education in Scotland (ADES), Skills Development Scotland (SDS) and Creative 
Scotland.  
9.1.4 More on Validity, Reliability and Reflexibility 
Validity, reliability and reflexibility are all features of successful quality research – 
especially with regard to the accuracy of its procedure, analysis and findings. 
However, as Cohen, Manion & Morrison (2000, p.47) suggest: ‘All are complex in 
nature, for there is no singular or exclusive version of reliability, validity, or what 
constitutes an acceptable sample’. They also add that researchers should approach 
research in an open-eyed and open-minded spirit.  
For qualitative research, Cohen, Manion & Morrison (2000, p.107) note that 
Hammersley (1992, p.144) and Silverman (1993, p.153) think that ‘intensive 
personal involvement and in-depth responses of individuals’ are not adequate 
indicators of validity and reliability, in so far as the interpretative role of the 
interviewer should reflect what Blumenfeld-Jones (1995) refers to as the fidelity and 
honesty of the researcher. The researcher did not have any hidden political agenda 
and, as already explained, she tried to approach as many relevant people from as a 
wide range of posts and opinion as possible. In addition, she always sought to be 
informed about the backgrounds of interviewees and about the relevance of such 
background to their roles: e.g. which political party an interviewed member of the 
parliament might represent. This strategy promised what Burgess (1989; also Cohen, 






political or other ideological agendas of those involved in the research (either 
researcher, interviewer or interviewees). Moreover, even though the research 
proceeded in a critical and philosophical spirit, it sought to avoid any such external 
ideological influences: e.g. it was not commissioned to produce specific data in 
support of any political agenda or commercial contract and therefore the research 
entertained no intentions of directly ‘transforming the world’ in any overtly 
‘interested’ way. The researcher sought to be neutral between such partisan 
viewpoints and that is precisely why the research adopted a holistic approach. 
Nevertheless, as Cohen, Manion & Morrison (2000, p.111) state: ‘the research might 
focus on what might be (the leading edge of innovations and future trends) and what 
could be (the ideal, possible futures)’ (also in Schofield, 1993, p.209). For such 
focus, policy requires vision; and vision invariably means perspective. However, 
even if some of the interviewees were politically motivated in their policy-making 
role, this need not necessarily diminish the research validity. Indeed, on the other 
hand: i) this might more truly reflect human nature and education policy, which 
cannot be entirely apolitical (since, as Aristotle (Met.1253a in Korbilas, 2006, p.2) 
argued, ‘Man is by nature a political animal’); and ii) researchers may strive to be 
neutral while remaining sensitive to data that intertwines politics with policies. 
Overall, the issue of validity was addressed by making sure that the discussion of the 
data would be a discussion of representative items of both the sample and the whole 
set. The interviewees were identified as people holding high and responsible 
positions, and as such likely to give responsible answers to the researcher’s 
questions. In addition to this, however, the researcher assured interviewees of the 
anonymity of the data, so that they could be as open and honest as possible. In this 
way it was hoped that the research participants would not feel any pressure to 
represent any particular group or party, and might contribute to the research with an 
unbiased view. 
Moreover, as Campbell & Fiske (1959) and Brock-Utne (1996) suggest, ‘convergent 
validity implies that different methods for researching the same construct should give 
a relatively high inter-correlation’ (cited in Cohen, Manion &Morrison, 2000, 






reinforced knowledge gained from the review of policy documents and curriculum 
guidelines. This double means of researching the same constructs, employing 
comparison between interviews and documents aimed to capture the spirit of Scottish 
educational policies more accurately (ibid).  
This approach aimed to address the issue of reliability in the way that Cohen, Manion 
& Morrison (2000) and other researchers suggest: that is to say, by the use two or 
more methods of data collection to secure different dimensions of validity. As 
already stated in a previous section, the methods used for data collection in this study 
briefly were: i) reviewing policy documents and the government database of 
curriculum guidelines; ii) exploring the outcomes of pilot implementation of the new 
curriculum as described in the electronic government database; iii) interviewing the 
policy-makers who influence policy-making and/or people who know the policy 
making process; and iv) distributing questionnaires to people who could not be 
interviewed but were happy to participate otherwise. Reliability was also assisted by 
the researcher’s preliminary research into the background of these key policy players 
or ‘powerful’ people – as Walford (1994, p.225) calls them – and also by research on 
the context and the content of the new curriculum. The interviewees often assumed 
the interviewer’s up-to-date knowledge of the contemporary Scottish policy 
documentation existing in the public domain (something also mentioned by Walford, 
ibid); but such preliminary research aimed to secure reliability and avoid 
misconceptions of the part of the interviewer and misunderstandings of the part of 
interviewees. Beyond attention to preparation reliability and interview reliability, the 
researcher also sought to achieve maximum analysis reliability by fully transcribing 
all interviews in order to avoid what Lee (1993) and Kvale (1996, p.163) refer to as 
‘transcribers’ selectivity’. In addition, a diary of fieldwork notes with various 
comments on the interviews played an important role, in so far as transcriptions 
might sometimes appear to be de-contextualized. However, this diary helped the 
researcher to keep all needed verbal and non-verbal information in fairly clear view. 
This diary was systematically divided into two parts: i) neutral descriptive 
comments; and ii) some interpretive comments. This division/clarification also aimed 






This research also obviously employs much philosophical reasoning. However, the 
researcher aimed at all times to avoid any philosophical bias in the sense of 
ideological or political prejudice. While the researcher was certainly not oblivious to 
the potential reflexivity issues that philosophical reasoning might sometimes involve, 
she appreciated that she herself should be a ‘research instrument’ (Cohen, Manion & 
Morrison, 2000, p.141) or looking ‘glass self’ (Cooley, 1902 cited in ibid). Hence, 
she aimed to avoid: i) ambiguous and leading questions; ii) expression of her own 
feelings, fears and ideas; iii) selectivity of only data in accordance with particular 
trends; and iv) use of unsystematically interpreted data. Finally, it is important to say 
that the researcher was not trying to prove any particular point by this research, only 
to discern the spirit and direction of the new Scottish Curriculum for Excellence. 
Moreover, such knowledge would not in itself either confirm or contradict the 

























Chapter 10  
 
10. The development of Scottish education policy in and beyond the 
documents 
10.1 The guidelines and a case for change 
A review of the contemporary policy documents relevant to Scottish curricula as 
appearing on the explicit online resources of Learning and Teaching Scotland (LTS) 
– which is the principal and largest public body responsible for the development and 
transformation of Scottish curriculum and education – made apparent that curriculum 
change was regarded as important in order to meet the needs of young Scottish 
people in the 21
st
 century (LTS, 2010b, http://www.ltscotland.org.uk/understanding 
thecurriculum/whatiscurriculumforexcellence/howwasthecurriculumdeveloped/casef
orchange/index.asp). For example, two reports (ibid) by Her Majesty's Inspectorate 
of Education (HMIE) stressed the importance of such change in order to redress 
present weaknesses of the education system as well as to improve its strengths. 
‘Confidence’ and ‘skills’ are immediately conspicuous words in key elements of the 
new curriculum. In this respect, the following words of the LTS website aptly 
express the spirit of the new Scottish curriculum (ibid): 
 Scotland’s future economic prosperity requires an education system within which the 
population as a whole will develop the kind of knowledge, skills and attributes which 
will equip them personally, socially and economically to thrive in the 21st century. It 
also demands standards of attainment and achievement which match these needs and 
strengthen Scotland’s position internationally.  
In this context: confidence, lifelong skills and attributes, professionalism and 
qualifications are among the first words to appear as key elements of the new 
curriculum. According to LTS (2010e, http://www.ltscotland.org.uk 
/understandingthecurriculum/whatiscurriculumforexcellence/howwasthecurriculumd
eveloped/processofchange/index.asp), this process of change was developed over 
approximately eight years following a national debate on education in 2002. The 






children and young people need an education that will equip them with skills and 
qualifications needed for life and work in an age of globalization. Thus, Scottish 
Executive ministers and a Curriculum Review Group worked towards a new 
curriculum, a first draft of which was published in 2004 under the title ‘A 
Curriculum for Excellence’. Since then, more publications, research, proposals and 
reviews have followed to build a more detailed curriculum with guidance on various 
aspects of school learning. After trialling activities, draft experiences, published first 
outcomes, analysis of feedback and further quality assurance processes, the new 
curriculum guidelines were published in 2009 allowing scope for planning and 
implementation up until 2011 (LTS, 2010c, 
http://www.ltscotland.org.uk/understandingthecurriculum/whatiscurriculumforexcell
ence/howwasthecurriculumdeveloped/index.asp). 
According to the LTS definition of the Scottish curriculum (2010f, http://www. 
ltscotland.org.uk/understandingthecurriculum/whatiscurriculumforexcellence/thepur
poseofthecurriculum/index.asp), the latter functions as a means to implementation of 
educational policy through planned experiences for children and young people 
during their schooling. These are claimed to be the fundamental principles that 
govern curriculum design and that should inform its guidelines (LTS, 2010d, 
http://www.ltscotland.org.uk/understandingthecurriculum/howisthecurriculumstructu
red/principles/index.asp).  
The first of these mentioned is that challenging and enjoyable activities should 
enable learners to achieve their potential through developing and expressing their 
creativity. Breadth and coherence of experiences, progression, depth and relevance to 
learners’ lives, personal support and equal opportunities and choices are also 
intended to apply to the learning of all children and young people. The basic 
principles of Curriculum for Excellence aim to promote flourishing life, learning and 
work, through the development of four capacities that may enable children and 
young people to become: successful learners, effective contributors, confident 
individuals and responsible citizens. In the key policy documents of Curriculum for 
Excellence, it is suggested that through the achievement of these four capacities, 






values of wisdom, justice, compassion and integrity. For a detailed account of these 
four capacities, see Figure 10.1.  
 
Figure 10.1 Four capacities from LTS (2010f, 
http://www.ltscotland.org.uk/understandingthecurriculum/whatiscurriculumfore
xcellence/thepurposeofthecurriculum/) 
In this regard, arts along with the other areas of the curriculum, should aim at the 
cultivation of these four capacities. Arts are described as ‘Expressive Arts’ and 
include mainly art and design, music, dance and drama. In an interdisciplinary and 
cross-curricular form, or individually, arts should build on these capacities in pursuit 






confident, self-aware and self-disciplined, critical thinkers, humane, cooperative, 
good communicators, creatively driven, capable of participating in collective 
activities, and of showing initiative, dependability, leadership and enterprise. 
 The key elements of artistic endeavour as presented in the guidelines are creativity 
and self-expression. These are to be achieved through participating in a variety of 
artistic forms and activities. By the term ‘Expressive Arts’, it is clear that the 
emphasis is on activities that provide opportunities for learners to express themselves 
and to develop skills of so-called ‘self- expression’. Such activities mostly involve 
the creation, presentation and performance of their work, and then probably the 
evaluation of their work and that of their peers. The following words of the 
curriculum guidelines appear to summarize the proposed connection of the four 
capacities with the arts (The Scottish Executive, 2006, p.7):  
 In developing expressive and aesthetic experiences from the early stages, the emphasis 
should be on enjoyment, expression and development as well as on the quality of any 
product. As they grow older, young people should continue to experience, explore and 
experiment while further developing knowledge and specific skills to encourage their 
progress in the arts. These skills include presenting ideas and emotions as individuals 
or in groups and commenting on their own work and that of others. Through activities 
of this kind they can be encouraged to develop their powers of observation, personal 
response, critical analysis, evaluation, and communication. 
In addition, arts may play a major role in learning about and using new technologies 
and therefore help learners to acquire relevant life skills. Finally, not only may the 
skills acquired in the arts help learners to perform better in other areas of the school 
curriculum, but arts can also be used as a tool to make teaching of other, often less 
popular, subjects more enjoyable. As such, teachers of the arts should work in 
partnership with artists, co-ordinators (so far called cultural coordinators), culture 
and arts organisations, and teachers of other subjects as well as the school’s larger 
community of parents and staff in order to organise collaborative activities that keep 
the arts relevant to the everyday lives of children and young people. 
The identified levels of learning in, through and about the arts, suggest that the first 
three levels will focus on enjoyable activities that involve presenting, performing and 






for young people who may choose to specialise in the arts and it seems to involve 
education and training for development of enhanced artistic skills and understanding. 
Such opportunities have been provisionally available in some schools in recent years 
and there is a published report of such experiences and outcomes in Expressive Arts 
(by Learning and Teaching Scotland). The report describes approximately 70 
experiences/outcomes from the arts, which involve creating, performing/presenting 
personal artwork; and at later stages evaluating own and peer work (LTS, 2010a, 
http://www.ltscotland.org.uk/myexperiencesandoutcomes/expressivearts/alloutcomes
.asp).  
All in all, however, the main emphasis in Curriculum for Excellence seems to be on 
practical creativity and/or skill development. Only once or twice is appreciation of 
the work of past or present professional artists mentioned.  
In general, the aim of Expressive Arts teaching in schools could be summarized as 
providing pupils with opportunities to (LTS, 2009, p.2): 
 experience enjoyment and contribute to other people’s enjoyment through 
creative and expressive performance and presentation 
 develop important skills, both those specific to the expressive arts and those which 
are transferable 
 develop an appreciation of aesthetic and cultural values, identities and ideas and, 
for some: 
 prepare for advanced learning and future careers by building foundations for 
excellence in the expressive arts.  
From this viewpoint, the new Scottish Curriculum for Excellence would appear to be 
a capacities and/or skills-led curriculum that aims to develop competent Scottish 
individuals for the globalised culture, economy and needs of the 21
st
 century. 
‘Expressive Arts’ can contribute alongside other curricular areas to such development 
by ‘inviting’ pupils to be successful learners, confident individuals, responsible 
citizens and effective social contributors, who are also creative, expressive and 
imaginative. Curriculum guidelines emphasize some aspects of development more 






what follows is some relevant discussion of the interviews with policy-makers for the 
sake of a clearer view of the policies and aspirations of the new Scottish curriculum.  
10.2 Through the eyes of the research participants 
All participants in this research agreed that arts have great value and should play a 
major role in Curriculum for Excellence or any other curriculum. All, without 
exception, disagreed with any educationalists, philosophers or policy makers who in 
the past have taken a more negative view of the educational place of the arts, 
regarding these as a distraction from the main business of teaching more 
economically ‘useful’ knowledge and skills. Their response to this view was 
generally that arts are important for all individuals for a wide variety of reasons that 
will be described more clearly further on. Before describing in detail why arts are 
regarded as important, however, it may be advisable to explain what interviewees 
meant by using the word ‘arts’. Thus, regardless of the researcher’s own view, the 
next part of this chapter will focus on attempts of research participants to define the 
arts.  
10.2.1 Defining and describing the arts 
Defining the arts was not perceived as easy, and of course there have been a wide 
range of past definitions. For contemporary Scottish educators, arts tended to be 
understood mainly as the four ‘Expressive Arts’ included in the curriculum 
guidelines: namely, art and design, drama, music and dance. However, research 
participants invariably made clear that the arts are not strictly reducible to these four. 
They would therefore usually refer to any visual, performing, technology-based 
and/or other creative expression that displayed some artistic aspect as arts. Moreover, 
the arts were never regarded as an isolated autonomous area of school learning, but 
always in connection with other fields of knowledge and skill. Descriptions of the 
arts were therefore inclusive rather than exclusive, and would generally recognise 
various aspects, relating arts to: i) culture; and/or ii) creativity. Accordingly, culture 






by a particular people or nation – though cultural arts would often be related more 
specifically to popular culture or Scotland’s culture. For example, Highland folk 
dances would be an example of expressing national identity through dance. With 
regard to creativity, the arts would be connected to any creative learning. In this 
sense, arts would often be applauded for their capacity to make a lesson fun, and 
consequently were generally valued across the curriculum as an effective means of 
teaching other subjects. Creativity and creative learning/expression tended to feature 
in most definitions of arts and were often associated with the development of life-
skills, such as those involved in craft and technology-based activities. Overall, then, 
there were four general approaches to defining arts: i) in terms of art subjects; ii) in 
connection with creativity; iii) with reference to culture; and iv) as anything of 
supposedly aesthetic or artistic value.  
10.2.2 A wider approach: moving from art subjects to letting creativity 
take the lead 
 
Defining arts in terms of art subjects was a common initial reaction to the question: 
‘How would you define the arts, and which arts would you regard as of particular 
educational significance?’ However, this was also commonly only an initial answer, 
since – as already indicated – there would also often be some further reference to 
culture and creativity. The commonly mentioned art subjects, as already said, would 
be those of the curriculum guidelines: art and design, music, drama and dance. In 
addition, other categories of arts might be mentioned, such as the performing or 
visual arts, sometimes including photography and cinema. ‘Moving image’ was 
another term used in connection with new media visual arts. Art and design was also 
frequently said to ‘include’ sculpture, two and three dimensional modelling, 
observed work, painting, computer graphic work and similar forms. And, of course, 
literature and poetry were often regarded as arts, though these are not included under 
‘Expressive Arts’ as defined in Curriculum for Excellence. 
Even though research participants would commonly start with reference to the 






broader definitions, regarding arts in terms of arts subjects as limiting, exclusive and 
restricted. A common reason given for this might be, for example, that dance could 
be regarded as both art and sport, as argued in the following: 
We’re using that [definition] in Scotland at this time to help define the fact that there 
will be boundaries but you don’t want to make them too closed. So, for example, the 
dance, they will see that, I mean they’ll have quite strong links with physical education 
and sport, because of the training that goes into dance as an art form. So they won’t 
separate out that dance as an art form needs to progress and develop and take risks. 
But they will see it as part of an education system in terms of physical education. So 
we’re at that stage where there are traditional art forms and we may have defined Art 
through those art forms, but those definitions are over sixty years old now – dance, 
drama, music, literature, crafts, visual arts. So we are adopting this creative industries 
definition for the moment, to include advertising, architecture, other broad areas. 
Consequently, a new definition of the arts tended to emerge that gave a central role 
to creativity. According to this definition, arts as subjects are not at the centre, but 
creativity, and creative learning takes the lead role. Thus, although there may still be 
different departments in arts councils and governmental institutions, such as a dance 
department, a drama department, a literature department, a visual arts department, a 
crafts department, a music department, and so on, this was also considered by some 
to be an ‘old-fashioned way of working’. As one interviewee stated:  
I don’t think it’s very profitable to spend time worrying about which pigeonhole we’re 
in. Rather, I would think, if we’re talking about artistic and creative practice – how do 
we network and join up and feed other people that are doing creative practice? And I 
mean people like scientists and mathematicians and all the rest of it because I think we 
have a lot to learn from each other, and we have certain ways of working in common. 
So I prefer to think of it in terms of creative learning, and creative learning, of course, 
also helps in terms of education; creativity is reasonably high up the agenda now. 
Creative industries are very high up in the economic sector, they’re a huge growing 
part of the economy and even non-creative industries want employees that are creative. 
They want people that can think creatively, that can collaborate with other people, that 
can move on and be flexible and all that kind of stuff, problem-solving, all the creative 
attributes. So I think creative learning is really what we’re about. 
Quite a few research participants highlighted that moving from more standard 
categories of art towards a definition of creativity was strongly influenced by the 
Department for Culture, Media and Sport in England and the UNESCO (2007) 






Such sectors are: advertising; architecture; crafts; designer furniture; fashion 
clothing; film, video and other audiovisual production; graphic design; educational 
and leisure software; live and recorded music; performing arts and entertainment; 
television, radio and internet broadcasting; visual arts and antiques; and writing and 
publishing (UNESCO, 2006, p.1).  
These ‘creative sectors’ and the associated creative mentality seems to have 
persuaded many policy makers in this research to relate creativity to wider culture. 
References to Scottish heritage were frequent, and again a definition of arts very 
much departing from subjects has been reinforced. For example, one interviewee 
stated: 
I would have a broad definition of the arts and culture. I think they’re truly important 
because, that way, you don’t tend to go down a very narrow field that perhaps is 
exclusive. So the arts, for me, in education certainly would include music, certainly 
would include art, certainly would include drama, but I would also include a whole 
range of other things. For example, in the arts there’s an element of language, 
particularly, for example, our native language. There would be elements, for me, in the 
arts of our heritage and our history. As opposed to a very narrow definition that some 
people would say, well, the arts are just about music, and they’re just about the stage, 
and theatre and drama. Let’s have a much broader definition of the arts.  
This view represents the great majority of participants in the research and suggests 
that for them arts and culture go hand in hand: that, therefore, an interest in the arts 
will stimulate interest in culture. However, it can also be confusing when people try 
to define arts in this way. Indeed, some interviewees identified the equal difficulty of 
defining ‘culture’. They said that even this is dangerous because culture may mean 
anything – and, if people start defining it, they tend to narrow it and perhaps the term 
then loses much of its common meaning: namely everything that a nation or people 
produces or represents. For the majority of policy-makers interviewed, however, it 
was the beauty of the term ‘culture’: to be so inclusive. For example, one interviewee 
cited the instance of a street festival that is a mixture of cultural events, and yet of 
aesthetic or artistic value. This person, and other interviewees, mentioned that there 
is so much now which happens across art-forms that is representative of both arts and 
culture. Therefore, the general view of the relationship of art to culture could be 






 I like the word culture better than the word art. And I think it was maybe one of the 
Greek philosophers, and I can’t remember which one – it may have been Aristotle – 
said that culture was the whole experience of human existence. Everything you do is 
cultural; it’s the whole experience of human existence. So it is broader, it’s the whole 
thing; the whole of life is culture. And to try and pigeonhole, put it into a slot of theatre 
or drama or drawing or painting, is a mistake. 
Furthermore, the overall trend was towards yet wider and wider definitions. The 
alleged multifaceted nature of arts resulted in even more inclusive responses by 
research participants, many of whom seemed to regard anything as art or at least as 
potential art. There was a strong tendency to view art in the widest possible sense: 
for example, cookery was sometimes mentioned as an art form. Such inclusiveness 
could also be considered to represent the flexibility of Curriculum for Excellence 
itself, as greater flexibility might be hoped to introduce extended educational 
opportunities and experiences for children and young people. Examples of the 
broadest definitions of arts may be seen in the following responses:  
I find it difficult to think about defining art. You could start by saying art might be 
painting, it could be music, it could be what you traditionally think of as the arts. But it 
could be a lot more. I think I’ve a bit more sympathy with the idea that the arts can be 
anything at all. Planting flowers in a nice way, landscaping areas. I think that’s a 
creative thing as well. So I think there’s arts everywhere and I think it’s about how you 
ensure that you’re engaging properly, I think it’s about ... you know, PE could be quite 
a creative and expressive form, or expressive subject. It could be about dance...or...I 
really like football and sometimes I watch a player play football and I think wow: that’s 
incredible, that’s just beautiful what he’s just done, I respect the way he’s moved, so 
graceful. But I think ... definitely I think I’ve much more sympathy with they’re being 
arts and the potential for there being an element of the arts in every subject that we do. 
And I think that kind of echoes what the Curriculum for Excellence should be about. It’s 
about liking everything that we do and seeing the benefit of everything. 
And similarly: 
Personally I would be looking at a broad definition of the arts. I referred earlier on to 
grace and movement in the athletics arena. I remember for example one of the big 
influences that I had in the 1970s was a Russian athlete called Ludmilla Tourischeva 
who was the most graceful gymnast that you could see. Just a wonderful gymnast, and 
she opened up a whole new dimension of grace and beauty and elegance to my life 
because I had never really been interested in gymnastics before, but when I saw 
Ludmilla Tourischeva performing, then it just gave me a new dimension. When I saw 
the Brazil football team play in the World Cup of 1970 – one of the greatest communal 
expositions, exhibitions, of grace on a football pitch that you could ever see. In cinema, 
recently I went to a film by the Coen brothers called ‘No Country for Old Men’. And 






the actors, by the cinematographers. So yes, art. I mean some people would say there is 
art in ice sculpture, flower arranging, gardening – I say yes.  
Such perspectives on culture and creativity suggest that arts may be identified as any 
form of creative and cultural learning or enhancement of people’s skills and 
capacities through such activities as festivals organised by local authorities. Such 
definitions do not limit arts education only to schools and school learning, but 
apparently embrace a wider social spectrum and range. Nevertheless, on this view, it 
would seem that it is not education or schooling that serves the arts for their own 
sake, but that arts serve education more instrumentally. In this way, education serves 
to develop creativity and relevant skills: meanwhile creativity serves a society which 
is conceived of as a body of skilful citizens. In short, the focus is not on arts 
education as such, but on capacities and skills that might be developed through the 
arts, that are not now defined (in the manner of recent educational policy and cultural 
development) as subjects, but rather in relation to their role in socially ‘creative’ 
productivity.  
10.3 The role of arts 
This section of the thesis began with the claim that any effort to define or identify the 
arts is not an easy task. The interviews quoted thus far seem to confirm this view. 
However, accounts given so far given of the arts do make a little clearer how the role 
of arts might be educationally conceived in the new Scottish curriculum. Thus, all 
research participants appear to agree on the dual educational role of arts: i) on its 
cross-curricular role in promoting wider knowledge and skills; and ii) on its 
contribution to activities in creative sectors that develop certain socially valued 
capacities. The role of arts in education will shortly be explored in more detail; but 
before that, it is important to identify what kinds of values appear to have influenced 
such accounts and definitions of the arts.  







Some policy makers described Scotland as ‘creative’ (there also is a homonymous 
body called Creative Scotland) and they emphasised that the Scottish government is 
keen for businesses and educational services to interact more closely so that teaching 
in the educational sector might reinforce business skills across the artistic and 
creative board. That is to say, government feels that creativity is not being 
sufficiently encouraged through schooling as strongly as it could be. There seems to 
be much concern that creativity is not being promoted enough. It seems to be a 
common view that creativity is to some extent nurtured in early school years, but 
when children get older, perhaps in later years of their secondary schooling, there is 
less focus on creativity. In later stages the focus appears to be more upon the 
academic learning of history, maths, English and other exam-assessable subjects. The 
new Curriculum for Excellence therefore seeks to develop creativity throughout the 
whole educational spectrum. The vast majority of interviewed policy-makers 
therefore stressed that ‘the most important thing is interactivity between business and 
education’: namely, between education, creative businesses and the creative 
industries. Communication skills and creative skills therefore seem to be regarded as 
more important than in the past. Creativity and innovation, enterprise and culture are 
all to be viewed by Curriculum for Excellence as means to enhance Scottish 
education – so that, in turn, creative educational development may stimulate business 
and economic development.  
Thus, the general focus of Scottish education appears to be on developing the four 
mental and social capacities that the curriculum guidelines identify. It seems 
therefore widely accepted by Scottish education authorities that the new curriculum 
is a capacities-led curriculum. The four main capacities, as already identified, are 
intended to produce confident individuals, responsible citizens, successful learners 
and effective contributors. The first question that now emerges is: what spirit lies 
behind the policy making that promotes the values underpinning the key capacities of 
Curriculum for Excellence? In private correspondence with the researcher, the First 
Minister for Scotland (2009, p.1) made clear that:  
As a country, we must maximise the economic potential of all our citizens. As a caring 
society, we must make sure that we are getting it right for every child. We need a 21
st
 
century education system for a 21
st






positive process of change imbued in Curriculum of Excellence. It is a highly ambitious 
programme of reform and has a vital role to play in preparing our young people to take 
their place in a modern society and economy. 
Without exception, all research participants stressed the importance of the Scottish 
economy and how much this should influence educational thought and policy-
making. Their references to the importance of such influence were not vague or 
ambiguous, but very specific and similar between them. Thus, for example: 
The economies in China, in India and in Brazil are growing rapidly. What kind of 
young person do we need to develop in Scotland who will have the understanding and 
the ambition and the drive to work not just around the corner here, but to realise that 
their work probably impacts on China, or some other country, and actually they could 
be trading, they could be working, with people in those countries? So, what we need to 
develop are people with the right skills to learn throughout their lives. 
Such references to economy and working life seem to have influenced not only 
Curriculum for Excellence in general, but thinking about arts education in particular. 
From this perspective, arts education would not add value to education by virtue of 
its own distinctive character and potential, but because of its contribution to more 
general educational aims and objectives. It would be the role of arts, like other 
subjects, to promote the generally desired skills, capacities and outcomes of 
successful education. A policy maker stated: 
What I can see within the Curriculum for Excellence and the advantages that the 
Curriculum for Excellence can bring to arts education, you see, is that it will allow arts 
education to become much more central and important for the young person’s 
experiences. Because through the arts you can make them very confident, because of 
public performance. You can make them interested in life-long learning because of for 
example photography. You see, of all the arts the one element that probably everybody 
uses nowadays is photography. Because they will take a digital photograph and if they 
don’t like it they will throw it away. Some people put it onto their desktops, on 
computers, create their own photographs... 
However, this view – connecting education with everyday life, business with 
training, knowledge with skills, useful production with consumerism, arts experience 
with active learning – seems to promote a certain instrumental or utilitarian spirit 






everyday living. Thus, policy makers often represented creativity in the arts in terms 
of the following examples:  
You can also then learn through it, so you are learning about creativity. You’re 
learning to be creative. You’re learning to take chances. You’re learning to explore. 
You’re learning to take something and through the use of computer, with technology, 
turn it into something else. So you can download a tune from iTunes onto your 
telephone, take it into the classroom, put it onto the computer programme, and sample 
one small bit of it and turn it into a new pop song for yourself, and then use that as a 
backing track for your pop group performance at a school show [...] We want people to 
go to pop concerts, we want people to go to opera, we want people to go to art galleries 
and appreciate, and criticise. Because that helps everybody to feel that they are 
contributing to society. They have a voice, and they have an interest. They’re not just a 
consumer of pop music. They’re not just a consumer of paint and they go along and 
paint everything white. But they actually have a view. They have their own view about 
something, and that’s very important. We want people to be motivated, ambitious and 
actually have a business mind, because they might well go to IKEA and say ‘I can 
design better than that. You know, I can design better furniture than IKEA’. And so that 
will drive them to maybe choose a particular career pathway, you see. So there are a 
lot of long-term benefits and the arts are something that are round about all of us all of 
the time. 
What is interesting about the data from this research is that many of the stated views 
of research participants so far gathered would appear to be largely in accord with the 
general thrust of recent Scottish education policy documentation. Whether all 
participants agree with them completely is another issue. But from the tone, the 
examples given and their precise words, the majority of participants would seem to 
be happy enough with their main import. However, there was a small minority who 
seemed to be less in agreement, in so far as they could see too much emphasis on 
developing individuals for current economic needs in changing economic 
circumstances. Moreover, according to the view of this minority, such economic 
focus diminishes the value and potential of the arts. That is to say that the arts 
become a mere tool of the utilitarian spirit of present times. Furthermore, by 
diminishing genuine aesthetic and artistic aspects of development, learners may also 
be diminished as people. So, according to a few research participants, much current 
policy making seems to be following a direction that – while understandable – is in 
danger of moving away from the more general and broad education within schools 
and universities that might produce more well-rounded individuals. Thus, a 






The more you learn about a range of subjects in a general degree the better you are 
equipped to deal with the world. If you just go down and want to be an accountant, you 
end up being a boring accountant with no understanding. What do they say about 
boring accountants who understand the price of everything but the value of nothing? So 
what we’re teaching in the education system is value. It’s the values that are important 
in transmitting from one generation to the other. And the values we’re transmitting now 
seem to be purely economic-based and not the broader cultural artistic ones that make 
a full person and fuller rounded society.  
Now, having indicated how research participants attempted to understand the nature 
of arts, and following some reflection on the possible spirit behind such views, 
something needs to be said about implications of these various perspectives for 
education. While there is clearly significant agreement among policy makers on the 
important role of arts in education, this part of the thesis will try to explore further 
the practical implications of such ‘importance’. 
10.3.2 The educational meaning of the ‘important role of the arts’ 
One main aim of Curriculum for Excellence is to encourage young people to see 
connections between different subjects or areas of the school curriculum. There is 
evident sympathy here with the idea of cross-curricular links. In this regard, a policy 
maker who has long been working in this direction and who has contributed to both 
the 5–14 guidelines and Curriculum of Excellence stated: 
My concern is, in the past, you had the curriculum, all the curriculum subjects. And 
then here you had the young person. The young person went to that subject, and then 
went to that subject, and then went to that subject and that subject, and so on, and 
never made the connections. The cross-cutting of the Curriculum for Excellence – 
which is quite a new way of thinking– I think it’s a good way of thinking. Science, if 
you’re learning science, if you’re learning about what the scientists hold, if you’re 
learning about some of their input into life, if you’re learning about some of the... if 
you’re learning history ... about the history of Science, you’re learning all these 
different things, then I think the arts, culture, different things, can have an input into 
what you’re doing all through the different subjects. I don’t think ... if you want to have 
a truly creative nation as well, then I don’t think you can just make the arts and culture 
an aside. I think, if you’re going to talk about making arts and culture important, then it 
has to be done properly and it has to be done on a level playing-field. 
According to many research participants, the new policy guidelines allow more 






approaches in which the arts can play a valuable part. A key question that emerges 
here, however, is that of what such policy makers may have meant by ‘valuable’. In 
fact, in terms of their examples, they often seemed to mean that arts may offer a 
useful tool for the effective delivery of other subjects and fields of knowledge. Of 
course, utilising the arts in this way has often been regarded as challenging for 
schools, teachers, and educational authorities, in so far as teachers need to feel 
confident that they can teach the tools of music, art and design, dance, drama, as well 
as to use the arts in a cross-curricular way that supports the teaching of other subjects 
or themes. But here, it is interesting to note that while the arts were often appreciated 
for their potential to assist other forms of learning, only a small minority of 
participants entertained the reverse possibility. Thus, common examples of cross-
curricular learning with reference to the arts were the promotion of environmental 
studies, maths or history through painting, drama or music (rather than vice versa). 
In the words of a policy maker (in connection with dance education):  
Now numeracy is the responsibility of all teachers. Mathematics in terms of calculus, 
algebra, and so on is for the mathematics specialist, but everybody should be 
contributing to numeracy. So when you are in the dance classroom with young 
children, they can be learning to count-count by counting dance steps. They can be 
learning to speak and to read through rhythmic activities If the teacher wants to take, 
for example, a Highland dance and links the Highland dance to Highland music and 
links that to a story of either cultural and economic prosperity in the Highlands of the 
21st century. Or maybe links it back to the tragic circumstances of the Highland 
Clearances in the late 18th and early 19th century and builds it into geography and 
history and social and economic change– there are plenty of ways of doing that [...] 
One of the challenges that we have in Scotland is our health, our nation has got a bad 
reputation for bad health. Our diet and the lack of physical activity, exercise. Within 
schools there is one particular group that’s worrying us and that’s teenage girls. 
Because very often teenage girls, by the time they’re into second year, let’s say in 
secondary school, teenage girls turn off physical education. They don’t want to do 
physical education, games and so on. But what they have developed a real active 
interest in is dance, in modern dance particularly – and through modern dance many 
young girls are actually getting an opportunity to both be physically active, and be 
creative as well. And that’s very helpful for them physically, but also educationally and 
spiritually. 
Indeed, it is interesting that when a policy maker was asked what the educational 
value of dance is, he referred to contestants in the BBC’s ‘Strictly Come Dancing’ 
show. He underlined ‘how toned they are now, and how fit, and how they’ve lost 






This example of the cross curricular function of arts does not have only theoretical 
implications, since projects are constantly promoted, such as ‘Arts across the 
curriculum’, with a view to teaching subjects that would not readily have been linked 
to the arts in the past (e.g. learning physics through music in connection with notes 
and pitches). ‘Arts across the curriculum’ is a very fashionable idea and plausibly 
supported by the thought that arts and artistic means may make lessons in other 
subjects more attractive and enjoyable. In addition, a recent popular Scottish scheme 
has been that of ‘cultural coordinators’ who are invited to schools in order to 
facilitate arts projects. These projects usually have a cross-curricular function. An 
example of this was given by a cultural coordinator responsible for a group of 
schools:  
So, for example, we did one where ... with primary children ... where they were 
evacuated for the day to the local castle basically. So they were asked to come in with a 
toothbrush and a cup and a pair of pyjamas and they were then informed that there was 
a war going on. They met Winston Churchill and Neville Chamberlain, you know 
actors; they met American paratroopers, and they got driven from their school out to 
the country with an American armed convoy, big vehicles, trucks and jeeps and things. 
And then they spent the day out in the park, writing postcards home about what life is 
like, learning semaphore on the fields with the big flags. And they also had a 1940s 
school classroom lesson where they did geography and maths from the day, with little 
slate boards and things. So we turned that whole day into a World War Two experience 
for primary children. We did the same thing for secondary schools where we turned 
their day into an Army boot camp, because in the Second World War the men would 
have gone to a local high school to sign up. So we actually signed all the kids up at the 
start of the day, put them into platoons. And, instead of English, they did code-
breaking; instead of science, they did how to escape from a prisoner-of-war camp with 
explosions and invisible ink; instead of PE, they had a Sergeant-Major with a 
moustache screaming at them, and they did lots of different activities to do with the 
War. And at the end of the day they were all given a name, and some of them were 
given stripes so they were given a rank, and at the end of the day we had a Wall of 
Death where we announced that we’d put the names up of the people who had fallen 
during the War and some of the kids, that was their names so they had to sit down – so 
there were kids crying. It was very emotional, it was really good. And we also did the 
same for ship-building. 
To be sure, there is a role for the arts that is conducive to the teaching and learning of 
other subjects. Arts can provide various types of knowledge. Thus, there is real 
possibility of movement from knowledge in the arts to knowledge through the arts. 
But in moving away from a knowledge-led curriculum, policy-makers who have 






led conception of arts learning. In this regard, however, there is clearly a distinction 
between two categories of artistic skills: precisely skills in the arts and skills through 
the arts.  
 
Figure 10.2 The aim of skills and knowledge in and through the arts.  
Skills in the arts seemed to be regarded as very important by some policy makers 
who underlined the importance of e.g. musical culture in Scotland. A project that 
offered free access to music tuition for a year in Scotland was recently launched that 
reflected how valuable this art is regarded. This project is called ‘Youth Music 
Initiative’. But concerns were also raised about this project by some policy makers 
who had reservations about such projects in so far as they are not an in-built feature 
of formal education. It has been argued that the Youth Music Initiative has been 
delivered in too many different ways by different local authorities and has not 
therefore reached every child as originally intended. For example, a research 
interviewee stated that:  
The Youth Music Initiative is sometimes been offered as an after-school or a try-if-you-
want. I spoke to somebody whose child had had two lessons in something, that’s 
nothing. That’s like saying here’s a carrot and then taking it away. You know, dangling 
a carrot. So I think it’s not as clear cut as every child in Scotland has had an 







Thus, some research participants argued that arts are only theoretically, but not 
practically, a priority, given that the government tends to assume that arts will be 
delivered anyway. And indeed, if someone looks, for example, at the national 
educational outcomes that the Scottish Government wants to achieve, there are 45 
indicators that are meant to identify educational achievement, but none of these seem 
specific to the arts. According to the Scottish Government (2009, 
http://www.scotland.gov.uk/About/scotPerforms/indicators): 
 National Indicators enable the Scottish Government to track progress towards the 
achievement of its National Outcomes and ultimately the delivery of its purposes’.  
Out of 45 indicators, some are about crime: e.g. Reduce overall conviction rates by 
two percentage points by 2011; and one is even about tooth decay: 60% of school 
children in primary education will have no signs of dental disease by 2010. Not one 
of them is about arts or even culture.  
Research participants generally held that all young people should have the 
opportunity to learn in all of the arts areas. However, some of them raised concerns 
about the few projects available (e.g. projects facilitated by cultural coordinators). 
They were regarded as not enough to provide adequate arts education, since they do 
not offer sufficiently systemic exposure to the arts. In addition, financial implications 
may also affect learning in the arts. In other words, it costs much more to invite an 
arts team to perform for the children than to ask children to draw pictures for 
themselves. Similar concerns were expressed by other policy makers who understood 
the spirit of the new curriculum and the economic realities it seeks to address, but did 
not seem to think that provision of a few art experiences in schools are enough; what 
they regard as more important is to get young people engaging with arts on a regular 
basis from early years, because a true understanding of the arts cannot be gained 
from limited exposure. As one interviewee said, it could not be supposed that 
someone might become a great football player from having played football only 






school invites Scottish Opera only once – despite the wide range of education 
programme provided by Scottish Opera – this is unlikely to be enough to engage the 
interest of young people in the rich range of artistic experience available through 
opera. On the other hand, if opera has become part of the learners’ habitual 
vocabulary, then he or she may engage with it on the same terms as the rest of their 
educational and cultural experience. So it is not enough to provide children with 
random experiences at a particular age: e.g. one trip to the theatre between the ages 
of 12 and 14. It is not about ticking boxes. Thus, research participants who were less 
optimistic about the art educational prospects of Curriculum for Excellence, and who 
recognised how important to self-development an educated appreciation of arts is, 
also feared that occasional or superficial exposure to arts is insufficient for such 
purposes. In particular, one policy maker argued:  
I think it’s important that we start to embed an appreciation of the arts, an 
understanding of the arts, as young as possible. We encourage children to draw from a 
very early age and possibly dance and other things; use music, musical instruments. 
But we never seem in the primary school anyway, maybe even secondary school, to put 
that in context and say what it is the arts are about. What’s the culture of the arts, 
what’s the history of the arts, why is it important to you, what do you enjoy about it. 
There’s no debate for that, there’s no space for that. And then we wonder why we 
haven’t got audiences, necessarily the numbers we’d like, or an appreciation of culture 
and arts generally in our society. But we’ve not put any space. 
In brief, this research participant says that current educational policies have not 
provided enough space for the appreciation of the arts and education in the arts. A 
related question, then, is that of what Curriculum for Excellence has provided space 
for. The answer seems to be, as already indicated, that educational space has mostly 
been devoted to the alleged economic needs of society, as many research participants 
emphasised. It would therefore once again seem that arts education has come to 
mean education through the arts: indeed, not even so much education through arts 
education, but training in or through artistic skills. As already suggested, in line with 
the views of many research participants, arts might well have a cross-curricular 
function by assisting knowledge of other kinds; but it should not be concluded from 
this that arts should be mainly focused on the promotion of skills out-with artistic 






The four capacities that Curriculum for Excellence is constructed around and seeks 
to promote –namely, successful learning, individual confidence, responsible 
citizenship and effective contribution– were regularly cited as key benefits or 
products of participating in the arts. The policy-makers interviewed seemed 
confident that these four capacities could be effectively promoted by arts in Scottish 
education, providing an efficient way of getting the most out of the various arts. One 
policy-maker even regarded such potential benefits of arts as distinctive of them. 
Precisely, it was held that arts might promote all four capacities at the same time 
(whereas other subjects may only contribute to only one or some of these capacities, 
or have to be delivered in an artificial way in order in order to bring out the other 
capacities). A director of education expressed sympathy with the role of arts in 
promoting the aims of Curriculum for Excellence capacities in the following words: 
‘if we concentrate in terms of those four capacities and how we deliver those four 
capacities, then I think there’s an excellent future for the arts’. However, when the 
researcher asked research participants to offer examples of what they had in mind in 
this respect, they invariably came up with examples that reflected the instrumental 
spirit so far identified. In this view, arts may be practically useful in helping learners 
develop e.g. their social, teamwork, presentation and public performance skills 
through taking part in choirs, performing on the stage or playing in an orchestra. 
Quite a few policy makers referred to the work of cultural coordinators who tried to 
inspire pupils to take part in artistic competitions and exhibitions as potential 
competitors or exhibitors. As a councillor said: 
I think it [arts] can create confidence in children. We did an interesting project with 
arts. We have five cultural arts co-ordinators who work in our schools and we had the 
travelling bus exhibition. And we had a number of primary schools who, over a period 
of months and led by the arts cultural co-ordinators did an exhibition. They actually 
created the artworks – and this was printing and this was drawing and this was 
painting and this was sculpture. It was very interesting talking to the children as to 
what effect this project had had on them. And quite a number said ‘we didn’t think we 
could even paint, we didn’t even think we could do art’. So they gained enormous self-
confidence by the end of the project that it was something they could achieve, and they 
could get a lot of pleasure from a feeling of great self-fulfilment and this was something 
which would last them and could last them all their lives, it was a lesson learnt which 






In this regard the Curriculum for Excellence capacity of ‘confident individuals’ 
tended to be the most highlighted, because getting involved in a whole range of the 
arts, or arts involvement as such, might help people become increasingly more 
confident, either individually or collectively, by expressing themselves through 
aesthetic experience and artistic creativity. An important focus here is on the 
satisfaction of achievement, either in connection with a piece of work produced by 
the pupil, or through a good relationship built up with peers. As a policy maker 
stated: 
 It’s to do with this confidence-based experience and that is so important. And having 
an encouragement to do a task is really important as well. So having a child who thinks 
they can’t do a piece of sculpture and they’re taken away and given some papier-mâché 
and given lots of ideas and given the confidence that they can actually create 
something. And then they create something and then they paint and they think ‘gosh 
that does look like a bird, I could do that, that’s a bird’. And that makes them a 
successful learner, successful in their own eyes and successful in their teacher’s eyes, 
and successful in their peers’ eyes. Very important. 
Thus, this ‘satisfaction’ of achievement in arts apparently builds general self-esteem 
or confidence in addition to any successful learning, and hopefully generates interest 
in other subjects as well. This capacity of successful learning was also the one most 
closely associated with the cross-curricular function of the arts. Claims for this 
potential of the arts have already been cited; but another example comes from those 
policy makers who argued that a big educational benefit from literature is literacy, 
mainly through increase of vocabulary. Such broadening of linguistic knowledge was 
held to increase the general capacity to learn and the confidence to express one’s 
‘self’. Reference to Scots as tending to be ‘very reticent or shy about expressing 
themselves’ was frequent. It was often claimed that being encouraged to express 
themselves would make Scots feel better about themselves, irrespective of their 
intellectual or other abilities.  
A few policy-makers referred to another aspect of being a successful learner through 
the arts: that being a successful artistic learner should involve having an appreciation 
of the arts, given the connection between learning of the arts and arts appreciation. 
Thus, the emphasis seemed to be on artistic learning that was not just a matter of 






examples of this they would usually just state how pleasant appreciation of arts can 
be, and would eventually refer back to participation in arts and other aesthetic 
activities – finally returning to the connection of arts to other non-artistic knowledge 
and to the cross-curricular function of arts. A typical example of this from the 
interviews is as follows: 
Interviewer: Could you bring an example? How by appreciating a piece of art we 
make a learner successful? And what is the benefit of this? 
Interviewee: Yes. One way of doing it is by listening to music. This could be a 
symphony orchestra; it could be a small group of musicians who are rooted in the local 
culture. I would say, start with what you know and then eventually develop to the 
orchestra and see if people will want that. In terms of appreciation of pictures, 
paintings and architecture, start with your local community. Look at the architecture of 
your local community; find out more about why buildings have been built in a kind of 
particular way; look at the relationship between function and form; start to get people 
interested in these kind of things. Get people to appreciate dance. Again when it comes 
to dance it is probably better for them, instead of standing back and admiring, in the 
first instance it’s better for them to become directly involved. And I would go as far as 
to say that appreciation of, for example, athletic movement – and speaking to someone 
from Greece for whom the history of athleticism should be part of your, is part of your 
culture – I‘m thinking of the relationship between, for example, playing football 
gracefully and appreciating football. But I believe that you can look at football and the 
way people play football, and see art, appreciate art. For example, you just need to 
look at someone like Thierry Henry, who is the most graceful athlete. Look at someone 
like, for example, Carl Lewis, the athlete, and again appreciate movement. But in order 
to develop that in a young person, probably the quickest way is to get them to 
participate themselves, so that it’s not at a distance, but that it’s relevant to their 
experience. 
Successful artistic learning experience was also described as the experience of 
appreciating or critiquing, not only of performing. For example, it was claimed that a 
song about Nelson Mandela could be the stimulus for discussion of peace and human 
rights. Again, role-playing in drama classes could give learners the opportunity to 
discuss topics such as bullying or drugs or gender. The arts were sometimes 
described by research participants as good stimuli for discussion and debate amongst 
pupils. Various arts might encourage them to think about the subjects and themes of 
art, the reasons why artworks were created and the contexts in which they were 
created. Such reflection may develop appreciation of a range of social and cultural 
themes and therefore some sense of social and political responsibility. This was one 






In connection with this capacity, it was noted that many public arts projects had 
engaged with children and young people, giving them some insight into what 
citizenship might mean. When these young people were next creating e.g. a flower 
bed in a housing scheme, or painting a mural on a wall, they might feel responsible 
for it, since they’ve had an input; in which case it is less likely to be vandalized, 
because they might well feel more protective and responsible. So, such ‘artistic’ 
projects might well provide a way of creating ‘responsible citizens’. Such projects 
are about making young people aware of their social or cultural surroundings in ways 
that might instil a sense of community pride.  
Another interesting perspective on the capacity of ‘responsible citizen’ was that of 
developing ‘diplomatic’ skills through the arts. Multicultural schools and societies 
may discover a common language through the arts that will allow learners to 
exchange cultural experiences. Pupils from different ethnic backgrounds within a 
particular school might learn from each other by sharing the arts of their respective 
cultures. This potential of the Arts was often described by participants as a ‘soft 
diplomatic skill’ that might serve to break down social barriers in an educationally 
significant way. And, of course, such exchange of cultural experiences is not only 
about the development of skills, but a way of appreciating the history and heritage of 
other nations and countries. Folk dance was frequently cited as a means of learning 
about other cultures. 
Another frequently mentioned way of developing the capacity of ‘responsible pupil’, 
and perhaps eventually citizen, would be through collective activities. Being a 
member of a team means that one has to co-ordinate one’s activities with those of 
others: for example to co-operate in projects, by acting for the good of the team 
rather than selfishly and so on. In this respect, collective activities may build a 
variety of social skills and capacities. By way of example, a policy maker stated: 
Absolutely, and that’s very much the case in drama isn’t it? And there’s something for 
everyone in drama; you don’t have to be on the stage, you can be backstage. There’s a 
whole range of skills that you learn there... so creativity and both individual creativity, 






And, as already mentioned, creativity may also engender confidence – in which case 
effective contribution, complements the idea of confident individuals. As the 
majority of the research participants argued, if children are confident they can readily 
take part in debates, in music, or in drama festivals. As a result, they can also 
contribute to their community, or their society, or their country. Another policy 
maker added:  
Well, stimulating creativity to make pupils more creative in education, there’s a school 
of thought that considers enhanced creativity in pupils as a stepping-stone to creating 
adults more developed for entering the working world. A more creative person is 
considered to be a more efficient person. 
To be sure, developing a creatively active role for pupils was not considered an easy 
task. Research participants thought that the best way to do this is to relate arts and 
other subjects to the every-day experiences of children. Creating the right context for 
learning in and through the arts is clearly very important. It enables pupils to make 
clear connections between their experiences and may effectively stimulate them 
towards fresh or novel experiences. That is why two already mentioned aspects of 
experience were so important to the interviewees: popular culture and technology. 
Everyday situations may also involve relationships with other people or situations 
like the following:  
Active role in the school but everyday situations. You know, designing an office, 
designing a school. Use of colour, use of space, use of shape. All these kind of things, 
very important. You could say the same about mathematics, of course, that’s very 
important. So if they learn about art and how to design something new, when they have 
finished being a student and they are buying a house, they’re going to decorate it 
better. They’re going to choose more adventurous colours, they’re going to have a 
critical eye for pattern, for putting furniture in certain places, for choosing furniture, 
because they have an understanding of design and the look that they want. So these 
things are actually helping people to use these skills throughout their lives, and that’s 
part of a life-long learning. 
To develop skills that contribute to life-long creative learning was said to be very 
important, especially in modern societies in which life, working and economic 
situations are prone to rapid change. One example suggested by a policy maker was 
that people may start off on one job, perhaps working in a supermarket, but then 






then, in five years’ time, construction becomes more efficient, because everything is 
made in a factory and assembled on site by machines. Under such circumstances, 
people need to demonstrate creative adaptability or retrain in order to acquire the 
knowledge needed in the new working environment. Thus, interviewees were 
generally of the view that teachers faithfully following Curriculum for Excellence 
guidelines ought to try to develop adaptable young people who are also ambitious, 
confident, and in possession of the required skills and personal qualities for effective 
performance of their jobs. Indeed, it was emphasised that such essential skills and 
attributes as ambition, self-respect, drive – qualities that arts may help to build – 
were closely connected, if not actually presupposed by the four capacities of 
Curriculum for Excellence. 
In general, communication and creative skills do seem to be regarded as more 
important than they were in the past. Creativity and innovation, enterprise and 
culture are all viewed by Curriculum for Excellence as ways of stimulating and 
enhancing the quality and relevance of Scottish education. In this way, educational 
emphasis on creative development may therefore serve to stimulate business and 
economic development. Moreover, a more creative person is considered to be a more 
efficient and thoughtful person. In the words of a policy maker:  
Creativity and education could stimulate an entrepreneurial atmosphere in Scotland 
and stimulate the small to medium-sized enterprises in Scotland at the moment, of 
which there is quite a strong base. The key thing is to get Scotland competing at an 
international level. So by ensuring that creativity is stimulated in education, through 
the Arts, it will impact upon other aspects of the pupils’ lives, either if it’s dance or 
physical education they’re taking part in, so long as their creative mindset is being 
developed and stimulated. Then it is thought, and I would tend to agree with it, that it 
will, as I say, impact upon other aspects of their lives and determination to succeed. 
The way in which they approach problems, find solutions for them, the way they 
interact out-with the educational environment, in society as a whole. So that’s the most 
important thing.  
To this extent, the four capacities of Scottish Curriculum of Excellence do seem to 
focus on educational achievements beyond mere qualifications and on ways to 
educate and/or train young people for life and work. Thus, contemporary Scottish 
education appears to be making a serious effort to lay the foundations of an 






these belong the world of work, to their family lives or to their leisure time. Whether 
such ambition is feasible or not is another issue. What this part of the thesis has 
sought to explore is the spirit and the motives behind the new curriculum policy. In 
this respect, creative industries, technology, skills and socially valued capacities were 
described by many interviewees as ‘the single key priority area’ of a creative 
Scotland for arts and all other areas of the curriculum. 
10.3.3 Arts and moral power 
However, given this representation of arts as having such an instrumental and 
versatile role, and in light of the researcher’s research interests, research participants 
were also asked whether arts might have any potential for moral education. The 
researcher did not want to influence the research participants by leading them to a 
necessarily positive answer. In consequence, she asked interviewees to respond to the 
more radical claim that arts (such as literature, music and cinema) may sometimes – 
if not always – serve to corrupt the morals of the young.  
In this regard, some research participants focused on popular art, defending it as a 
way in which young people might achieve identity and expression, allowing them to 
form groups of like-minded peers. Such groups could enable valuable feelings of 
‘belonging’ to social groups that had their own identities and cultures. Many research 
participants also claimed that society cannot prevent the more popular modes of 
expression of young people:  
You will never stop young people wanting to express their view, wanting to have 
something that belongs to them. And that’s why art, fashion, music, films, have always 
developed because young people want their own identity. Rock ‘n roll, heavy metal, 
punk rock, all the disco music, eh, house music, garage music, all these things are 
young people wanting their own identifiable art. OK? So that will always happen. In 
terms of morals, in terms of the content, I would have said that throughout history art 
has been pushing morals – it’s been pushing the boundary of morals.  
But it was also pointed out that pushing moral boundaries does not necessarily mean 
moral corruption. With regard to school there would seem to be a degree of 
censorship already in the kinds of art to which young people are exposed. In 






ways of expression for young people that are not just a matter of peer pressure or 
following the status quo. Indeed, popular and other arts may well enable critical 
questioning of the social and other circumstances in which young people find 
themselves, even of challenging their own popular cultures. It was often argued by 
the research participants that such artistic questioning is a vitally important part of 
learning, growing up and developing one’s own ideas, values, and philosophies. That 
said, people are often presented with opposing viewpoints in the arts. Since the 
morally good and bad may be both present in the same works, who is to decide 
what’s good and what’s bad? Are young people capable of discerning this for 
themselves or do they need to be taught? Interestingly, research participants claimed 
that arts, no less than other curriculum subjects – contain or lay down certain 
(objective?) values and standards for flourishing lives, which young people may 
discover either by careful instruction or through exercise of their own critical 
faculties. Thus, what some research participants advocated for Scottish arts education 
is a general widening of learners’ opportunities and perspectives – including moral 
perspectives.  
To be sure, it was recognised that there must be some ‘censorship’ in schools, in so 
far as it was generally felt (for example) that ‘filth and pornography’ are not 
conducive to educational flourishing. In addition, artistic portrayal of excessive 
violence was regarded by some research participants as unhelpful to the development 
of young people; not least visually depicted violence on film or television. It was 
sometimes claimed that such depictions can lead to a desensitisation of younger and 
older people alike. In this respect, a councillor argued: 
You stop feeling, you stop reacting, it becomes normal, average, it doesn’t feel painful 
any longer and I think that is a very dangerous state to be in, and I think that children 
are very vulnerable indeed, and I think it can be harmful to them. So I think the 
portrayal of violence has to be used in a very careful and disciplined way with young 
people.  
However, the majority of the research participants were reluctant to deny young 
people – in the name of censorship – exposure to anything worth calling art, arguing 
instead that education should help them judge the difference between morally good 






 I’m sure if you were to go back and look at what the church said about the arts –
perhaps a couple of centuries ago – they would be worried that by reading certain texts 
and getting involved in certain pursuits, the morals of young people would be 
corrupted. I think there are much, much broader – what’s the best word? A much 
broader approach to these things these days. 
A balanced exposure to artistic expression is an important part of education because 
the morally good and the morally bad are integral to any experience of human life 
that inevitably includes both. Such exposure may indeed assist young people to cope 
with morally bad things, as well as to reject them. The general view of participants 
seemed to be that cinema, literature etc, are not in themselves bad or good: rather, 
they are opportunities to be used in either morally educational positive or negative 
ways. To be sure, it was also admitted that it might be better to provide young people 
with artistic experiences that are not overly distressing or shocking, especially since 
some of them – in terms of their psychological and emotional development – may be 
ill-equipped to deal with these. Children may come from back-grounds which are 
fragile and dysfunctional, so that they should not be presented with images that may 
exacerbate their already damaged emotional and psychological condition. In this 
respect, a policy maker stated  
Now, can I think of images which would be shocking? Yes I can. Can I think of images 
that can corrupt? I think you’re then into a philosophical discussion about whether the 
image has the power to corrupt or whether the response from the individual is that 
which corrupts.  
The same policy maker referred to films by directors Scorsese and Tarantino that 
he/she considered to be artistic masterpieces and to have many commendable 
qualities – but which also, on the other hand, contained scenes of sex and violence 
that might have some potential to de-sensitise or ‘corrupt’. 
Overall, however, when research participants were asked if and how artworks might 
assist students’ moral education, or help to make them critical moral thinkers, the 
general answer was mainly in the terms of promotion of the four Curriculum for 
Excellence capacities, and in turn through offering pupils opportunities to take part in 
various artistic performances. Since some critical discussion of this perspective has 






point. However, a suggested general argument that the arts may nurture the creative 
spirit of children or young people is clearly an interesting one here, given it may 
have significant moral educational implications beyond those generally entertained 
by research participants. For example, one policy maker did suggest that such artistic 
creativity is what an arts programme should be doing and that this is the important 
and essential contribution of arts, given that it is not necessarily – or in the same way 
– encountered in the study of science, history or maths. Moreover, this was suggested 
as central to what it means to be artistically creative. To create effective and affecting 
art, someone needs to be very sensitive to human emotion. Both the ‘artist’ and the 
audience need to be able to empathise and understand how they conceive and react to 
the world. The role of art in understanding and exploring human relationships would 
sometimes be stressed in this respect. For example, one policy maker mentioned that 
many of the operas of Mozart and his contemporaries profoundly explored moral 
issues around human relationships, freedom, sexuality and so on. Nevertheless, when 
the researcher asked this policy maker to give a realistic present-day educational 
example of this and to say how this might be a consequence of witnessing an artwork 
such as opera, he answered:  
 If you are studying a play for the theatre, you’re studying that in English, and you’re 
looking at how that writer produced the dialogue, produced the situations. You’re 
learning how to communicate, how to use language, how to write language in a way 
that communicates particular feelings. The educational value is in terms of how people 
can develop characters through what they say, what they do. How do people construct 
a novel, now that’s a very important skill to learn The ways that what people say and 
do are connected and how, if you’re writing a play or writing a film script, the way that 
people say things and the language that they use, the actual words that they use, can 
tell you a lot about a person. It can infer a lot about a person. You can draw a 
conclusion about a person. Now I have seen very interesting learning and teaching 
through a class watching ‘Friends’, the television programme ‘Friends’. So children 
watch it daily, but what they can learn if the English teacher talks about it? What they 
can learn is how does Joey’s character, how is it developed by what he says, what he 
does – and because of the way Joey acts, what might you think his past life was? What 
might you think he will do next? A young person should be able to imagine that kind of 
thing based on the character of Joey or the character of Monica. What has made 
Monica so tidy? So demanding in terms of a clean, tidy house. Why is she like that? 
What maybe happened in her past life? That’s quite important for young people to be 
able to think through these things. 
And when the researcher asked whether ‘Friends’ the soap opera could be considered 






from a dramatic point of view or from an artistic perspective: in this way, yes, it can 
be art. And with particular reference to ‘Friends’ he added:  
So it is, it’s a piece of art from there, because you have a situation, you have 
characters, you have scenery, you have the clothes that they wear. Why do they choose 
these clothes? The costume designer looks at the character of Monica and says what 
kind of clothes would that person wear? So you’re right. That’s where art and design 
can meet the English department.  
At all events, the majority of the research participants were inclined to say at some 
point that arts do have some moral educational significance. Many said that the arts 
can take audiences to more ‘elevated’ places and to heights of delight and mystery: 
they spoke of an ‘awakening’ that may happen when people encounter great arts. It 
was often particularly said that people can be moved by arts to great emotion – and 
that arts may be underused in this role. However, one policy-maker put this point as 
follows: 
There is also a dimension that I would like to raise, and that is that in my opinion the 
arts are under-used in their capacity to influence positively disturbed and vulnerable 
young people. And again, I would argue that rather than promoting an appreciation, 
you know, art appreciation, in the first instance what I would be doing is trying to get 
young people to express themselves. In other words to do, to be involved in drama, to 
be involved in physical activity, to be involved in the use of the voice.  
This view was again common amongst those interviewed and seems once again to 
accord with the capacities-led spirit of Curriculum for Excellence. Thus, once again, 
it seemed that for many of those interviewed, the way to stimulate discussion of 
morally significant issues in schools was to make an issue the subject of a piece of 
drama or role-playing and to use the arts merely as a vehicle for moral discussion. By 
and large, interviewees seemed to suppose that the point of arts is that pupils might 
learn better about a moral or other issue in an artistically active way rather than 
through passively reading about it. Furthermore, using drama and role play was 
argued to help children appreciate better what it would have been like in another era, 
country, or in a particular culture that artistic representation can bring to life. Still, 
although this perspective may seem to resemble the view of arts as morally 
educational that has been defended elsewhere in this thesis, there are clearly 






of arts to communicate significant ideas about or aspects of human life, the 
prevailing tendency was to see life relevant art-forms as only contingent vehicles for 
the expression of such themes and ideas, rather than as the essential forms or 
embodiments of intrinsically significant artistic content, But it is surely not, as 
argued elsewhere, that a Wilfred Owen (1920) poem expresses some war theme that 
might be expressed in other terms elsewhere; but that the theme or experience of war 
in the poetry of Owen is one that could only be expressed in that form by that 
particular poem. In fact, a favourite example of research participants was Second 
World War themes in which children might take on different historical roles of the 
time and act out what it would be like to be an evacuee sent away from home to live 
with strangers, to carry your gas mask, and so on. But such role-play is used only to 
illustrate information available in other forms (perhaps in a history text) by other 
means (as a picture might illustrate an event in a story). On the other hand, the 
Wilfred Owen poem conveys an experience that cannot be had other than through the 
poetic medium in which Owen expresses it. 
Still, it was generally argued that the arts may open up worlds to children and young 
people, different from those they may presently be experiencing. Thus, arts may offer 
insight into other ways of living that can also make a difference to the way that they 
live their lives, especially underprivileged young people who have difficult lives and 
limited prospects. Some policy makers actually said that arts might bring much 
vision and hope into such limited lives. For example, those children who may be 
trapped in abusive family or other relationships may read a book or see a film and 
suddenly realise that their experience is not normal or acceptable; that is not what 
everyone does, and that things need not be like this; that violence and abuse and 
disrespect should not be a part of their lives. The artistic presentation of some 
problematic social issues such as alcohol abuse may help children appreciate and 
understand some negative aspects of life in a critical and constructive way. It was 
suggested that harnessing the positive educational uses of arts in such a way can be 
the most constructive way of promoting the moral education of students. However, 
although research participants could understand the moral potential of arts, their 






Whereas in their ‘theoretical’ reflections, arts were often accorded some non-
instrumental value, the practical examples they described invariably focused on 
instrumental value. 
Finally, a few further dimensions of moral education in or through the arts were 
mentioned. A very important point for policy makers seems to have been that pupils 
need to develop an understanding of others if they are to engage successfully in any 
sort of group activity, such as making music or performing drama. There has to be 
some element of not just self-awareness but awareness of others and of how to 
respond positively to them. This educational potential and benefit of the arts for 
group work was frequently emphasised. However, another recognised moral 
educational benefit of engagement in the arts was the development of such qualities 
as the discipline acquired in the process of learning a musical instrument or in 
submitting to the rules of an artistic project. In connection with this, a policy maker 
stated about arts:  
I think they can do all the things we talked about, they can make people – they can be a 
tool to engage pupils, they can be a way to allow students, if they’re playing an 
instrument, they can make them disciplined to learn something and to may be apply that 
same skill to learning. To reading books, appreciating books, to doing their maths –
whatever. Just getting those ... these are all good things. I don’t necessarily think music 
would make someone a better person either. I don’t think it ... in a moral sense, I think 
they’re ... if I’m going to say that it doesn’t corrupt morally, I don’t see how it can ... I 
don’t know, it’s difficult. I don’t think the arts necessarily corrupts the mind, I don’t 
know either whether it makes someone morally better, but I think it can make you ... if 
it’s used well it’s something that can give you the skills to be creative; to be critical 
learners.  
10.3.4 Seizing the moment of fun 
In sum, arts were described as of having the potential to convey various sorts of 
knowledge and to help learners develop a wide variety of skills. Nonetheless, there is 
another highlighted dimension of the arts to which the majority of the research 
participants referred: precisely, the hedonic, sensory or kinaesthetic pleasure that 
results from, and through, fun in the arts. For children to be able to appreciate and 
enjoy music, or art, or dance, or drama – was regarded as a psychologically healthy 






fact that it can bring about pleasure and relaxation, or help them to relieve the 
pressures of other aspects of their lives, was generally applauded by interviewees. In 
short, the pleasure of arts for some people is clearly escapism, and this may also have 
positive therapeutic value. Quite a few policy makers and cultural coordinators 
stressed that the arts can give children, intense feelings of pleasure, satisfaction and 
joy that might not be so readily found in other classes. And of course it was widely 
argued that if children are not enjoying their learning, there is little hope of their 
becoming life-long learners. Arts could therefore be described as the ‘enjoyment in 
Curriculum for Excellence’. A policy maker commented:  
To see primary school children dancing and running around and they feel so free and 
so in touch with their whole bodies. And the fact that their bodies are in space in a 
position and the movement and their little faces all light up – and that is an absolutely 
fantastic experience which is particular to dancing and particular to the arts 
experience. And that’s the way we should look at arts in our schools. 
However, this dimension of the arts reminded the researcher and the research 
participants of two problematic terms in the Scottish curriculum that have been much 
criticized by educators, other commentators and other members of the general public. 
Even some research participants were unsympathetic to these terms in so far as they 
sound vague and are not readily susceptible to practical assessment. The general 
view may be represented in the following words of a policy maker:  
Somebody said a very derogatory remark, about the writing and the expressive arts 
outcomes because the writers had mentioned something about the magic and wonder of 
the arts. And they felt this was all very hippy-hippy, you know, flowery sort of language. 
And yet, if you sit and look at a child’s face when they are either watching a 
performance or engaged in a performance; they are just so totally drawn into it and 
thoroughly enjoying it. It is magic, it is wonder to a young child, and I don’t think we 
should put it down.  
10.4 Magic and wonder in the arts: concluding remarks  
Magic and wonder may be vague and ambiguous expressions; but at the same time 
magic and wonder in the arts is largely what this thesis is all about. Indeed, the 
philosophical part of this thesis has attempted to clarify more precisely what 
constitutes the magic and wonder of the arts, and consequently of arts education. 






formation of children and young people has been precisely related in this thesis to 
their power to communicate humanly significant knowledge, in particular moral 
understanding of emotion, character and virtue. On the other hand, the practical 
research of this thesis has indicated that contemporary educational policies have 
tended to point in other directions. Current policy seems to value the arts in the rather 
more utilitarian terms as indicated in this chapter.  
 
That said, in this research, the initial question ‘Does Scottish educational policy 
development accord much significance to the arts (and to what extent)?’ has attracted 
a generally affirmative response from research participants. Scottish educational 
policy development does indeed accord much significance to the arts. Moreover, arts 
do seem to be appreciated as useful tools to build those skills and capacities that are 
needed for pupils in their work and life. Arts are regarded as pleasant and pleasurable 
means of giving learners ‘a chance to succeed’ – as one policy maker argued: to 
succeed precisely through successful participation in active individual and group 
presentations and performances. Such participation is a source of hedonic pleasure, 
but also purportedly of the satisfaction of achievement that yields confidence and 
other psychological benefits (though, of course, it is also arguable that this would 
require empirical proof). To be sure, one reservation here might be that there are 
many learners who are not at all artistically talented and who therefore do not 
experience such enjoyment in artistic participation. However, arts may also be used 
as vehicles of other curricular knowledge and therefore have a cross-curricular 
function as well. In this regard, the first conclusion from this research would be that 
arts are generally regarded by arts policy makers as important in the various ways 







Figure 10.3 Turning the scale in favour of education through the arts. 
This figure represents the standard view of research participants on the educational 
significance of arts. There is a clear focus on education through the arts, though 
education in the arts may still take place in the context of projects wherein pupils 
might participate and express themselves creatively through performances and 
presentations. Most importantly for policy makers, education through the arts may 
help pupils to make significant educational connections between different curriculum 
areas, as well as between education and everyday life: e.g. in getting to know their 
own and other cultures through festivals, ceilidhs etc. According to research 
participants, however, the main educational requirement seems to be the training of 
people in the various skills needed for life and work. For most interviewees, 
moreover, training for life appeared to be equivalent to the development of the four 
Curriculum for Excellence capacities, already much discussed. In this respect, the 
new Scottish curriculum is arguably a curriculum that focuses on training more than 
education; though the arts are equally valued alongside other subjects, especially in 
so far as they assist the achievement of skills and capacities with particular respect to 
so-called creative learning. But to that extent, the answer to the second main question 






in healthy human formation?’ would seem to be that it has primarily instrumental 
worth. In fact, its main role would seem to be that of contributing to the creative and 
cultural learning that will produce (artistic and other) skills and capacities for the 
schooling system. And, for that matter, an education or schooling system that is 
designed primarily to serve the economic needs and purposes of society (Figure 10.4) 
 
Figure 10.4 Direction of Scottish education system. 
In this respect, education does not serve the arts for their own sake, but the arts are 
conceived as serving an instrumental function in education. In short, the arts do not 
serve education in any distinctive way, but only in a manner that is largely common 
to or shared by other subjects: that of preparing learners/trainees for a competitive 
globalised economy. This was explicitly held to be important because Scotland was 
described as a little country that needs to compete economically with other countries.  
Thus, physically performing and participating were generally supposed to offer ways 
to promote creativity and self-expression for the first three common levels of arts 
education, and if learners chose to proceed further in the arts then they could have 
further training. Such uses of the arts also seemed to support use of the Scottish 
curricular term ‘Expressive Arts’ in its thinking about arts education. However, even 






participants tended to associate arts with wider culture and other forms of creativity. 
This often resulted in broader definitions of art. That said, broader definitions would 
be sometimes too inclusive to the extent of confusing the artistic with (more general 
notions of) creativity or the aesthetic. The distinction between the artistic and the 
aesthetic has been explored in other chapters of this thesis in which it has been 
argued that: i) not all aesthetic beauty and value is a matter of art; and ii) not all 
artworks may have aesthetic value or intent. This distinction would seem to be at 
some odds with the view of many research participants who claimed that anything, 
such as cookery, graffiti, football and so on, may be regarded as genuine art. Such 
confusion is arguably problematic in so far as it is liable to lead to: i) more 
instrumental use of some arts, such as using dance as a pleasant form of exercise; 
and/or ii) inclusion of some activities in arts education that are of debatable artistic 
significance, such as cooking, sport or some technologically based activities of little 
actual artistic value. For example, according to the arguments of this thesis, and 
despite the grain of truth that it contains, there would seem to be significant 
objections to the promotion of genuine arts education through, for example, a class 
watching the television programme ‘Friends’. Here, the soap opera ‘Friends’ may 
well be used by a teacher to provide a pleasant or ‘light’ lesson, and could stimulate 
students to develop and exercise certain skills, but it seems more doubtful whether 
this would qualify as significant ‘arts education’. Such ‘arts education’ may well lead 
to people with certain (perhaps limited) skills, or to people who had some pleasant 
moments at school, but it seems less likely to lead in any significant sense to 
‘artistically educated’ people.  
 
In this respect, there may seem to be some contradiction between the four basic 
values mentioned initially in Curriculum for Excellence guidelines and the four 
capacities at which the guide aims. This is to say that the values or virtues of 
wisdom, justice, compassion and integrity really require the sort of reflective 
(Aristotelian) moral knowledge and understanding for which this thesis has argued. 
But in the way that the four Curriculum for Excellence capacities have been 
characterised in: i) the curriculum guidelines; ii) the outcomes of the pilot of the new 






is not obvious that being a successful learner, confident individual, responsible 
citizen and effective contributor is quite the same as being an agent of moral wisdom, 
justice, compassion and integrity. Indeed, the principles that seem to govern current 
Scottish education policies seem rather to reflect the utilitarian spirit of present day 
pragmatic, economic and consumerist values. In this regard, the main curricular 
space made by the current Scottish curriculum for arts seems to be for the promotion 
of practical or craft knowledge and skills of potential social and economic utility 
(Figure 10.5). 
 
Figure 10.5 The mechanism of policy influences. 
While such emphases mean that the arts are accorded an important role in the current 
Scottish curriculum, it seems that arts education in any more substantial sense has a 
less secure place. Drawing a general distinction between use of artistic means of 
expression and education in the arts, it seems that artistic modes of training are not 
at all the same thing as arts education. Some policy makers did indeed notice that 
current policies have provided little space for the actual appreciation of arts and 
education in the arts; a view that this study confirms. In this regard, opportunities to 






curriculum arguably lacks planned space for the kind of regular and systematic 
exposure to arts that might contribute to real arts education. Clearly, financial 
concerns are a hugely influential factor. Many cultural coordinators and policy 
makers pointed out that it is cheaper to organise group performances (by the pupils) 
rather than visit an arts venue or invite an arts company to the school. Collective 
activities, therefore, are often favoured for utilitarian purposes (a cost effective 
approach). Nevertheless, even if the school does invite an arts company, inclusive 
activities that involve audience participation are preferred. However, this approach 
overlooks a major aspect of artistic activity. The majority of works of arts are not 
created with practical or utilitarian outcomes in mind. Art-works should primarily be 
opportunities to explore artistic ideas or expression, and as such be objects of 
contemplation more than practical utility.  
In conclusion, the philosophical part of this research has argued that arts can be 
important sources of educationally valuable moral and other knowledge, 
understanding and insight. Research participants often mentioned the possibility of 
using artworks as tools to develop skills with ethical implications or consequences, 
such as team-work skills. In addition, a significant majority agreed with the idea that 
arts have some power to influence or educate learners’ emotions. However, when 
asked to cite examples of this, they would again emphasise the importance of 
children or young people participating in performances and presentations rather than 
appreciating artworks. As already argued, such perspectives may result in 
problematic educational, curricular and cultural tendencies. For example, one festival 
manager and policy maker interviewed for this research claimed that the number of 
young people playing music in Scotland is probably unprecedentedly high, and yet 
audiences at concerts are in decline. Occasionally, policy makers would refer to 
evaluation and appreciation of ‘art’; but this would usually mean the evaluation and 
appreciation of learners’ own work or that of their peers. Such a limited view of 
evaluation and appreciation presents two dangers. Firstly, there is the danger of over-
focus once again on the development of skills (or on the technical aspects of a work). 
Secondly, however, there is the danger that with over-focus on the productive side of 






the education of children in schools. Thus, the answer to the third main research 
question of this study of ‘Does policy development in Scottish arts education 
recognise the full educational potential of the arts?’, may be less positive than it has 
so far seemed in so far as the full educational potential of the arts would mean 
exploration of the epistemic and moral aspects of arts through proper academic 
exposure to them in schools. Moreover, this conclusion would seem to have some 
implications for the first research question of ‘Does Scottish educational policy 
development accord much significance to the arts?’ (and to what extent), in so far as 
any initial affirmative response to this question may reflect an unduly narrow 
perception of arts education. On a broader view, the policy development of Scottish 
arts education does not seem to appreciate the full educational potential of the arts, 
since it neglects too many significant dimensions of the arts. In sum, Scottish 
educational policy development does accord some significance to the arts, but by no 
means enough. Most importantly, what is excluded is reference to a distinctive 
curricular role of the arts that would justify a central place for them in the healthy 
educational formation of young and old.  
In particular, it has been a main aim of this thesis to argue that the potential of arts to 
promote significant moral knowledge, understanding and insight is one that should 
be given a central educational role in schools. In so far as one distinctive power and 
benefit of the arts is to enhance understanding of the world, human relationships and 
the place of humans in the world, such knowledge can play an important part in the 
formation of human moral character. It would appear from the research for this thesis 
that this role of arts education has not been taken nearly seriously enough by 
contemporary Scottish policy makers. If it was taken more seriously, it might 
possibly help bridge the evident shortfall between the four Curriculum of Excellence 
values of wisdom, justice, compassion and integrity, and the four capacities of 
successful learning, individual confidence, responsible citizenship and effective 
contribution so celebrated in this initiative.  
However, the overall conclusion of this chapter is that arts can play a major 
educational role in at least two significant ways: the first as envisaged by 






argued for in this thesis, as an important contributor to wider moral and other human 
development. This potential is here summed up in Figure 10.6. 
 






Chapter 11  
 
11. Closing remarks 
This chapter concludes the present work by considering some limitations of the 
study, suggesting areas for future research, summarizing the main argument of the 
thesis and finally making some recommendations for educational policy and practice 
in Scottish and wider educational contexts. 
11.1 Limitations and suggestions 
This thesis has mainly pursued a philosophical exploration of the educational value 
and place of the arts and has then sought to evaluate recent Scottish educational 
policy in the light of such exploration. Having reflected on the order of enquiry in 
this thesis I might probably, if I were to approach things again, start first with the 
practical research in order to come to the issues with a more ‘innocent eye’. 
However, I have tried throughout to be sensitive to this issue, and as far as possible 
to avoid partial perspectives and interpretations on the research questions.  
Another limitation of this research relates to the difficulty encountered in finding 
more people related to policy-making, for interview in the study. This research was 
limited to 30 research participants. Nevertheless, I believe that I was very fortunate in 
finding a good representative sample of Scottish policy makers. It is also true that the 
sample interviewed includes only Scottish policy-makers. Still, even though Scotland 
has its own education system and guidelines, it still is a country within the United 
Kingdom and may therefore be held to reflect the influences of wider British 
educational policy-making. However, future research might well seek to include 
research participants from a wider United Kingdom context. 
The Scottish Curriculum for Excellence is a new curriculum (although it is also 
continuous with and draws upon the previous Scottish curricula of 5-14 and Standard 
Grade). In so far as this is so, however, future research in this area might be 






impact on Scottish schools and on what happens in practice after schools have sought 
to implement the policy guidelines and directions. 
Indeed, another question that might be explored is that of the extent to which new 
policies do really influence school practices. It is interesting that the following view 
of a present research interviewee (cultural coordinator with permanent post in a 
council) was often endorsed:  
Technically the Curriculum for Excellence is like a kind of odd thing because if you 
were to ask a teacher what you think of the Curriculum for Excellence, they will 
probably say that they think they already do that, right, and they kind of think that I 
suppose, how would you put this, they think that it’s the government formalising, like 
giving a name to something they already do, they’re just trying to formalise it and give 
it a kind of heading. 
Similarly another interviewee:  
I think there are certainly ways of creating arts projects that absolutely tie into all four 
of the Curriculum for Excellence areas. When that first came out we all went hallelujah 
because it was what we were already doing. I mean we’ve not had to change anything 
that we do to fit in with that because what we do is already that. 
Consequently, another question is that of whether policy guidelines or the established 
practice of teachers in schools ’carry more weight’ in professional terms. In 
connection with this, if policy makers were to recognize the real potential of the arts 
for which we have argued in this thesis, the question might be that of how they could 
frame policy that would guarantee appropriate practice. It seems that the ‘root’ of the 
problem could lie in the culture and psychology of social groups such as teachers that 
may militate against the implementation of new policies. Future research might well 
seek to confirm or disconfirm whether the current state of professional educational 
practice has been influenced in the directions that the participants in this research 
believe to be reflective of Curriculum for Excellence. Such research might well 
throw considerable light on the general processes of educational policy change as 
well as upon the particular concern of this essay about developments in arts 
education. This research has of course argued for moral education through the arts, 
but it has not proposed or suggested any specific curriculum of arts that might be 






on the philosophical argument of this thesis, by attempting to conceive specific 
testable programs designed for the promotion of moral educational and other 
epistemic aspects of arts in school contexts. 
11.2 Concluding remarks and recommendations 
It is often argued by people in the media or in academia (and/or in schools) that 
people should be roundly educated. Kant (1960, p.6) stated that man becomes human 
only by education. This thesis has dealt with a variety of particular issues, but it has 
been centrally concerned to give an answer to the questions of what ‘education’ and 
(an artistically or otherwise) ‘educated’ person actually mean. It seems clear that 
while the ancient Greeks placed the educational emphasis on the intrinsic value of 
wisdom, modern day schools have focused more on the instrumental benefits of 
science and technology: the former would recognise the main value of knowledge for 
the personal formation of character, while the latter tends to emphasise the practical 
utility of socially and economically beneficial skills and other capacities (Carr, 
2010a). Some distinction between educated and merely trained people of the kind 
emphasised in modern times by the likes of Richard Peters and Paul Hirst assumes 
much significance at this point. Richard Pring (2001) also highlights some such 
distinction in arguing against the modern tendency for education (or perhaps 
schooling) to take on utilitarian purposes rather than moral purposes. Thus (ibid, 
p.101):  
the practice of education goes adrift from its moral roots – and serves particular ends 
such as economic well-being or citizenship as conceived by those in power. Secondly, 
the programmes of moral or personal and social education are isolated from the moral 
context in which they make sense. 
In the course of interviews with Scottish educational policy makers, and review of 
contemporary policies, this study has gone some way towards showing that there is 
indeed a ‘de-moralisation’ of education in Pring’s sense: that, indeed, people have 
become more and more ‘one dimensional’ in a ‘Marcusean’ sense. While a liberal 
moral education of ‘broad initiation’, of the kind envisaged by such as Peters and 






to see how such genuine education might be implemented in societies and cultures 
increasingly focused on the pursuit of material economic benefits and characterised 
by what the English poet William Wordsworth notably referred to as ‘getting and 
spending’. In such contexts, the prevailing trend is to construe schooling and the 
school curriculum in terms of the pursuit or promotion of various skills and to reduce 
‘education’ itself to some kind of paper-chase of academic qualifications. The pursuit 
of wisdom is replaced by collection of certificates. In indicating the dangers of this, 
Richard Pring (2001, pp.111–112) cites a touching poem written as a letter from a 
principal to her colleagues:  
Dear Teacher, 
I am a survivor of a concentration camp. My eyes saw what no man should 
witness: 
Gas chambers built by learned engineers. 
Children poisoned by educated physicians. 
Infants killed by trained nurses. 
Women and babies shot and burned by high school and college graduates. 
So, I am suspicious of education. 
My request is: Help your students become human.  
Your efforts must never produce learned monsters, skilled psychopaths, 
educated Eichmans. 
Reading, writing, arithmetic are important only if they serve to make our 
children more human. 
Aristotle long ago emphasised the importance of the formation of virtuous character, 
as a vital constituent of what he called happiness (eudemonia). Virtuous character, 
for Aristotle, in turn requires the kind of knowledge needed for practical wisdom 
(phronesis); in Carr’s (1991, p.59) words, ‘the moral knowledge of wisdom is a 
knowledge of how to make right moral choices’. This thesis has argued that one 
significant way in which we might equip people with the wisdom of phronesis, and 
therefore make them more human, is by educating their minds, hearts and characters 
through the arts. Having explored a variety of philosophical views on arts, the 
general conclusion of this thesis is that arts may indeed be contributory to the 
development of phronesis (the practical wisdom of virtue) as well as (if not rather 
than) techne (the productive knowledge of skill). In fact, the thesis has argued that it 
is the distinctive role of the arts, perhaps by contrast with other curricular areas, to 






emotional education is through the development of learners’ understanding and 
appreciation of the arts, rather than by developing their technical skills or promoting 
‘free expression’. Indeed, it has been argued that the major educational benefit of the 
arts is that they are able to communicate various important kinds of knowledge and 
understanding, including moral knowledge. 
It would also appear that while the arts are regarded as important in schools at the 
present day, they are not seen as important as other subjects. The policy documents 
of the new Scottish Curriculum for Excellence, as well as the research participants of 
this study, have certainly sought to emphasise how important their Expressive Arts 
are. However, both current policies and practices seem to conceive of the arts as 
serving mainly practical and utilitarian ends; they seem to observe the spirit of what 
Ball (1998, p.119) calls the ‘marketisation of education’. To this extent, they do not 
seem to be primarily appreciated in formal schooling for their cultural value and 
heritage. Curriculum for Excellence intends the arts to be used as a cross-curricular 
tool to make lessons in other subjects fun, to entertain or to promote useful skills and 
capacities. But while such aims and values are not unimportant in meeting the 
economic and other utilitarian needs of societies, they are not enough to give really 
significant meaning to a human experience in which such other values as love, 
friendship and general quality of life are no less important. Life is not all ‘getting and 
spending’, and it hardly profits a person to gain the world but lose his or her soul. 
Still, as Kristjanson (2009, p.375) reviewing McLaughlin’s (2008) work observes: 
Because we lack ‘a shared view of the meaning of life’, schools are not to be allowed to 
implant in students any ‘thick’, ‘holistic’, ‘comprehensive’ or ‘substantive’ conception 
of the human good, but only the basic procedural ‘public values’ of freedom, justice 
and autonomy (pp. 52–55). Most importantly, schools need to bring up students able to 
exercise ‘independent critical reflection and judgement’ (p. 107) and thus be ready and 
able to choose the comprehensive moral framework that fits their personal values and 
temperament. 
In this regard, it is presently important to emphasise that the arts do not dictate how 
people should live their lives, or what they should morally or otherwise do. Their 
power is not in providing propositional or even prescriptive knowledge. As argued in 






propositional knowledge; it is knowledge that serves to extend people’s cognitive 
and emotional horizons, to deepen their insights and to cultivate their sensibilities as 
civilized human beings. The arts (particularly great artworks) are beneficial, not 
because they provide easy answers to simple questions, but because they serve to 
provoke further questioning on complex human issues. In this respect, education in 
great art embodies Richard Peters insight about education generally – that to be 
educated is not to arrive at a destination, but to travel with a new view. But such 
transformation of heart and mind cannot happen only with one-off school 
experiences in the arts or by participating only in a few performances or activities. It 
also cannot happen if the arts are merely exploited to make propositional knowledge 
in scientific and other fields more enjoyable. Rather, if the full educational benefits 
of arts are to be realised, then systematic exposure to them is required. In this regard, 
Scottish education policy as exhibited in Curriculum for Excellence is arguably 
pointed in a direction that threatens to underestimate or downplay the full 
educational power and value of the arts. A comparative review of seven (Austrian, 
Berlin, Bulgarian, Greek, Catalonian, Russian and Swedish) European music 
curricula, and their philosophical underpinnings (Kokkidou, 2009), also suggests that 
these seven countries have been influenced by the modern instrumental spirit -that 
has likewise influenced Scottish educational policy (as the present study suggests)-, 
resulting at best in a focus on musical training rather than music education. So 
although the arts clearly have the potential to provide a proper curriculum balance of 
education and training, it would appear that most contemporary educational 
approaches to the arts, in Scotland and more widely, have not yet quite got the 
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Appendix B: Reason and Argument in Professional Controversy and Debate 
by David Carr (unpublished) 
Introductory remarks 
In the course of your postgraduate research work, you will need to develop and exercise 
capacities for defining and engaging in significant contemporary educational debates and 
controversies. This will involve isolating – from relevant books, papers in academic journals, 
newspaper articles and so on – a significant body of research literature or media discussion 
on a given issue, and analysing this literature to the purpose of identifying key arguments for 
and against a particular educational theory or policy. The first stage, then, is to identify a 
more extended body of literature (through, for example, pursuing the references cited in that 
article, and (as far as necessary) the references cited in those references) in order to identify 
clear arguments for and against a particular educational perspective or policy proposal.
 
However, it is important to see that any rational evaluation or assessment of such arguments 
and counter-arguments (the pros and cons) depends on some appreciation of the kinds of 
argument these are, and the sorts of grounds upon which they are made. One needs, in short, 
to appreciate that there are different sorts of arguments – such as the logical (philosophical or 
conceptual), the empirical (factual or statistical) and the normative (moral or evaluative) – 
that may well be interwoven in educational controversies or debates in highly complex ways. 
 
Logical (conceptual, philosophical) arguments 
Although much if not most educational argument is of a practical rather than theoretical 
nature – that is to say, it is concerned with what to do, rather than what to believe – it 
nevertheless needs to be appreciated that practical action is subject to logical constraints of 
internal coherence and consistency (Geach 1976) For example, if a mother asks her child to 
take the shortest way to the shops, but not to go by the canal – but the shortest way is by the 
canal – then she asks the child to do something which is not just a matter of practical 
difficulty but logical impossibility. 
 
This impossibility is sometimes hard for people to see in educational debates. In a former 
professional context, students on a BEd course were required to write an essay on curriculum 
theory in which they were asked to contrast and evaluate two (well known) views: the first 






that children of different interests and abilities should be given different sorts of content 
more suited to individual needs. It was quite common (not to say alarming) to find students 
concluding after a discussion of first one and then the other of these perspectives that the 
answer could only lie in the middle.  
The point is not, of course, that there could not be any educational debates in which some 
practical compromise might be reached (it has, for example, been argued that there are 
plausible alternatives to the apparently opposite sides often taken by educational 
traditionalists and progressives) – but rather that this is not an issue of this kind. To point out 
that there could be no coherent curriculum initiative requiring both that all children should 
follow the same curriculum, and that not all should, is not to point to a matter of practical 
difficulty (so that we might come up with a solution if we thought hard enough), but to one 
of logical impossibility (where we cannot avoid choosing either this or the opposed option). 
Some educational theories and policy initiatives may therefore be doomed to failure from the 
outset because they enshrine such prescriptive incoherences or inconsistencies. 
Such points about logic and consistency may also do something to shake us free of the 
tendency of at least some educational researchers to suppose that any genuine educational 
argument must ultimately rest on empirical evidence. For it is not at all clear (to put it 
mildly) how the gathering of data or statistics about different sorts of curriculum experience 
would help us to solve the problem (if it is one) of whether all children should be exposed to 
common or alternative curricula. How, then, might we decide? The following section may 
have a bearing on this. 
 
Normative (moral, ethical) arguments 
Arguments for this or that educational policy or strategy are clearly not just grounded in 
empirical or other evidence, but also in our values – in considerations about what we actually 
desire or think should happen. Some philosophers (so-called non-cognitivists) have thought 
that our values are purely personal and subjective and quite unrelated to (factual) 
considerations about how the world is – but this is not very plausible. At a basic level, 






circumstance: humans (more or less universally) value clean water, adequate shelter and 
medical care because life is uncomfortable or intolerable without them. That said, the 
relationship of fact to value in human affairs – and educational and other debate – is by no 
means straightforward. 
For example, order and discipline in the classroom are obviously desired by any and all 
sensible educationalists and teachers. Debates about discipline – particularly in former days 
of corporal punishment – not infrequently turned on purported evidence of the effects of 
such punishment. Thus, some would argue that corporal punishment should be retained 
because evidence showed it to be an effective deterrent; but others argued that it should be 
abolished because evidence showed that it was ineffective. However, it is important to see 
that it is not in the least inconsistent for someone to maintain that although physical 
punishment is an effective deterrent it should nevertheless be abandoned – or even, perhaps 
less obviously, to argue that although corporal punishment does not effectively deter (some 
pupils may actually seek it out) it should nevertheless be continued.  
But on what grounds could such positions be maintained? Although moral non-cognitivists 
would explain this in terms of the basic subjectivity (non-rationality) of value-preferences, it 
seems implausible to suppose that in dismissing evidence of the deterrent effects of corporal 
punishment, its opponents are being no more than unreasonable or sentimental. On the 
contrary, those who oppose physical punishment invariably argue from a morally principled 
regard for universal human rights, or from the incompatibility of certain forms of 
punishment with civilized (liberal-democratic) life and polity. Likewise, those who insist that 
although such punishment is ineffective we should retain it, will also argue (perhaps less 
obviously) on morally principled grounds of reciprocal justice (an eye for an eye). The key 
point for now is that it may be quite rational – in educational debate as elsewhere – to 
override evidence of so-called practical ‘effectiveness’ in the name of other practical 
imperatives of a normatively more compelling nature. 
 
This is not, of course, to say that moral principles are never in line with empirical evidence 
and research. To be sure, the moral case against corporal punishment may derive some 
support from evidence that corporal punishment does not work – at least for the minority of 
miscreants at which it was often primarily aimed. In addition, advocates of corporal 






For example, I have often heard teachers defend its use on the grounds that children actually 
preferred it (to, say, detention or lines): but how, one might ask, might one justify something 
as a punishment on the grounds that it was actually preferred to something less congenial ?  
Empirical (factual, statistical) argument 
All the same, we can hardly suppose that empirical evidence and research never has any 
relevance to the framing of educational policies and prescriptions – though, again, such 
relevance may not be straightforward. One recurring debate in which statistical evidence has 
often been brought to the aid of educational prescription concerns the adverse effects on 
pupil learning of large class sizes. But while it seems likely (as a matter of common sense) 
that children in large classes are unlikely to get their fair share of a teacher’s attention, any 
judgement to the effect that this must undermine their learning is unlikely to be quite value-
free. To the extent that some contemporary (anti-progressive) advocates of direct instruction 
seem to subscribe to accounts of knowledge and knowledge acquisition as largely a matter of 
information transmission, whether or not one holds that large classes are educationally 
inappropriate would appear to depend on how broadly or narrowly learning and education 
are construed. 
One should also appreciate that empirical arguments in education come in different varieties 
and forms based on different kinds of evidence. Clearly, though some educationally relevant 
statistical evidence may be concerned with physical or material conditions and resources 
(school buildings, access to facilities, safety features and so on) much if not most of it is 
likely to be of a social more then natural scientific nature. To that extent, however, the kind 
of problems with which educational researchers engage – about the effects of this or that 
teaching strategy on cognitive growth, or of a working class upbringing on achievement – 
are apt to be of a highly normative character involving essentially contested concepts and 
judgements of value. Indeed, though the authoritative tones of official policy documents – 
often themselves drawing on the ‘expertise’ of reputable educational researchers – could lull 
us into believing that this or that curriculum strategy (of, say, broad initiation) has been 
scientifically proved to be superior to others, such proposals may often be little more than 
values in thin empirical disguise. 
It also seems that different forms of social-scientific research apparently pointing in the same 






researchers of the so-called psychometric movement at one time argued that since 
intelligence is innate, children would need to be sorted for separate educational treatment in 
different sorts of schools if their different educational requirements were to be properly met. 
Again, however, some past educational sociologists argued that since working class children 
are socialised differently from middle class children, they are also likely to experience 
difficulty with the sophisticated modes of communication and instruction offered by the 
general run of middle-class teachers. An influential post-war educational theory (Bantock 
1973) used both of these views to argue that there are basically two sorts of pupils requiring 
different sorts of school curricula to meet their very different educational needs: whereas the 
children of middle-class background and status should be given one sort of (academic) 
curriculum suited to the development of their higher innate intelligence, working class 
children should be exposed (in separate schools) to alternative (vocational or technical) 
curricula better suited to their inferior ability. 
Although there are no doubt many questionable assumptions here, the key point for now is 
that it is doubtful whether these different ‘psychological’ and ‘sociological’ arguments can 
be harnessed in the same cause. Even if both are true (and there are strong reasons for 
doubting both) the first argument would seem to be at best irrelevant and at most to offer 
unhelpful support to the second in any case for separate forms of schooling. One obvious 
point is that it is doubtful whether differences of innate intelligence exactly coincide with 
those of socio-cultural class and status. What, for example, should we decide in the case of 
the not very bright scions of nobility: should they be assigned to an academic school on the 
basis of their superior (class) socialization, or to a vocational school on the basis of their low 
ability? Or, suppose we discover in the very lowest of socio-economic strata, prodigious 
mathematical talent: should such a person be sent to a vocational school on the basis of 
working class socialization, or to an academic school on the basis of mathematical genius?  
At all events, we need to be clear that we can get into just as much of a muddle between 
different sorts of (alleged) empirical evidence, as we can by mistaking conceptual truths or 
normative assumptions for empirical claims. 
Professional competences: as suitable case for analysis 
We might now briefly consider how some of these points might be brought to bear on the 
analysis of a particular recent professional educational concern – that of the pros and cons of 






of teacher professionalism? Briefly, it is the view that it is both possible and useful to 
construe any form of vocational or professional expertise in terms of a repertoire of 
(connected but separately identifiable) practical dispositions, abilities or skills which are also 
apt for measurement or evaluation against predetermined standards: indeed, the key case for 
regarding professional training in this way is that pre- or in-service teaching performance can 
be measured against a common standard (which is also why competence models are 
invariably favoured by administrators). In 1993, the SOED introduced a competence model 
into the pre-service training of Scottish teachers with these words:  
The Government considers that greater prominence than ever before should be given in 
teacher training to the securing of classroom skills and that competences in teaching 
should be the critical factor which institutions must take into account in designing 
courses.  
Although in writing on the progress of the Scottish competence initiative, Donald Christie 
(in Bryce and Humes, 2003) has written in terms that suggest that those who opposed 
competences in general and the SOED competences in particular made rather a mountain out 
of a molehill, it cannot be denied that many writers (including the present one) have 
perceived them as a threat to professional education and training – and it may therefore be 
worth asking why this is so, and what the main arguments for and against competences 
might be. In this respect, although I shall not presently pause to pursue the psychological 
case, it should be said that some of the theoretical literature (mostly against) competences 
did purport to be of an empirical kind concerned with the more practical difficulties of 
identifying discretely measurable professional dispositions and capacities in the terms 
required by competence models: in short, the key problem for competence approaches was at 
least sometimes taken to be one of practical rather than conceptual difficulty. 
Despite this, it is my own view that the key arguments against competence models were and 
are conceptual and normative rather than empirical-psychological: that the trouble with 
competences is not that they are difficult to identify for the purposes of mapping onto 
professional evaluation schedules, but that they cannot (logically) be squared with anything 
that we should (ethically or morally) want to regard as adequate professional preparation. On 
the matter of conceptual incompatibility with professionalism, for example, Christie follows 
a common line that the SOED Guidelines (in particular) were essentially reconcilable with 
the best practices of professional teacher preparation. However, although something 
undoubtedly hangs on what is here regarded as good professional practice, it would seem to 






exercise individual autonomy and initiative on the basis of principled reflection, rather than 
simply conforming to the dictates of others, it is difficult to see how this could be squared 
with a model which – by definition – actually requires conformity to pre-specified 
objectives. Another way of putting this is to say that if some alleged competence initiative is 
so squarable with best current practices of professional training, it could not be a genuine 
competence model – and, conversely, insofar as it is so squarable, such training could hardly 
be genuinely professional. 
There are, to be sure, some complexities here. One issue upon which the argument turns is 
that the most vociferous opponents of competence initiatives in professional training have 
mainly deplored the behaviourist reductionism of cruder vocational models: such implacable 
opponents of competence as Hyland (1993, 1994) have rightly complained that one can 
hardly reduce the theoretical complexities of professional expertise to the kind of hands-on 
skills that a hairdresser or bricklayer might employ. However, Christie rightly observes that 
since the SOED Guidelines were not reductive in this sense, they are not open to any such 
anti-behaviourist objections. Indeed, much here has been made of the following passage 
from the 1993 Guidelines:  
In these Guidelines the term ‘professional competences should be taken to refer to 
knowledge, understanding, critical thinking and positive attitudes, as well as to 
practical skills. In order to teach satisfactorily, certain craft skills have undoubtedly to 
be mastered. But in addition teachers must have a knowledge and understanding both 
of the content of their teaching and of the relationship between their methods and 
children’s learning, and must be able to evaluate and justify their procedures to 
others.’ (SOED 1993) 
It appears that the authors of the Guidelines believed that by introducing references to 
knowledge as well as skills they had effectively insured the SOED competences against the 
standard anti-behaviourist criticisms of such models – and that Christie also believes this to 
have been so. In short, it seems to have been widely believed that in terms of my above 
dichotomy between competence and professional models, the SOED initiative could not be 
regarded as a reductive competence model. I believe, however, that this view is mistaken and 
that the SOED model, though not strictly behaviourist, nevertheless bears the main hallmarks 
of a competence model.  
Perhaps the key consideration is that although the SOED model speaks of knowledge and 
even critical thinking, it is doubtful whether anything in the proposal departs radically from 






sentence from the report is at least interestingly equivocal: for whereas talk of being able to 
‘justify their procedures to others’ could mean coming to develop independent professional 
initiative, it could just as well mean bottom-up answerability to the directives of appropriate 
line-managers. Moreover, while I do not insist that this is the way that this point would have 
to be taken, it seems that little in the detail of the document does much to substantiate the 
idea of knowledge as independent critical thought, and much more seems focused on 
ensuring that trainees are acquainted with appropriate local and central documentation and 
directives. Nowhere, perhaps more tellingly, was it suggested that critical professional 
thinking might be concerned with questioning the wisdom of competence models as such.  
In any case, a more general problem with even the SOED ‘knowledge-based’ competence 
model lies in a strong suggestion that the kinds of expertise of lesson planning, pupil 
organization and classroom discipline needed by educational professionals are apt for 
analysis and evaluation as value-neutral or normatively uncontroversial (albeit principled) 
skills – an implication that also seems underscored in the Guidelines by separate (and 
secondary) treatment of values and skills. Apart from the fact that, as I have argued 
elsewhere (Carr 2000, 2003), it seems mistaken and distortive to regard all kinds of 
professional teacher expertise as skills, it seems clear that many of the so-called skills of 
competence models amount to little more than broad indications of professional desiderata 
that are also deeply contested. The plain fact is that since teaching is itself a morally 
normative practice which is apt to enshrine different concepts of human flourishing and 
association, what counts as good lesson presentation or good discipline is open to wide and 
variable interpretation. The pros and cons of such different concepts are of course open to 
rational debate and discussion on principled (logical, empirical and normative) grounds, but 
by that very token it seems dubious to suggest that the evaluation of even pre-teacher 
professionalism might be liable to top-down checklist measurement against a standard of 
good practice about which all are mainly agreed. 
In arguing against competence models of teacher professionalism, I have often been asked to 
present my own alternative model. The only proper answer to this challenge, I believe, is to 
deny that that it is my business as a teacher educator to promote any one model. On the 
contrary, as an educator of professionals, my job is to acquaint trainee teachers with as many 
different conceptions of good or effective educational practice as possible, and to equip them 
with the rational capacities and resources to evaluate these in an intelligent and responsible 
way. Likewise, as a teaching supervisor, it is arguably not my job to tell trainees what to do, 






unanticipated) problems they may face on their placements – with an ultimate view to 
enabling them think for themselves as professionals should. Students themselves more 
usually want to be told what to do: I have even had it complained to me that it is a fault of 
their courses that lecturers will say different and incompatible things about good practice in 
their lectures – since lecturers really ought to agree. It should hardly need saying, however, 
that the key to any robust (as opposed to restricted) professional initiation is coming to 
embrace such different perspectives, and to be able to deal with them in a reflective, 
principled and responsible way. In this light, any ‘model’ of professional effectiveness or 
competence which serves to undermine this goal should be viewed with suspicion. That said, 
I should also want (in the name of consistency) to encourage no less of a critical professional 
attitude to any anti-competence arguments I have presented in this short paper. 
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